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During the cultural and philosophical shift of 10th-century Arabo-Islamic society, 
Isfahani (d. 967) compiled his renowned, multi-volume anthology the Book of Songs 
(Kitab al-Aghani). In the Aghani, Isfahani curates four centuries of poetry and lore 
(akhbar). Among the chapters of the Aghani are those he devotes to 7th-century tragic 
love (udhri) poets, including Majnun Layla, Qays Lubna, Dhu ‘l-Rumma Mayya, and 
Kuthayyir Azza. Within these chapters, the way in which Isfahani curates the source ma-
terial foregrounds contradictions and ambiguities and toys with expectations of narrative 
linearity and finality. We find no comprehensive, authoritative narratives around the per-
sonalities in Isfahani’s text. Instead, the Aghani disrupts the familiar features of popular 
stories and thwarts attempts to distill them into truisms. 
Although scholars have long recognized the Aghani as a masterpiece of Arabic 
literature, they have generally confined it to the reference shelf as a source of facts. 
Scholarship on the Aghani has largely focused on its quality as a reliable reference and 
    vii 
often views the text’s contradictions and ambiguities as byproducts of Isfahani’s sup-
posed commitment to accuracy. 
This dissertation explores the literary quality of the Aghani in light of the cultural 
and philosophical transformation in which it was produced. I offer an approach to classi-
cal Arabic literature that embraces the postmodern concerns that are consistent with the 
cosmopolitanism of 10th-century Arabo-Islamic society. I draw upon Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s notion of the “rhizomatic” book and Bakhtin’s theory of “dialogism” to demon-
strate that Isfahani treatment of udhri lore calls attention to patterns and to fields of expe-
rience to which universal laws cannot apply. This orientation inspires pursuits of 
knowledge through wonder and produces a kind of knowledge that demands and culti-
vates a mind capable of thinking in multiplicities and contextualities. 
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Introduction 
 
In the 10th century, “a noticeable renaissance was in evidence” in Arabo-Islamic 
society that was characterized by “an autochthonous Islamic egalitarianism and human-
ism” (Ali, “Abbasid Public Sphere” 471) and it is during this cultural and philosophical 
shift that Abū ‘l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī (d. 967) compiles his renowned, multi-volume antholo-
gy the Book of Songs (Kitāb al-Aghānī). Iṣfahānī’s project spans over 9,000 pages in its 
current form and curates four centuries of poetry, musical notes, and lore (akhbār, sing.: 
khabar) surrounding Arabic songs and Arabic-speaking poets. Iṣfahānī arranges this in-
herited knowledge into chapters, usually introduced by songs, each devoted to a particu-
lar poet, composer, or event. Among these chapters are those devoted to the narratives 
and poetry of 7th-century tragic love (ʿudhrī) poets, and this dissertation examines four 
such chapters of Iṣfahānī’s Aghānī. In particular, I consider the way in which Iṣfahānī 
relates and curates akhbār around the stories of Majnūn Laylā, Qays Lubnā, Dhū ‘l-
Rumma Mayya, and Kuthayyir ʿAzza. These ʿudhrī love stories dramatize the all-
consuming infatuation with an unattainable beloved that often leads to the lover’s death. 
Within these chapters, the way in which Iṣfahānī curates the source material—poetry and 
narrative reports—foregrounds divergences and ambiguities and toys with expectations 
of narrative linearity and finality. We find no comprehensive, authoritative narratives 
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around the personalities of poets and composers in Iṣfahānī’s text. Instead, the Kitāb al-
Aghānī disrupts the familiar features of popular stories and thwarts attempts to distill the-
se narratives into truisms. 
PROBLEMATIZING THE FIELD 
 Classical Arabic literature in general has had a difficult reception in modern 
scholarship—one that spans from romantic fascination (J. Stetkevych, “Arabic Poetics”) 
and overwhelming disgust to boredom (Sells, “Qasida”). The assumptions that emerged 
from this reception, it seems, underlie the difficulty scholars have had in appreciating and 
approaching the Kitāb al-Aghānī as literature. Michael Sells argues that in Euro-America, 
up until recently, the Arabic ode (qaṣīda) has been subject to stereotypes and arbitrary 
criteria for literary judgments, which led to conclusions that the qaṣīda itself is stereo-
typed and arbitrary. Sells’s discussion of the literary engagement of classical Arabic liter-
ature focuses on the qaṣīda because a great deal of the scholarship in the field focuses 
itself on the qaṣīda, while relegating other literary genres as sources of historical refer-
ence. Classical Arabic literary genres based on akhbār pose a particular challenge to 
modern Euro-American aesthetic expectations. As such, scholars have tended to seek to 
tame the foreignness of akhbār-based genres through questions about the authenticity of 
isnād1 and through historical approaches. Such approaches ignore the literary value of the 
                                                
1 Akhbār are usually made up of chains of transmitters (isnād), an authorizing technique 
much like the present-day use of footnotes or endnotes, which precede the anecdotal con-
tent (matn) they relate the path the matn took in reaching its ultimate compiler and thus 
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form and content and view literary concerns to be at odds with historical concerns, which 
they take to involve a preoccupation with fact-based accuracy. 
 The bulk of the studies that treat Iṣfahānī’s Kitāb al-Aghānī involve efforts to 
tame the text and bring order to it by attempting to resolve internal divergences and to 
find and impose a conventional logic for its organization of narrative reports, chapters, 
and songs. Over the last two centuries, scholars have published abridgments, indices, de-
scriptions, and translations of the text. Recent scholarship engaging Kitāb al-Aghānī 
tends to employ the text as a reference text for fleshing out the histories and biographies 
                                                                                                                                            
the audience.  While the inclusion of isnād became essentially a necessity for ḥadīth texts 
as well as an important keystone for establishing authenticity, especially as they took on 
legal and legitimizing weight, the necessity and function of isnād in akhbār texts were 
not conventionally predetermined. Rather, the presentation of sources (isnād) of particu-
lar matn and their effect on the reception of the matn can be interpreted in diverse ways. 
While at times the isnād of akhbār texts, like ḥadīth, can appear to attempt to establish 
credibility and legitimacy, their employment can also offer more varied effects on the re-
ception. At times, compilers of akhbār texts (akhbāriyyīn) include incomplete or labyrin-
thine isnād as well as isnād that propose impossible relationships between transmitters. 
As Beatrice Gruendler points out, akhbār raise “assumptions and expectations on the part 
of author and audience,” and isnād, in supposing “a conventional truth claim,” can un-
dermine or raise doubt about that claim (90).  
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of the people and events it stages.2 Hilary Kilpatrick’s Making the Great Book of Songs, 
however, states an aim to treat Kitāb al-Aghānī as a work of “literature in its own right” 
(n.p.) and expresses surprise regarding “the paucity of studies of the Aghānī as a literary 
work (rather than as a source for social history, musical life, poetic criticism, diglossia, 
and a number of other topics)” (vii). Kilpatrick investigates the internal logic of the text, 
highlighting Iṣfahānī’s skill in compiling, arranging, and commenting on the akhbār. 
While Kilpatrick’s observations are both numerous and thought-provoking, her study fo-
cuses on practical concerns of compilation and organization and remains preoccupied 
with the truth/falsehood binary. Specifically, Kilpatrick, among others, argues that 
Iṣfahānī’s extensive use of paratextual conventions such as isnād, far from undermining 
authority or foregrounding the text’s status as a work of art, point to a “constant preoccu-
pation” with accuracy (Kilpatrick, Great Book 111) and a concern that his text be “re-
spected as a reliable, accurate transmission” (Binkley 153). As such, her work views am-
biguities and divergences in Kitāb al-Aghānī as circumstantial byproducts of Iṣfahānī’s 
presumed concern for accuracy. 
 Of course, there are also those scholars who view the Aghānī’s production of am-
biguities and divergences as functionless vestiges of an irrelevant tradition, i.e., isnād, 
that contribute nothing to the historical, literary, or symbolic weight of the text. For ex-
ample, in his introduction to his 1961 abridgment of the Aghānī, Ahmad Kamal Zaki ex-
plains that the Aghānī is “difficult…for the modern reader” due to its “isnāds…and re-
                                                
2 See Khairallah and Khan 
   5 
ports, which contradict each other, do not keep to the point and are not arranged chrono-
logically” (qtd. in Kilpatrick, Great Book 5). In Hilary Kilpatrick’s words, Zaki portrays 
“old texts” as “trackless waste in which the reader soon loses his way” (Great Book 5). In 
deeming the traditional function of isnād irrelevant, Zaki precludes the possibility that 
they might function in new ways in the text such that they consciously call into question 
their own function. The number of abridgments of the Aghānī that remove narrative di-
vergences and isnād altogether suggests that other abridgers share this view.3 In remov-
ing these elements of the text, these abridgers shy away from confronting Iṣfahānī’s pecu-
liar arrangement of akhbār and use of isnād in the Aghānī, which function to pose diffi-
culty for the reader and make him “lose his way.” Rather than addressing the questions 
raised by the text’s peculiar mode, this approach conveniently erases such peculiarities, 
once again stripping the text of its artistic value and performative impact.  
 The scholars noted above, among others, such as Asʿad Khairallah and Ṭaha 
Ḥusayn (d. 1973), do back away at times from concerns of accuracy when celebrating the 
literary value of what is contained in the text and the stories of the ʿudhrī (tragic love) 
tradition in particular. In this celebration, however, the Aghānī itself is relegated to the 
reference shelf and allowed to function only as a source or documentation of literary 
works rather than as a work of literature in its own right. Thus, even as scholarship on the 
Aghānī as a source for the ʿudhrī tradition has trended towards interpretations of the sto-
ries within the text as “a literary work that fascinated people’s imagination” (Khairallah 
                                                
3 See ʿAwn, Yūsuf, for example.  
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93), interest in the Aghānī’s production of ambiguities and divergences has been tossed 
aside as part and parcel of the prevailing, misguided interest in historicity and validity. 
Rather than incorporating these techniques into new, literary readings of the Aghānī and 
its presentation of these stories, the divergent akhbār are treated as raw material from 
which cohesive narratives of symbolic importance can be drawn.  
 At times these scholars attribute literary value to Iṣfahānī’s Aghānī itself. In doing 
so, however, they presume an inherent, inescapable tension between literature and histo-
ry. Kilpatrick, for example, attempts to approach the Aghānī as “a work of literature in its 
own right,” but her study of the text nonetheless concludes that “accuracy may…be as-
sumed to have been a constant preoccupation of [Iṣfahānī’s] throughout the time he was 
working on the book” (Great Book 111). Thus, despite her aim to treat the text as litera-
ture, Kilpatrick imposes issues of objective accuracy and validity upon it. Although she 
deems Iṣfahānī’s use of isnād in the text “modern,” pointing to examples wherein the au-
thor consciously employs the technique of isnād “with his tongue in his cheek,” (“Mo-
dernity” 252-3) she nonetheless views the author’s literary (adab) interests, and “com-
mitment to accuracy” as fundamentally incompatible (Great Book 45). By setting up 
Iṣfahānī as an author caught between two conflicting “urges”—to be faithful to historical 
accuracy and to include “representative material in the spirit of adab”—Kilpatrick frames 
ambiguities and apparent contradictions in the Aghānī as a byproduct of this dual focus, 
based on the premise that history and literature are inherently at odds with one another 
(“Genuine” 104-5; Great Book 43-45, 104-119). She further accuses scholars who seek to 
demonstrate Iṣfahānī’s innovative use of narrative divergences, particularly ʿAbdullah al-
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Simṭī, despite his claim to the contrary, of “ignorance of the true nature of literary con-
ventions of classical Arabic prose compilations, and indeed of the literary culture of the 
time” (Kilpatrick, Great Book 11). That is, for Kilpatrick, whenever his commitment to 
accuracy can explain his choices as a compiler, further interrogation of those choices 
should be avoided in order not to draw interpretations inappropriate to the literary con-
ventions of the text. However, it would appear that rather than conveying ignorance of 
the literary conventions of “classical Arabic prose compilations,” al-Simṭī consciously 
breaks away from the limiting interpretative conventions of modernist scholarship of 
those prose compilations.4 
 The preoccupation of modern scholarship on the Aghānī with the text’s presumed 
attempt to report poetry and lore with “accuracy” reflects a positivist and presentist ap-
proach to the text, along with other akhbār texts. This approach to the Aghānī seems to 
stem from its initial confinement to the reference shelf as a source of literary history ra-
ther than as a work of literature in its own right. ʿAbdullah al-Simṭī makes a similar ob-
servation about the scholarly reception of the text, pointing out that “we always confine 
[the Aghānī] to the framework of this limiting [historical, scientific] view” (108). Even 
                                                
4 Indeed, al-Simṭī begins his study of the Aghānī by declaring his conscious departure 
from the prevailing reception of the text: “The magic of the Kitāb al-Aghānī is that it 
broke with and rendered ineffectual our historic (scientific) approach which we apply to 
sources of Arabic heritage…[nevertheless,] it is this [historical, scientific] view that is 
applied to the Kitāb al-Aghānī; however, I see [we should approach it] otherwise” (108).  
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when scholars set out to appreciate the text as literature, this conventional relegation con-
tinues to inform how questions of the Aghānī’s compilation and curation are addressed. 
In particular, these scholars admit, albeit indirectly, the effect of this unique compilation 
and curation of akhbār on the audience, but overlook their effect on the audience. In oth-
er words, while these scholars convey their own sensitivity to the text’s akhbār arrange-
ment and employment of isnād, rather than exploring those prominent characteristics of 
the text, they eliminate them as artistic concerns worth considering by explaining it away 
as a concern for documentational accuracy. 
METHODS 
 The persistent positivist and presentist approach to akhbār texts tends to overlook 
the culture of adab5 during the 10th century. In contrast to modern evaluations, judg-
ments of narratives were not based on their perceived truthfulness in literal representa-
                                                
5 Adab, a key term in classical Arabic literature, includes, as Samer Ali argues, not only 
“a corpus of varied literary knowledge…that a littérateur must know” and “the constella-
tion of courtly manners and tastes to be conditioned and exhibited,” but also often-
overlooked social dimensions of acquiring, producing, and performing that corpus of 
knowledge, manners, and tastes (Salons 33). Adab knowledge belongs to Arabic 
knowledge (ʿulūm ʿarabiyya), which refers to the branch of knowledge that must be “per-
sonally transmitted” (manqūla) or else would be irretrievably lost (Salons 14). It is adab 
knowledge, knowledge that relies on and emerges from performance, in particular that I 
intend in my discussion of knowledge production in this dissertation.   
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tions of people and events, but rather on the artfulness of interpretations of people and 
events (Ali, Salons 5). Furthermore, the scholarship’s preoccupation with literal represen-
tations of people and events discounts the skepticism, relativism of truth, and rejection of 
binary divisions that defined adab culture of 10th century Arabo-Islamic society (Kraem-
er xxviii; Ali 1). 
 While scholarship on akhbār sources, for the most part, continues to be largely 
occupied with questions of facticity and reliability, the work of Marshall Hodgson, Su-
zanne Stetkevych, Tayyib El-Hibri, and Samer Ali seeks to interpret and explore these 
literary devices and the narrative strategies at work in these sources. Hodgson, the cele-
brated author of the three-volume work The Venture of Islam, made great efforts to draw 
attention to the misguidedness inherent in imposing modernist notions of accuracy onto 
akhbār texts. His work reflects a keen awareness that for medieval “Islamicate” littéra-
teurs, “accuracy as to ‘fact’ was much less important than validity as to life-vision” 
(Hodgson, “Two pre-modern” 62). In Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, El-Hibri 
continues in this vein in his consideration of how medieval Islamic historiography active-
ly engages readers, narrators, and listeners to offer historical commentary. His study 
demonstrates how symbolism, allusion, innuendo, symmetry, and intertextuality convey 
authorial aims in ways that challenge the reader’s perception of history and his or her 
place within it. Ali demonstrates in his study of Arabic literary salons that the adab cul-
ture of the classical period was inextricably linked to the culture of sociability and charm. 
Of particular interest here is Ali’s theorization of a performer’s responsibility to his audi-
ence, which often demanded both performance and textual adjustments in order to attract 
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and hold the audience’s attention. These performative pressures, he suggests, “might be 
instrumental to understanding how banal, literal lives and events were transmuted into the 
artistic, figurative truths that have greater potential to move, persuade, and inspire” (Ali 
Salons 58). The concerns involved in transmitting knowledge, then, were not so much 
focused around perceived truthfulness in literal representations of people and events but 
rather on the artfulness of their figurative truths.  
 This dissertation builds on the work of these scholars. Following the lead of this 
“narrative turn,” my approach employs methods that attend to the role of performance 
and the social production of knowledge in adab culture. By exploring the literary quality 
of the Kitāb al-Aghānī in light of the cultural and philosophical shift in which it was pro-
duced, I offer an approach to medieval Arabic literature that embraces the postmodern 
concerns that are consistent with the cosmopolitanism of Arabo-Islamic society of the 
10th century. 
I also draw on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari and their notion of 
the “rhizomatic” book, in particular.  The “rhizomatic book,” which they set in opposition 
with the rooted, tree-like book, is decentered and has multiple points of entry and exit. 
The rhizome is “always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo.” (Deleuze 
& Guattari Plateaus 27). Like a rhizome, Iṣfahānī’s text establishes connections between 
people, events, and thoughts, and the nomadic movements between them have no clear 
beginning or end. Conceiving Iṣfahānī’s Kitāb al-Aghānī thusly as a rhizomatic book, I 
follow Deleuze and Guattari’s invitation to ask not what a book means but instead how it 
functions and with what it functions (Plateaus 4) and to consider the impact of the 
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Aghānī on the audience and the ways in which it can function with its audience, 10th cen-
tury Arabo-Islamic society, and the ʿudhrī tradition. 
 I also adapt Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of “dialogism.” For Bakhtin, the author of a 
dialogic work draws in “languages of heteroglossia,” i.e., voices that emerge from social, 
professional, temporal, and generic stratification, to indirectly express “his intentions and 
values,” so that the author’s creativity and originality lie in the combination of elements 
not in the elements themselves (291-92). The akhbār genre, much like the novel, fore-
grounds many perspectives in addition to that of the narrator, ingests other genres, and 
does not posit the authority of one perspective over others. Following Bakhtin’s lead, 
then, I explore the interpretive possibilities of the way in which Iṣfahānī orchestrates a 
diversity of voices in the Aghānī in order to argue for an artistic function of the inclusion, 
arrangement, and orchestration of akhbār beyond “mere” contextualization, as some 
scholars suggest.  
THESIS 
 While previous approaches to the Aghānī treat Iṣfahānī’s work as a rich jumble 
that needs to be sorted out and needs to have its perceived extraneous appendages re-
moved before literary interpretation can proceed, this dissertation considers the Aghānī’s 
full presentation of these ʿudhrī stories and, in particular, the literary function of the ar-
rangement of akhbār including the isnād. I examine the way in which Iṣfahānī advances 
literary uses of the anecdotal (akhbār)-style texts in his Kitāb al-Aghānī and will explore 
the implications for reception of the text therein. I demonstrate that Iṣfahānī’s text can be 
read as a rhizome through its “variation, expansion, and offshoots” (Deleuze & Guattari 
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Plateaus 27). The chapters devoted to the ʿudhrī poets offer variations on tragic love, ex-
panding into stories on madness, sincerity, and authenticity, which in turn become explo-
rations of the circulation and reception of cultural production. Each repetition of a song 
offers a variation—in the lyrics, narrative setting, or musical setting—and expands the 
poetic corpus and lore. Characters, poetry, and events overlap, creating offshoots and 
multiple entryways, and exits (Deleuze and Guattari Plateaus 226). 
 In drawing upon the work of Bakhtin, Deleuze, and Guattari, I demonstrate that 
Iṣfahānī’s treatment of ʿudhrī lore calls attention to patterns and to fields of human expe-
rience to which universal laws cannot apply and thus produces a mode of knowledge that 
demands and cultivates thinking in multiplicities and relativities through which 
knowledge continues to be produced. 
CHAPTERS LAYOUT 
This dissertation considers Iṣfahānī’s curation of akhbār, isnād, and poetry in the 
Aghānī’s chapters devoted to four ʿudhrī love poets and suggests that the text performs 
these stories as open, malleable, and unsettled. Part I, which comprises chapters 1 
through 3, is titled “Mad Wonder.” In it, I examine and compare two particular chapters 
of Iṣfahānī’s Kitāb al-Aghānī, “The Lore and Lineage of Majnun of the Banu Amir” 
(“Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu”) and “Narrations, Lineage, and Lore of 
Qays bin Dharih” (“Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi”), to exemplify 
the ways in which the text produces this kind of knowledge by provoking mad wonder in 
the audience. Titled “The Social Production of Knowledge,” Part II comprises chapters 4 
and 5 and explores the Aghānī chapters “Narrations and Lore of Dhu l’Rumma” (“Dhikr 
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Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabarihi”) and “Narrations of the Lore and Lineages of Kuthayyir” 
(“Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi”) to argue that Iṣfahānī’s narration of these sto-
ries calls attention to the social production of knowledge through a play with ambiva-
lence. 
 Chapter 1, which is titled “Iṣfahānī’s Invitation to Madness in the Story of 
Majnūn Laylā,” examines the Aghānī’s chapter on Majnūn Laylā (“Akhbār Majnūn Banī 
ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu”) and departs from the view of the Aghānī as a verifiable source of 
poetry, histories, and biographies, instead making a case for a literary approach to 
Iṣfahānī’s text that is fitting with the concept of adab. The “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir 
wa Nasabuhu” confronts the audience with unresolving divergent knowledge about 
Majnūn, whose name means “Madman.” We are left not only wondering about his name, 
his origin, and his mental state, but also his being—does he even exist? I engage 
Deleuze’s articulation of difference and Bakhtin’s theory of “dialogism’ to consider the 
potential performative impact of Iṣfahānī’s selection, arrangement, and presentation of 
the voices of the akhbār and employment of isnād on audience that engages in the text. 
That is, I consider the relationship of Iṣfahānī’s text, a text that stages performance and 
inspires performance, with and its orientation toward its audience. The first half of this 
chapter examines the introductory section of the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa 
Nasabuhu” to suggest that the line of questions we are compelled as an audience to ask 
about Majnūn implicates us in his madness and the madness of the text, as it disrupts and 
complicates that which appears most essential to his story and provokes us to wonder 
(ʿajab). The second half of the chapter further suggests that the introductory section of 
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“Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” frames knowledge not as certainty but as an 
emergent product and driving force of wonder that renders the passionate knowledge-
seekers among us mad.  
 Chapter 2 is titled “A Touch of Something: The Story of Majnūn Laylā” and fur-
ther explores the role of madness in “The Lore and Lineage of Majnun of the Banu Amir” 
(“Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu”). In “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa 
Nasabuhu,” Iṣfahānī constructs an impossible timeline in narrating the story of Majnūn 
and his descent into madness after falling in love with Laylā. We repeatedly encounter in 
this chapter a paradoxical refrain about Majnūn: “He was not majnūn, rather he had some 
lawtha (a touch of something) in him.” In this chapter, I examine Iṣfahānī’s presentation 
of time through akhbār and deployment of this phrase to suggest that it challenges audi-
ences’ assumptions and refocuses the question of madness toward lawtha, which I argue 
we might read as “a touch of something,” “an in-betweenness,” and “a socially contin-
gent marker of difference” based on its deployment in this and other chapters of the 
Aghānī. Drawing upon Shoshana Felman’s theorization of madness and writing, I argue 
that, in keeping with this notion of lawtha, Iṣfahānī presents madness as relative, socially 
contingent, and transitory in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu,” such that it 
breaks down boundaries between madness and sanity and collapses cause and cure into 
one: the figure of Laylā.   
 Chapter 3, “Problematizing Rationality in Iṣfahānī's Qays Lubnā Narrative,” con-
trasts the presentation of the Qays Lubnā story in the Aghānī with its narration of the 
Majnūn Laylā story. In Chapters 1 and 2, we see how Iṣfahānī presents Majnūn’s story in 
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a “disordered” arrangement of divergent akhbār. In this chapter, I demonstrate how 
Iṣfahānī relates the Qays Lubnā legend, in contrast, as a straightforward, seemingly co-
herent chronologically-arranged narrative. As I point out, however, we also find that the 
stories of Qays Lubnā and Majnūn Laylā share narrative motifs, plot details, poetic verse, 
and distinctive phrasings in akhbār. Iṣfahānī’s selection, arrangement, and presentation of 
akhbār and employment of isnād in “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” 
differ vastly from that of “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu,” which I explored 
in Chapters 1 and 2. The collective narration that characterizes the majority of “Dhikr 
Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” is relatively free of divergences and reaf-
firms the audience’s sense of the world and preconceptions, and its straightforward narra-
tive seems to fly in the face of the Aghānī’s project of destabilizing authoritative 
knowledge. In this chapter, I examine the different narrative techniques Iṣfahānī employs 
in the Aghānī and their distinct effects on the audience, drawing again on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s rhizomatic theory. I argue that this collective narration, along with Iṣfahānī’s 
emphasis on the correctness of the akhbār and the theme of union in the story itself, 
seems to promote the knowledge of certainty and the cohesion of reason. I further argue 
that the way in which the type of divergence we encounter at the end “Dhikr Qays bin 
Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” points to the absurdity that adherence to reason inevi-
tably produces, undermining this mode of knowledge, and instilling a sense of mad won-
der in the audience.  
 Chapter 4, “Reframing the ‘Authenticity’ of Dhū ‘l-Rumma in the Aghānī” con-
siders the concept of “authenticity” as a metaconcern in Iṣfahānī’s portrayal of  Dhū ‘l-
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Rumma in the Aghānī. The “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabarihi,” confronts us with great 
ambivalence around the poetry attributed to Dhū ‘l-Rumma, a famed Bedouin poet who 
problematizes poetry for the urbanizing Islamic society. I consider the receptive ambiva-
lence Iṣfahānī relates around Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry and offer a reading of the text that 
suggests the Aghānī attempts not to resolve this receptive ambivalence but to appreciate 
his poetry’s provocative in-betweenness. Engaging Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism once 
again and Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the “rhizomatic book,” I argue that Iṣfahānī’s 
use of  Dhū ‘l-Rumma promotes an approach to poetry that foregrounds complexity and 
opens it up to a wider range of interpretation and inquiry. First, I suggest that the 
Aghānī’s review of the audience response to Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry conveys ambiva-
lence among poets and scholars and calls into question the value of pure aesthetics. In the 
next section, I argue that the “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabarihi” connects this ambiva-
lence with the question of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s authenticity and rejects the validity of ques-
tions of authenticity, instead calling attention to the complexity of the notion of identity. 
Finally, I examine the stories of “false” attribution and plagiarism in the “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-
Rumma wa Khabarihi” to suggest the ways in which the chapter demonstrates that poetic 
style and skill, a poet’s public persona, and the perception of the audience are all subject 
to change and alteration and dictate how poetry should be received and understood.
 Chapter 5, titled “Sincerity in the Story of Kuthayyir ʿAzza,” directly explores the 
way in which the Aghānī can be read as foregrounding the social production of 
knowledge in “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi.” “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa 
Nasabihi,” like “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabarihi,” confronts the audience with great 
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ambivalence. The narrators in this Aghānī chapter stage the poet Kuthayyir as disingenu-
ous, especially as a lover of ʿAzza, and transgressive toward social norms. Nevertheless, 
Iṣfahānī’s orchestration of the narrators’ voices in this chapter provokes skepticism in the 
audience towards Kuthayyir’s critics and sympathy towards Kuthayyir himself despite his 
disrespect toward patriarchal tradition and societal norms, his bizarre behavior, and the 
doubts around his professed love for ʿAzza. Drawing further on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
notion of the “rhizomatic book,” I examine this orchestration of voices in “Dhikr Akhbār 
Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” and argue that by redirecting criticism toward the critics and 
skeptics, Iṣfahānī leaves the question of Kuthayyir’s sincerity open. I suggest that he 
dramatizes the skepticism around Kuthayyir to cast the figure of Kuthayyir in the role of 
an unavoidable reminder of the instability of narrative as a form of knowledge that claims 
to distinguish truth from mendacity and “sincerity” from deceit. 
NOTES ON TRANSLATIONS AND TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM 
 Throughout this dissertation, I use the transliteration system of the International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES) for all Arabic words and names with the ex-
ception of words that have entered the English language. In keeping with the IJMES sys-
tem, I have indicated elision with the definite marker alif-lām (al) for strings of words 
and proper names to form contractions when appropriate without indicated sun letter as-
similation. Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Arabic texts are my own.  
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PART I: MAD WONDER 
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Chapter 1 
Iṣfahānī’s Invitation to Madness in the  
Story of Majnūn Laylā 
 
O Qays, O Qays, 
Did you drive me mad or were you driven mad? 
Each of us blood, sleepless, in the end of the poem.6 
- Qāsim Ḥaddād (b. 1948) 
INTRODUCTION 
 “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” (“The Lore and Lineage of Majnun 
of the Banu Amir”) organizes knowledge of Majnūn in the form of akhbār (lore) that ap-
parently contradict, and these akhbār begin to diverge from the moment the chapter 
opens: “He is—according to what those who scrutinized his origin and his story—Qays. 
It is said: Mahdī”7 (Iṣfahānī 3; vol II).8 This apparent contradiction in statements about 
                                                
6 Original text: 
ﺎﯾﻳوﻭ  ُﺲَﯿﻴﻗ ﺎﯾﻳ  ُﺲَﯿﻴﻗ/ِﻲَﻨﺘْﻨﱠﻨَﺟ َوﻭأﺃ ،٬َﺖِْﻨﻨُﺟ/َﺎﻧﻼِﻛ  ٌمﻡَدﺩ  ٌﺮِھﮪﮬﻫﺎَﺳ ِﻲﻓ َﺎﯾﻳﺎَﻘﺑ ةﺓَﺪﯿﻴَﺼﻘﻟاﺍ.  
7 All translations of Arabic into English are my own, unless otherwise indicated.  
8 All references to page numbers of the Aghānī in this dissertation are, unless otherwise 
indicated, to the Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya edition. 
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Majnūn’s name sets the tone of this Aghānī chapter, which is characterized by the morph-
ing of knowledge. As the akhbār proceed, claims about the poet’s name continue to di-
verge. In the first seventeen akhbār alone, we encounter five variations on his name: “his 
name is…Qays bin al-Malawwaḥ,…Qays bin Muʿādh,…al-Buḥturī bin al-Jaʿd,…al-
Aqraʿ bin Muʿādh,…[and] Mahdī bin al-Malawwaḥ” (Iṣfahānī 3-7; vol II). Each of these 
names consists of a given name, e.g., Qays, and a patronymic, e.g., al-Malawwaḥ, which 
is indicated by the word “bin,” meaning “son of.” These narrative reports shuffle ar-
rangements of various given names with various patronymics to form identity permuta-
tions for Majnūn, suggesting the continuous multiplication of his name-based identity.9 
We encounter given names that repeat (Qays and Mahdī) as do some patronymics (al-
Malawwaḥ and Muʿādh). As such, we find certain given names matched with more than 
one patronymic, as with Qays bin al-Malawwaḥ and Qays bin Muʿādh, and certain patro-
nymics matched with multiple given names, as with Qays bin Muʿādh and al-Aqraʿ bin 
Muʿādh. These permutations suggest a set of given names and patronymics from which 
new names can be born. Based on these examples, one might assume that these names are 
generated from a limited set of possibilities. However, in one example, both the given 
name and the patronymic are replaced by previously unmentioned names, i.e., Buḥturī 
bin al-Jaʿd. This inclusion of a completely unique name suggests not only the potential 
for further permutations of those already mentioned, such that al-Aqraʿ bin al-Jaʿd could 
                                                
9 As we will see in what follows, the unfixedness of Majnūn’s identity is not limited to 
the identity indicated by names and extends to his origin, mental state, and actuality.  
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also perhaps be his name, but also for the potential introduction of new names that would 
generate unfettered permutations.  
 If we cannot know Majnūn through his name, perhaps we can come to know him 
in some other way. However, Iṣfahānī also confronts us with divergent knowledge with 
regard to his origin: some narrators say he is from the Banū ʿĀmir, some say he is not. 
One of the nobles of the powerful Quraysh tribe, Nawfal bin Musāḥiq’s (d. 693), for ex-
ample, related that when he “set out to collect [poetry?] from the Banū ʿĀmir, [he] saw 
the Madman” who recited for him (2: 5). The literary scholar al-Madāʾnī (d. 843) tells us 
that “the Madman (al-majnūn) famous among people for his poetry is the companion of 
Laylā, Qays bin Muʿādh of the Banū ʿĀmir (2: 5). The father of the Islamic scholar 
Ḥamād bin Isḥāq (d. 880) and the literary scholar Abū Ziyād al-Kulābī (d. 815) also tell 
us that “the Madman” (al-majnūn) was from the Banū ʿĀmir (2: 5, 6). At the same time, 
however, we hear twice from the narrator Ayyūb bin Abāya that when he “asked each 
clan of the Banū ʿĀmir tribe one by one about Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir..[he] didn’t find any-
one who” knew him (2: 4, 10). Ibn al-Aʿrābī also, for example, tells us that “a group from 
the Banū ʿĀmir were asked about the Madman (al-majnūn) and did not know him” (2: 
10). We also learn very early on in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” that even 
Majnūn’s identity as a madman is unfixed: some say he is mad, such as those narrators 
mentioned above who go so far as to deem him the Madman (al-majnūn), while others 
say he is not. Al-Aṣmaʿī in particular tells us directly that “he wasn’t mad (majnūn), ra-
ther he had a touch of something (lawtha) in him” (2: 3). 
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 After such divergent knowledge with regard to his lineage and his mental state, 
the audience encounters denials of Majnūn’s very existence: “‘The Madman’ (al-majnūn) 
is a metaphor. It has no actuality. And there is no origin or lineage for him from the Banū 
ʿĀmir”10 (Iṣfahānī 2: 10). After presenting pages of divergent akhbār about his name, 
origin, and mental state, Iṣfahānī raises the question of Majnūn’s fundamental existence: 
he is a metaphor without actuality. In this way, Iṣfahānī presents questions about 
Majnūn’s identity as interconnected, weaving them together in ways that escape resolu-
tion. 
 This foregrounding of difference characterizes Iṣfahānī’s presentation of akhbār in 
this chapter of the Aghānī, and he achieves this characteristic emphasis on difference 
through the juxtaposition of divergent narratives. I refer to this technique as “performa-
tive friction,” a term intended to call attention to the productive and adhesive function of 
plurality among unresolving divergent accounts in the form of both poetry and prose. By 
pointing to the performativity of this friction, I mean to call attention to two senses in 
which it functions. First, the resultant friction of these divergent accounts produces enig-
mas in each instance of reception. Second, this friction emerges from performance as a 
cultural practice, wherein the text both emerges from and presents itself for the perfor-
mance of adab knowledge in literary salons and other venues. What effect do this “per-
formative friction” and the enigmas it produces have on the story and on the audience’s 
                                                
10 Original text: 
 نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ ﻢﺳاﺍ  ٌرﺭﺎﻌﺘﺴﻣ ﻻ ﺔﻘﯿﻴﻘﺣ ،٬ﮫﻪﻟ ﺲﯿﻴﻟوﻭ ﮫﻪﻟ ﻲﻓ ﻲﻨﺑ ﺮﻣﺎﻋ  ٌﻞﺻأﺃ ﻻوﻭ  ٌﺐﺴﻧ.  
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experience of it? Why might Iṣfahānī destabilize our knowledge of Majnūn’s identity or 
very existence?  
 Such questions become preemptively null and void for most scholars of the 
Aghānī11 who tend to dismiss the possibility that “performative friction” in the text could 
serve artistic functions. Instead, these scholars take a positivist approach to the text in a 
way that excludes possible insights of other readings and limits interpretations of the text. 
This approach takes the competing akhbār to be evidence—even if deceptive or weak—
of Iṣfahānī’s true or feigned commitment to accuracy or a mere byproduct of that com-
mitment. That is, they suggest that out of a desire to produce, or a desire to appear to pro-
duce, a reliable source of knowledge, Iṣfahānī employed the scholarly technique of isnād 
(chain of transmitters), and this practice inevitably resulted in narrative divergence, fore-
closing the need to consider its performative effect. These evidentiary assumptions not 
only deny the Aghānī artistic value, they also necessarily dismiss possible literary read-
ings of the text.  
 In engaging akhbār-narratives, scholars of classical Arabic literature have been 
reluctant to follow what Martin Kreiswirth terms the “narrativist turn” in the humanities. 
In his essay “Trusting the Tale,” Kreiswirth chronicles the broad shift from a positivist 
approach to narrative as byproduct towards a “cross-disciplinary, theoretical concern with 
narrative as narrative” in the humanities over the past four decades (633). Samer Ali 
                                                
11 See Dawūd Sallūm, Walīd al-Aʿzamī, Hilary Kilpatrick (Great Book), ʾAbd al-Majīd 
Ayt ʿAbbū, ʿAbdullah ʿAli al-Sawiʿī 
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notes that while the mainstream of humanities has made the interpretation of narratives 
“as storied evaluations of people, places, and events” the norm, scholars in the field of 
classical Arabic literature and historiography tend toward a source-critical approach in 
which narrative is mined for “facts and details representing actual people, places, and 
events” (Salons 220). While, as Ali demonstrates, a narrativist trend is evident in the 
work of Suzanne Stetkevych, Tayyib El-Hibri, Marshall Hodgson, and others, which con-
sider the performative and social aspects of akhbār texts, the majority of Middle East 
scholarship tends either to distill akhbār narratives into a set of facts or to view akhbār 
sources “as largely accurate and referentially truthful, with rare fanciful exceptions” (Sa-
lons 219). 
 While scholars have clearly afforded a literary function to the poetry and stories 
that they consider to be contained in but external to the Aghānī, they oddly deny such a 
function to the Aghānī itself and allow it to function only as reference documentation of 
literature. Considering the conventions of classical Arabic prose compilations, however, 
this conventional practice of scholarship on medieval Arabic literature, which separates 
form from content, becomes untenable. The medieval Arabic concept of adab, often 
translated as “literature,” includes, as Samer Ali argues in his study of literary salons in 
medieval Islamic culture, not only the “varied literary knowledge…that a littérateur must 
know” and “courtly manners and tastes to be conditioned and exhibited,” but also the so-
cial dimensions of acquiring, producing, and performing that corpus of knowledge, man-
ners, and tastes (Salons 33). In relating adab knowledge, the Aghānī inevitably produces 
adab knowledge, and in collecting it, it necessarily performs it. The quality of such a per-
  25 
formance, as Samer Ali suggests, would be judged by “its impact expressed as audience 
reaction” (Salons 35). Thus, it is consistent with the conventions of classical Arabic prose 
compilations to consider the impact of Iṣfahānī’s presentation of his adab knowledge on 
the audience. Furthermore, collections of adab knowledge, themselves a type of adab, 
were not only expected to entertain in such a way as to gain its audience’s approval but 
were also commonly used as educational and didactic texts (Pellat n.p.). Thus, such col-
lections served both to inform and relate adab knowledge to those seeking to acquire 
knowledge for performance in literary salons and other venues and to cultivate a particu-
lar kind of habitus.  
 If the Aghānī produces adab knowledge, what kind of knowledge is it, and what 
kind of knowledge do we find in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu”? If we take 
adab knowledge, and specifically the knowledge of akhbār texts, to require certainty and 
finality, as scholars of the Aghānī have implied,12 the Aghānī would appear to present 
                                                
12 The expectation of certainty in knowledge to be gained from akhbār texts can be 
gleaned from the type of scholarly praise and criticism the Aghānī has received. As allud-
ed to above, scholars tend to assess the Aghānī’s contribution according to the reliability 
of knowledge it contains. For example, Dāwūd Sallūm, praises Iṣfahānī’s “precision 
(diqqa) and commitment (ḥirṣ) to faithful narration” as well as his attempt at “sound, un-
biased criticism,” which he estimates “make the Aghānī the most valuable, most reliable, 
and least exaggerated literary document in the Arabic language” (qtd. in al-Ṣawiʿī 259). 
Kilpatrick, similarly, argues that the Aghānī demonstrates Iṣfahānī’s “commitment to ac-
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Majnūn as thoroughly unknowable and to have failed grandly as a source of knowledge 
about the poet. But, being the longest of the chapters on the ʿudhrī poets, “Akhbār 
Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” is replete with knowledge—the audience becomes 
privy to 95 pages worth of his stories and poetry. Moreover, the Aghānī’s retelling of the 
Majnūn Laylā story has been the version upon which later poets and storytellers drew, 
which speaks to its impact on cultural memory.  
 In considering the kind of knowledge we find in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa 
Nasabuhu” and the effect of what I refer to as the “performative friction,” I draw on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome, as it offers a means to consider the effect 
of the kind of “multiplicities,” “variation, expansion, conquest, and offshoots” (Plateaus 
21) we find in this chapter, as well as Deleuze’s articulation of difference. Deleuze and 
Guattari theorize the rhizome as “a continuous self-vibrating region of intensities whose 
development avoids any orientation toward a culmination point or external end” (Plat-
eaus 22). As a multiplicity, the rhizome builds to a pitch of intensity without arriving at a 
resolution. Rather than resolving, the akhbār in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa 
                                                                                                                                            
curacy” (Great Book 45). In his criticism of the text, ʿAbd al-Majīd Ayt ʿAbbū also bases 
his assessment on its reliability. He argues that although many scholars in the field of 
adab and history consider the Kitāb al-Aghānī to be “one of the authoritative reference 
works for scientific (ʿilmī) and historic research” and “draw from its stories conclusions 
about religion, society, and history,” the book “does not come close to being a reliable 
authoritative source or a scientific resource” (Ayt ʿAbbū n.p.).  
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Nasabuhu” multiply knowledge by affirming divergent “truths.” For Deleuze, “the dis-
covery in any domain of a plurality of coexisting oppositions is inseparable from a more 
profound discovery, that of difference, which denounces the negative and opposition it-
self as no more than appearances in relation to the problematic field of a positive multi-
plicity” (Difference and Repetition 255). Furthermore, the paradox of “the affirmation of 
both senses or directions at the same time,” he theorizes, produces “a veritable becoming-
mad” (Logic 1). A “sort of groping experimentation” is implied in the Deleuzian ethics of 
“immanence,” which “resorts to measures that are not very respectable, rational, or rea-
sonable” (“What is Philosophy” 41). That is, the production of paradoxes invites the dis-
covery of difference and madness.  
 As I will argue, Iṣfahānī’s arrangement of the akhbār and the particular way he 
employs isnād draw the audience’s attention to the morphing of knowledge about 
Majnūn. The friction that results does not merely reflect a given reality but changes the 
audience’s perception of reality through an unrelenting confrontation with unresolving 
divergences that demands a mind capable of thinking in multiplicities and relativities. As 
an audience, we find that the more we learn and the more we “know” of Majnūn, the less 
certain we become, and the more we are driven to wonder. Like the beloved of the ʿudhrī 
tradition, Majnūn is beyond our reach. Indeed, we are not able to “know” him as he is 
presented in the Aghānī, but Iṣfahānī’s retelling of Majnūn’s story nonetheless and per-
haps precisely for that reason, provokes us to “get to know” him. The lover becomes the 
beloved, and the audience becomes the madman. In order to explore the way in which the 
Aghānī provokes us to madness, I make a case for a new reading of what I call the “per-
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formative friction” in the Aghānī, adapting Deleuze’s articulation of difference and para-
dox and Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of “dialogism.” Using the Majnūn Laylā chapter as an 
exemplary case, I demonstrate that divergent knowledge in the story as retold by Iṣfahānī 
is used to perform a particular conception of knowledge—one that has the capacity to 
perceive multiplicities and that is both driven by and coalesces with insatiable wonder-
ment. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, Iṣfahānī uses “performative friction” in 
“Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” to frame knowledge not as certainty but as 
wonder (ʿajab) that renders the passionate knowledge-seekers among us mad.  
AN INVITATION TO MADNESS 
 The first ten pages of “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu,” which com-
prise the introductory section to the chapter, present intense epistemological and ontolog-
ical friction about the character at the center of it all—Majnūn of the Banū ʿĀmir tribe. 
The divergent akhbār dismantle the most fundamental knowledge about Majnūn’s identi-
ty and existence. What is his name? Is he, as his nickname (laqab) suggests, mad? Is he 
one madman or many? Is he not a madman at all? Or is he simply not anyone to begin 
with? The line of questions we are compelled to ask implicate us in Majnūn’s madness 
and the madness of the text; we become confused and our minds dis-ordered as we chase 
after what seems at times to be figments of imagination.  
 The Aghānī is a compound narrative, a dialogue of different voices confronting 
one another. We encounter the speech of diverse genres—prose, poetry, and isnād—and 
the speech of diverse speakers—Iṣfahānī, the many narrators, and the various characters. 
The audience also adds its songs to the plurality of voices in Iṣfahānī’s narrative of 
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Majnūn Laylā, particularly as it places this narrative in interaction with the various ver-
sions of the romance that had been circulating in society mostly through oral transmission 
for over a century. How can, as Mikhail Bakhtin suggests, these diverse voices in diverse 
languages be understood to express Iṣfahānī’s authorial aims “in a refracted way” (Bakh-
tin Dialogic Imagination 324)? And what effect does this refracted delivery have on the 
message of this literary work or its effect?  
 Drawing from Bakhtin’s theory of “dialogism,” we might look to identify its 
power in the centrifugal and centripetal forces between these different voices. For Bakh-
tin, the author of a dialogic work pulls in “languages of heteroglossia,” i.e., languages 
that emerge from social, professional, temporal, and generic stratification, to indirectly 
express “his intentions and values,” creating a kind of performative friction, so that the 
author’s creativity and originality lie in the combination of elements not in the elements 
themselves (Dialogic Imagination 291-92). In the introduction to the Aghānī, Iṣfahānī 
proudly articulates his role in authoring the Aghānī as arranging akhbār, stories, charac-
ters, and tones in such a way that captivates the audience and drives wonder in it:  
It is the nature of the human to love moving from one thing to another and being 
delivered from the familiar and refreshed by newness. Every destination is more 
arousing than the place of departure. What is anticipated is more celebrated in the 
heart than what is present. So if these is true then what we have arranged is even 
more delightful and more admirable, offering the reciter, as he moves from one 
khabar to another, one story to another, ancient akhbār to modern akhbār, king to 
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subjects, seriousness to jest, the most spirited of readings and most arousing of 
page-turning of its diversities.13 (Iṣfahānī 1: 5) 
Iṣfahānī’s conceives of artistic excellence as that which provides the pleasure of differ-
ence and diversity. Our natural attraction to newness that he identifies echoes the state-
ment in the first book of the Odyssey, which observes that “men praise that song the most 
which comes the newest to their ear” (Homer 29). To achieve newness in his work, 
Iṣfahānī tells us that he exploits the variety of stories and songs in his hands in order to 
foreground difference. He invites the audience not only to spiritedness and arousal, but 
also to take note of this innovative approach to the akhbār form in which difference is 
foregrounded. Iṣfahānī arranges different voices—from ancient to modern, kings to sub-
jects, serious to jesting—to arouse and satisfy what the heart desires. Taking his lead, 
then, and engaging Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism, this study focuses on the way in which 
Iṣfahānī curates akhbār and toys with isnād. Iṣfahānī chooses the akhbār form, the most 
dialogic of available genres, and, as this study demonstrates, uses it to curate knowledge 
by creating ambiguities that do not coalesce to arrive at a singular point. As with Bakh-
                                                
13 Original text: 
عﻉﺎﺒطﻁ ﺮﺸﺒﻟاﺍ ﺔﺒﺤﻣ لﻝﺎﻘﺘﻧﻻاﺍ ﻦﻣ ءﻲﺷ ﻰﻟإﺇ ،٬ءﻲﺷ ﺔﺣاﺍﺮﺘﺳﻻاﺍوﻭ ﻦﻣ دﺩﻮﮭﻬﻌﻣ ﻰﻟإﺇ  ّﺪَﺠﺘﺴﻣ . ﻞﻛوﻭ ﻞﻘﺘﻨﻣ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻟإﺇ ﻰﮭﻬﺷأﺃ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺲﻔﻨﻟاﺍ 
ﻦﻣ ﻞﻘﺘﻨﻤﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﻨﻋ ،٬ ﺮﻈﺘﻨﻤﻟاﺍوﻭ ﺐﻠﻏأﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ بﺏﻮﻠﻘﻟاﺍ ﻦﻣ دﺩﻮﺟﻮﻤﻟاﺍ. اﺍذﺫإﺇوﻭ نﻥﺎﻛ اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ اﺍﺬﻜھﮪﮬﻫ ،٬ ﺎﻤﻓ هﻩﺎﻨﺒﺗرﺭ ﻰﻠﺣأﺃ ﻦﺴﺣأﺃوﻭ ،٬ نﻥﻮﻜﯿﻴﻟ 
ئﺉرﺭﺎﻘﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﻟ ﮫﻪﻟﺎﻘﺘﻧﺎﺑ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺒﺧ ﻰﻟإﺇ هﻩﺮﯿﻴﻏ ،٬ ﻦﻣوﻭ ﺔﺼﻗ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺎھﮪﮬﻫاﺍﻮﺳ ،٬ ﻦﻣوﻭ رﺭﺎﺒﺧأﺃ ﺔﻤﯾﻳﺪﻗ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺔﺛَﺪْﺤُﻣ ﻚﯿﻴﻠﻣوﻭ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺔﻗﻮﺳ ،٬  ِّﺪـﺟوﻭ 
ﻰﻟإﺇ لﻝَﺰـھﮪﮬﻫ ،٬ ﻂﺸﻧأﺃ ﮫﻪﺗءاﺍﺮﻘﻟ ﻰﮭﻬﺷأﺃوﻭ ﺢﻔﺼﺘﻟ ﮫﻪﻧﻮﻨﻓ.  
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tin’s theory of dialogic discourse, no one voice prevails. Instead, the diverging voices that 
he produces in this way are thus in dialogue with one another, and he refrains from sub-
ordinating them with his own voice. On the contrary, Iṣfahānī actively subverts the au-
thorizing potential of the akhbār form, while exploiting its destabilizing power.  
 The chapter begins with a parenthetical aside that breaks up the very first sen-
tence, as if Iṣfahānī is unable or unwilling to directly state even Majnūn’s name: 
[1]14 He is—according to what those who scrutinized his lineage and his story—
“Qays.” It is said: “Mahdī.” The correct one is (wa al-ṣaḥīḥ) that he is Qays bin 
al-Malawwaḥ bin Muzāḥim bin ʿUdas, bin Rabīʿa, bin Jaʿda, bin Kaʿb, bin 
Rabīʿa, bin ʿĀmir, bin Ṣaʿsaʿa. His girlfriend Laylā’s remark is among the indica-
tions that his name is Qays: 
Don’t I wish I could feel when there are many calamities 
When Qays goes off, exiled, and when he is coming back15 
(Iṣfahānī 2: 3)  
                                                
14 The numbering of akhbār is in accordance with the division markings of and order they 
appear in: Iṣfahānī, Abū ‘l-Faraj, Kitāb al-Aghānī. MS. TNI 538 - K. al-Maktaba al-
Waṭaniyya li-l-Mamlaka al-Maghribiyya, Rabat.  
15 Original text: 
ﻮھﮪﮬﻫ - ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎﻣ ﮫﻪﻟﻮﻘﯾﻳ ﻦﻣ ﺢﺤﺻ ﮫﻪﺒﺴﻧ ﮫﻪﺜﯾﻳﺪﺣوﻭ - ،٬ٌﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻞﯿﻴﻗوﻭ: ،٬يﻱﺪﮭﻬﻣ ﺢﯿﻴﺤﺼﻟاﺍوﻭ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ حﺡﻮﻠﻤﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ ﻢﺣاﺍﺰﻣ ﻦﺑ سﺱﺪﻋ 
ﻦﺑ ﺔﻌﯿﻴﺑرﺭ ﻦﺑ ةﺓﺪﻌﺟ ﻦﺑ ﺐﻌﻛ ﻦﺑ ﺔﻌﯿﻴﺑرﺭ ﻦﺑ ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺔﻌﺼﻌﺻ. ﻦﻣوﻭ ﻞﯿﻴﻟﺪﻟاﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ نﻥأﺃ ﮫﻪﻤﺳاﺍ  ٌﺲﯿﻴﻗ لﻝﻮﻗ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ ﮫﻪﺘﺒﺣﺎﺻ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻓ:  
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In khabar 1, Iṣfahānī interrupts the first would-be statement—“He is Qays” (huwa 
qays)—with an imbedded isnād that distances him from it—who are these people that 
“scrutinized his lineage and story”? Why would his lineage and story call for scrutiny? 
Iṣfahānī hedges by framing and extending the short statement “He is Qays” as another’s 
speech. Bakhtin argues in The Dialogic Imagination that “of all words uttered in every-
day life, no less than half belong to someone else” because “in real life people talk most 
of all about what others talk about” (339; 338).  Iṣfahānī’s extensive use of isnād in 
“Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” stages this motif in human speech, and this 
framing of the first utterance of the chapter throws the audience into this world dominat-
ed by other people’s speech. This hedging begins to cast doubt upon Majnūn’s identity in 
its hesitation, anonymous sources, and suggestion of a need for scrutiny.  
This doubt is compounded by the passive reported speech that follows, which suggests 
another name: “It is said: Mahdī.” While the first statement identifies its source vaguely 
as “those who scrutinized his lineage and story,” this piece of reporting completely omits 
the identity of the source, further mystifying Majnūn. The name “Mahdī,” meaning 
“guided,” evokes the image of the prophesied Mahdī, that is, the “Savior…whose ex-
pected return to rule the world will restore justice, peace, and true religion” (Arjomand), 
thus offering an antiphrastic facet for Majnūn, whose nickname (laqab) means “pos-
sessed by a jinn…and hence bereft of reason” (Lane 464). The name “Mahdī” not only 
                                                                                                                                            
 ﻻأﺃ ﺖﯿﻴﻟ يﻱﺮﻌﺷ بﺏﻮﻄﺨﻟاﺍوﻭ  ٌةﺓﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ  
  ﻰﺘﻣ ﻞﺣرﺭ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ  ٌﻞﻘﺘﺴﻣ ﻊﺟاﺍﺮﻓ  
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diverges with the statement that his name is “Qays” but also with the notion that he is 
“Majnūn” (“a madman”). The “dialogic overtones” of the utterance “Mahdī” offers “re-
sponsive reactions” to the assertion “Qays,” as “every utterance must be regarded as pri-
marily as response to preceding utterances in a given sphere” (Bakhtin, Speech Genres 
91-92). Iṣfahānī’s direct juxtaposition of these utterances, rather than instilling confi-
dence, mystifies the audience with regard to Majnūn. This performative friction performs 
enigmas around and multiplies his identity.  
 After raising doubt and compounding it, Iṣfahānī tells us what the “truth” is, i.e., 
“that he is Qays, bin al-Malawwaḥ bin Muzāḥim bin ʿUdas bin Rabīʿa, bin Jaʿda, bin 
Kaʿb, bin Rabīʿa, bin ʿĀmir bin Ṣaʿsaʿa” (2: 2). The doubt and friction established in the 
opening lines gives this statement of “truth,” which emerges without sources, a facetious 
tone and multiples truths rather than fixing it. Instead of offering sources, Iṣfahānī tells us 
indirectly that there is an “indication” (dalīl) that this is his “true” name and lineage. This 
indication, however, is tenuous, as it is indirect and relies on the presumption that the 
Laylā for whom the verse has been attributed is Majnūn’s girlfriend. This tenuous indica-
tion and the foregrounding of doubt reflect back on the claim to “truth,” which offers no 
more authority than a passive narrative. This dialogic expression is not finalized; “there is 
neither a first nor a last word” (Bakhtin, Speech Genres 170). 
 What follows constitutes the first substantial isnād of the chapter: 
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[2] Al-Ḥasan bin ʿAlī informed me that Aḥmad bin Zuhayr said: I heard some-
one—I don’t remember who—saying: The Madman’s16 name is Qays, bin al-
Malawwaḥ.17 (Iṣfahānī 2: 3) 
 While this isnād attributes this khabar (khabar 2) to Aḥmad bin Zuhayr (d. 892) through 
al-Ḥasan bin ʿAlī (d. 670), it leads the audience, which is finally anchored by named 
sources, to a claim made by an anonymous, unmemorable narrator (“I don’t remember 
who”). Even when we finally get a piece of knowledge substantiated by the claim to au-
thority provided by isnād, it is imbued with a facetiousness effected through its own ad-
mission of uncertainty. In this akhbār 1 and 2, the audience learns that the kind of 
knowledge to be gained in the Aghānī of Majnūn is vast and diverse. We learn that he is 
Qays, or Mahdī, and a son of Malawwaḥ and among the Banū ʿĀmir. We learn that he is 
“al-Majnūn” (the Madman) but also known as “Mahdī” (rightly guided) and that Laylā 
was his girlfriends. At the same time, we learn that this knowledge morphs and relies on 
anonymous sources, tentative indications, and assumptions. The resultant friction invites 
a kind of madness that keeps the audience wondering, pursuing knowledge.  
                                                
16 Translation note: Throughout my translations of the Kitāb al-Aghānī, I have chosen to 
give نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻣ (majnūn) as “Majnūn” or “majnūn,” depending on context and نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ (al-
majnūn) as “the Madman” (except when indicated otherwise). 
17 Original text: 
ﻲﻧﺮﺒﺧأﺃوﻭ ﻦﺴﺤﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ ﻲﻠﻋ لﻝﺎﻗ ﺎﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﺪﻤﺣأﺃ ﻦﺑ ﺮﯿﻴھﮪﮬﻫزﺯ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺖﻌﻤﺳ ﻦﻣ ﻻ ﻲﺼﺣأﺃ لﻝﻮﻘﯾﻳ: ﻢﺳاﺍ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ حﺡﻮﻠﻤﻟاﺍ.  
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 In the akhbār that follow, knowledge begins to further branch out in divergent 
responses to the question of “Who is Majnūn?” not only in reference to his name, but also 
to his mental state, tribal affiliation, tragic love-affliction, and eventually his very exist-
ence in the world. The next four akhbār raise questions about these aspects of Majnūn’s 
identity one by one: 
[3] He was not majnūn, rather he had a touch of something (lawtha)18 in him like 
that of Abū Ḥayya al-Numīrī.19 (Iṣfahānī 2: 3) 
[4] I asked each clan of the Banū ʿĀmir tribe one by one about Majnūn Banī 
ʿĀmir and did not find anyone who knows him.20 (Iṣfahānī 2: 4) 
In akhbār 1 and 2, Iṣfahānī raised questions about Majnūn’s name, while at the same time 
indirectly indicating that he is mad (majnūn), from the Banū ʿĀmir tribe, and Laylā’s 
companion. This next four akhbār (nos. 3-6) chips away at these suppositions. Khabar 3 
denies his madness and redefines his mental defect: “He was not majnūn, rather he had a 
touch of something in him.” This denial of his madness and assertion of a touch of some-
                                                
18 The term lawtha and the way in which Majnūn’s madness is defined and redefined 
throughout the chapter is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.  
19 Original Text: 
ﻢﻟ ﻦﻜﯾﻳ  ً ﺎﻧﻮﻨﺠﻣ ﻦﻜﻟوﻭ ﺖﻧﺎﻛ ﮫﻪﺑ ﺔﺛﻮﻟ ﺔﺛﻮﻠﻛ ﻲﺑأﺃ ﺔﯿﻴﺣ يﻱﺮﯿﻴﻤﻨﻟاﺍ.  
20 Original Text: 
ﺖﻟﺄﺳ ﻲﻨﺑ  ٍﺮﻣﺎﻋ  ً ﺎﻨﻄﺑ  ً ﺎﻨﻄﺑ ﻦﻋ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻣ ﻲﻨﺑ ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﺎﻤﻓ تﺕﺪﺟوﻭ  ًاﺍﺪﺣأﺃ ﮫﻪﻓﺮﻌﯾﻳ.  
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thing else (lawtha) defamiliarize the audience with the Madman they expect to encounter. 
Majnūn’s name implies madness, and this is a chapter devoted to, as indicated by its title, 
the lore of the Madman (majnūn) of the Banū ʿĀmir. To deny his madness, then, is to up-
root that which appears most essential to the story. We cannot hold fast to our previous 
knowledge of Majnūn and are forced to incorporate into it apparent contradictions and 
revisions that continue the process of defamiliarization, leading us into a mad wonder21. 
This process of multiplying knowledge, producing a kind of performative friction, con-
tinues in khabar 4, which calls into question another assertion implicit in the chapter title, 
i.e., Majnūn’s affiliation with the Banū ʿĀmir tribe. The narrator, Ayyūb bin ʿAbāya, re-
ports seeking out knowledge of Majnūn only to find that no one from the Banū ʿĀmir 
tribe seems to know Majnūn. This khabar is framed as a quest or pursuit of knowledge of 
Majnūn and emphasizes the lack of knowledge around Majnūn both among the communi-
ty and for the one who searches for knowledge.  
 The akhbār of the introductory section continue to defamiliarize us with Majnūn: 
[5] I said to a man from Banū ʿĀmir: “Do you know the Madman and would you 
recite something from his poetry?” He said: “Have we exhausted all the poetry of 
the wise men, to the point that we are reciting the poems of the mad ones! Indeed, 
they are many!” So, I said to him: “I don’t mean them. What I mean is Majnūn 
Banī ʿĀmir, the poet whom passion (ʿishq) killed.” So he said: “Ha! Preposterous! 
                                                
21 As we will see in what follows, wonder is explained linguistically in the Lisān al-ʿArab 
as emerging from a process of defamiliarization.  
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(hayhāt!) The Banū ʿĀmir have more grit than that. However, this sort of thing is 
found among the Yemeni tribes who have weak hearts, feeble minds, and bald 
heads. But as for the Nizaris,22 absolutely not.”23 (Iṣfahānī 2: 4) 
In khabar 5, the quest continues, as Ibn Daʿb (d. 787) also seeks out knowledge of 
Majnūn. Not only does he not find someone who knows Majnūn, he is told that his search 
is “preposterous” because such feeble madmen do not exist among the Banū ʿĀmir. This 
performative friction raises a series of open questions: Why is Majnūn so difficult to 
find? Is it that he is not mad? Not from the Banū ʿĀmir? Not so “feeble” as to be killed 
                                                
22 The term “Nizār” can refer to the Banū Nizār bin Maʿadd tribe, descendants of the 
Prophet Muḥammad’s eighteenth grandfather. However, as G. Levi Della Vida argues, by 
the end of the Umayyad period, “Nizār became the regular designation which was con-
trasted with Yamaniyya: henceforth the Banū Nizār were to be representatives of north-
ern Arabs.” (EOI2 “Nizār b. Maʿadd”). The man from Banū ʿĀmir with whom the narra-
tor of this khabar, Ibn Daʿb (d. 787), speaks seems to use the term Nizār in this sense, 
that is, in contrast to those from the Yemeni tribes.  
23 Original Text: 
ﺖﻠﻗ ﻞﺟﺮﻟ ﻦﻣ ﻲﻨﺑ ﺮﻣﺎﻋ: فﻑﺮﻌﺗأﺃ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ يﻱوﻭﺮﺗوﻭ ﻦﻣ هﻩﺮﻌﺷ ً؟ﺎﺌﯿﻴﺷ لﻝﺎﻗ: وﻭأﺃ ﺪﻗ ﺎﻨﻏﺮﻓ ﻦﻣ ﺮﻌﺷ ءﻼﻘﻌﻟاﺍ ﻰﺘﺣ يﻱوﻭﺮﻧ 
رﺭﺎﻌﺷأﺃ ﻦﯿﻴﻧﺎﺠﻤﻟاﺍ! ﻢﮭﻬﻧإﺇ  ٌﺮﯿﻴﺜﻜﻟ! ﺖﻠﻘﻓ: ﺲﯿﻴﻟ ءﻻﺆھﮪﮬﻫ ،٬ﻲﻨﻋأﺃ ﺎﻤﻧإﺇ ﻲﻨﻋأﺃ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻣ ﻲﻨﺑ ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﺮﻋﺎﺸﻟاﺍ يﻱﺬﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﻠﺘﻗ ،٬ﻖﺸﻌﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ: 
تﺕﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴھﮪﮬﻫ! ﻮﻨﺑ ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﻆﻠﻏأﺃ  ًاﺍدﺩﺎﺒﻛأﺃ ﻦﻣ ،٬كﻙاﺍذﺫ ﺎﻤﻧإﺇ نﻥﻮﻜﯾﻳ اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﻲﻓ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﺔﯿﻴﻧﺎﻤﯿﻴﻟاﺍ فﻑﺎﻌﻀﻟاﺍ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﺑﻮﻠﻗ ﻔﯿﻴﺨﺴﻟاﺍﺔ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﻟﻮﻘﻋ ﺔﻠﻌﺼﻟاﺍ 
،٬ﺎﮭﻬﺳوﻭؤﺅرﺭ ﺎﻣﺄﻓ رﺭاﺍﺰﻧ ﻼﻓ.  
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by love-sickness? Or perhaps he has been erased from Banū ʿĀmir memory for his unac-
ceptable feebleness? Doe he even exist? Ibn Daʿb’s search raises questions about 
Majnūn’s madness, his tribal affiliation, and his terminal love-sickness, the most salient 
elements of his story. Who is it that he, and thus the audience, are looking for? 
 By destabilizing the familiar and emphasizing the unknown, Iṣfahānī provokes a 
sense of ʿajab (wonder, fascination) in the audience. In the Lisān al-ʿArab, Ibn Manẓūr 
(d. 1311) defines ʿajab as “the consideration of a thing that is unfamiliar (ghayr maʾlūf) 
and unusual (lā muʿtād)…and whose cause (sabab) is hidden (khufiya) and unknown (lā 
yuʿlam)” (2811). To wonder, then, might be to consider an unfamiliar thing of unknown 
origin. Iṣfahānī invites us to ʿajab as much as he invites us to consider Majnūn while 
simultaneously rendering him unfamiliar. The effect of ʿajab, as Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī (d. 
1753) suggests in his Tāj al-ʿArus is the “agitation or excitation of the soul (infiʿāl al-
nafs)” (1: 731). Ibn Manẓūr equates the experience of ʿajab, (taʿajjaba) with that of the 
desire of renewed youth (taṣabbā) and of mad enchantment (tafattana) (Ibn Manẓūr 
2812). ʿAjab, then, emerges from confronting the unfamiliar and agitates desire and mad-
ness in the soul. Our confrontation with Majnūn as unfamiliar, or defamiliarized, has the 
potential to excite youthful desire and mad enchantment in us, which are directed toward 
Majnūn as the object of fascination. At the same time, this youthful desire and mad en-
chantment to which we are called is also that with which Majnūn himself is associated. 
The narratives of Majnūn that were in circulation at the time of the Aghānī’s production, 
as suggested by the akhbār of the Aghānī itself and Ibn Qutayba’s (d. 885) chapter on 
Majnūn in his book al-Shiʿr wa al-Shuʿarāʾ, stage the poet as a young boy who became 
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enchanted by a girl named Laylā and whose desire for her drove him to madness, as do 
the copious versions of the legend that appeared in later centuries. Our quest, like 
Majnūn’s, is driven by wonder and touched by madness.  
 In khabar 6, al-Aṣmaʿī (d. 828) suggests why this search to know Majnūn may 
seem so difficult: 
[6] Two men are not known in this world at all except by a name: Majnūn Banū 
ʿĀmir and Ibn al-Qirriyyah. Rather, storytellers and reciters of poetry (al-ruwāh) 
gave birth to them (waḍaʿahumā).24 (Iṣfahānī 2: 4) 
One of the greatest authorities on pre-Islamic literature and culture, al- Aṣmaʿī tells us 
that Majnūn is known only by name (ism). Deriving from s-m-w, suggesting elevation, 
and/or w-s-m, suggesting marking, the word al- Aṣmaʿī uses for name, ism, indeed de-
notes “a means of raising into notice the thing denoted thereby, and making it known” 
(Lane 1435). He rejects Majnūn’s materiality, while affirming his existence as a name. It 
is through his name—“Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir”—that Majnūn’s persona takes form. Abū l-
ʿAbbās explains that a name is “a trace (rasm) or a mark (sima) that is imposed upon the 
thing by which it is known” (Ibn Manẓūr 2109). The “thing” upon which this ism Majnūn 
is imposed, according to al-Aṣmaʿī, is the collection of narratives and poetry the narrators 
create and call “Majnūn.” In denying his material existence in this world, al-Aṣmaʿī ele-
vates (yusmī) Majnūn to a concept and affirms the diverse diction we have encountered as 
                                                
24 Original Text: 
نﻥﻼﺟرﺭ ﺎﻣ ﺎﻓﺮﻋ ﻲﻓ ﺎﯿﻴﻧﺪﻟاﺍ ﻂﻗ ﻻإﺇ ﻢﺳﻻﺎﺑ: نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻣ ﻲﻨﺑ ،٬ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﻦﺑاﺍوﻭ ،٬ﺔﯾﻳﺮﻘﻟاﺍ ﺎﻤﻧإﺇوﻭ ﺎﻤﮭﻬﻌﺿوﻭ ةﺓاﺍوﻭﺮﻟاﺍ.  
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audiences. The name “Majnūn” is the organizing tool for a legendary identity that trans-
cends the idea of a material, historical being and the means through which his story 
spread and expanded.  
 After deconstructing the audience’s knowledge of Majnūn, Iṣfahānī throws us into 
a spiral of affirmations, denials, repetitions, redefinitions, and revisions of what came be-
fore, creating a mise-en-abyme effect. His name, origin, madness, and existence are thus 
interwoven. Each question leads us back to a previous question and into a maddening in-
finite regress: 
[7] I set out to collect from the Banū ʿĀmir and saw the Madman. I was brought 
to him, and he recited for me.25 (Iṣfahānī 2: 5) 
[8] The Madman famous among the people for his poetry is Laylā’s companion 
Qays bin Muʿādh from Banū ʿĀmir and then from Banū ʿUqayl. He’s one of the 
Banū Numayr, son of ʿĀmir bin ʿUqayl. He said: “There is another man among 
them called Mahdī bin al-Malawwaḥ from Banū Jaʿda, son of Kaʿb bin Rabīʿa bin 
ʿĀmir bin Ṣaʿsaʿa.”26 (Iṣfahānī 2: 5) 
                                                
25 Original Text: 
ﺖﯿﻴﻌﺳ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻲﻨﺑ ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﺖﯾﻳأﺃﺮﻓ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ ﺖﯿﻴﺗأﺃوﻭ ﮫﻪﺑ ﻲﻧﺪﺸﻧأﺃوﻭ.  
26 Original Text: 
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These two akhbār, which seem to affirm his existence and affiliation with the Banū 
ʿĀmir, immediately follow denials of his material existence and affiliation. Iṣfahānī cu-
rates the akhbār so that we encounter these affirmations in light of the previous denials, 
that is, as part of this diverse, unresolving knowledge. He defamiliarizes Majnūn with this 
performative friction, extending the sense of wonder. The revisions of previous 
knowledge as contained in the akhbār do not lead us in one particular direction. That is, 
the akhbār do not build toward simple affirmation or denial, but rather the qualification 
of one with the other, inviting us to approach knowledge as multitudinous and relative.  
 The next khabar (khabar 9) diverges with the previous affirmations (akhbār 7 and 
8), and khabar 10 proceeds to offer nuance, revision, and divergence to that, continuing 
the spiral: 
[9] Majnūn’s stories and poetry were given birth to by a man (waḍaʿahu fatan) 
from Banū Umayya who loved one of his paternal cousins. He was loath to reveal 
what was between them, so he gave birth to (waḍaʿa) the stories of the Madman 
and the poetry that people would recite and attribute to the Madman.27 (Iṣfahānī 2: 
5) 
                                                                                                                                            
نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ رﺭﻮﮭﻬﺸﻤﻟاﺍ ﺮﻌﺸﻟﺎﺑ ﺪﻨﻋ سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ ﺐﺣﺎﺻ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ ذﺫﺎﻌﻣ ﻦﻣ ﻲﻨﺑ ،٬ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﻢﺛ ﻦﻣ ﻲﻨﺑ ،٬ﻞﯿﻴﻘﻋ ﺪﺣأﺃ ﻲﻨﺑ ﺮﯿﻴﻤﻧ ﻦﺑ 
ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﻦﺑ ،٬ﻞﯿﻴﻘﻋ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﻢﮭﻬﻨﻣوﻭ ﻞﺟرﺭ ﺮﺧآﺁ لﻝﺎﻘﯾﻳ ﮫﻪﻟ: يﻱﺪﮭﻬﻣ ﻦﺑ حﺡﻮﻠﻤﻟاﺍ ﻦﻣ ﻲﻨﺑ ةﺓﺪﻌﺟ ﻦﺑ ﺐﻌﻛ ﻦﺑ ﺔﻌﯿﻴﺑرﺭ ﻦﺑ ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﻦﺑ 
ﺔﻌﺼﻌﺻ.  
27 Original Text: 
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[10] The name of the Madman is Qays bin Muʿādh, one of the Banū Jaʿda son of 
Kaʿb bin Rabīʿa bin ʿĀmir bin Ṣaʿsaʿa.28 (Iṣfahānī 2: 5) 
Ibn al-Kalbī (d. 819), the narrator in khabar 9 rejects Majnūn’s material existence and 
echoes al-Aṣmaʿī’s claim in khabar 6 that Majnūn’s poetry and stories were created by 
someone else. Specifically, Ibn al-Kalbī offers an anonymous origin among the Banū 
Umayya for the persona of Majnūn, suggesting that because the unnamed boy created the 
stories, the identity of Majnūn does not belong to him. Majnūn belongs not to the materi-
al world but the world of legends, he proposes. Khabar 10, however, wrenches us back 
into the material world by anchoring his identity in a name presented in patronymic form 
that extends back to the Banū ʿĀmir bin Ṣaʿsaʿa, a presentation of lineage that challenges 
and responds dialogically to the other extended patronymic in khabar 1. As the akhbār 
alternate between affirmations, denials, revisions, repetitions, and redefinitions, wherein 
one qualifies the other, the affirmations and denials themselves diverge. Each time 
Majnūn’s material identity is affirmed, that identity is altered, and when it is denied, the 
denial takes on diverse qualifications.  
                                                                                                                                            
ﺚﯾﻳﺪﺣ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ هﻩﺮﻌﺷوﻭ ﮫﻪﻌﺿوﻭ  ًﻰﺘﻓ ﻦﻣ ﻲﻨﺑ ﺔﯿﻴﻣأﺃ نﻥﺎﻛ ىﻯﻮﮭﻬﯾﻳ ﺔﻨﺑاﺍ ﻢﻋ ،٬ﮫﻪﻟ نﻥﺎﻛوﻭ هﻩﺮﻜﯾﻳ نﻥأﺃ ﺮﮭﻬﻈﯾﻳ ﺎﻣ ﮫﻪﻨﯿﻴﺑ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﻨﯿﻴﺑوﻭ ﻊﺿﻮﻓ 
ﺚﯾﻳﺪﺣ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗوﻭ رﺭﺎﻌﺷﻷاﺍ ﻲﺘﻟاﺍ ﺎﮭﻬﯾﻳوﻭﺮﯾﻳ سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻠﻟ ﺎﮭﻬﺒﺴﻧوﻭ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻟإﺇ.  
28 Original Text: 
ﻢﺳاﺍ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ ذﺫﺎﻌﻣ ﺪﺣأﺃ ﻲﻨﺑ ةﺓﺪﻌﺟ ﻦﺑ ﺐﻌﻛ ﻦﺑ ﺔﻌﯿﻴﺑرﺭ ﻦﺑ ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺔﻌﺼﻌﺻ.  
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 A repetition of this denial of Majnūn’s madness follows these divergent akhbār 
about Majnūn’s materiality, and it is also attributed to al-Aṣmaʿī. This iteration of the de-
nial not only becomes a qualification but also an affirmation of the cause of his particular 
madness and his name: 
[11] He wasn’t Majnūn, rather he had a touch of something (lawtha) in him, 
which was caused by the passionate love (ʿishq) that had possessed him. He loved 
a woman from his tribe called Laylā. His name is Qays bin Muʿādh.29 (Iṣfahānī 2: 
6) 
This khabar concludes with the assertion that his name was Qays bin Muʿādh, and the 
next six akhbār continue to riff on the question of name and origin: 
[12] His name is Qays bin Muʿādh.30 (Iṣfahānī 2: 6) 
[13] His name is Qays bin al-Malawwaḥ. ʿAmr al-Shaybānī said: “A man from 
the people of Yemen told me that he saw him and approached him to ask about 
his name and his origin. He said that he is Qays bin al-Malawwaḥ.”31 (Iṣfahānī 2: 
6) 
                                                
29 Original Text: 
 ﻢﻟ ﻦﻜﯾﻳ ،ً٬ﺎﻧﻮﻨﺠﻣ ﻞﺑ ﺖﻧﺎﻛ ﮫﻪﺑ  ٌﺔﺛﻮﻟ ﺎﮭﻬﺛﺪﺣأﺃ ﻖﺸﻌﻟاﺍ ،٬ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻓ نﻥﺎﻛ ىﻯﻮﮭﻬﯾﻳ  ًةﺓأﺃﺮﻣاﺍ ﻦﻣ ﮫﻪﻣﻮﻗ لﻝﺎﻘﯾﻳ ﺎﮭﻬﻟ ،٬ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ ﮫﻪﻤﺳاﺍوﻭ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ ذﺫﺎﻌﻣ.  
30 Original Text: 
 ﮫﻪﻤﺳاﺍ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ ذﺫﺎﻌﻣ.  
31 Original Text: 
 
  44 
[14] He is Qays bin al-Malawwaḥ. His father died before he became disordered in 
the mind. So, he sacrificed his nāqa (female camel) on his father’s grave and re-
cited: 
Upon the grave of al-Malawwaḥ I slaughtered my nāqa 
 In Dhu al-Sarh when his relatives shunned him  
I said to her: “Be slaughtered, for I am 
 A man who walks tomorrow, while yesterday I was a rider” 
May God not take you away, O Ibn Muzāḥim 
 Everyone must no doubt drink from the cup of death.32 (Iṣfahānī 2: 
 6) 
[15] His name is al-Buḥturī bin al-Jaʿd.33 (Iṣfahānī 2: 7) 
                                                                                                                                            
ﮫﻪﻤﺳاﺍ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ ،٬حﺡﻮﻠﻤﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ ﻮﺑأﺃ وﻭﺮﻤﻋ ﻲﻧﺎﺒﯿﻴﺸﻟاﺍ: ﻲﻨﺛﺪﺣوﻭ ﻞﺟرﺭ ﻦﻣ ﻞھﮪﮬﻫأﺃ ﻦﻤﯿﻴﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ هﻩآﺁرﺭ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻘﻟوﻭ ﮫﻪﻟﺄﺳوﻭ ﻦﻋ ﮫﻪﻤﺳاﺍ ،٬ﮫﻪﺒﺴﻧوﻭ 
ﺮﻛﺬﻓ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ حﺡﻮﻠﻤﻟاﺍ.  
32 Original Text: 
هﻩﺎﺑأﺃ تﺕﺎﻣ ﻞﺒﻗ ،٬ﮫﻪطﻁﻼﺘﺧاﺍ ﺮﻘﻌﻓ ﻰﻠﻋ هﻩﺮﺒﻗ ﮫﻪﺘﻗﺎﻧ لﻝﺎﻗوﻭ ﻲﻓ ﻚﻟذﺫ:  
تﺕﺮﻘﻋ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮﺒﻗ حﺡﻮﻠﻤﻟاﺍ ﻲﺘﻗﺎﻧ  يﻱﺬﺑ حﺡﺮﺴﻟاﺍ ﺎﻤﻟ نﻥأﺃ هﻩﺎﻔﺟ بﺏرﺭﺎﻗﻷاﺍ  
 ﺖﻠﻗوﻭ ﺎﮭﻬﻟ ﻲﻧﻮﻛ  ًاﺍﺮﯿﻴﻘﻋ ﻲﻨﻧﺈﻓ    ًاﺍﺪﻏ  ٌﻞﺟاﺍرﺭ ﻲﺸﻣأﺃ ﺲﻣﻷﺎﺑوﻭ ﺐﻛاﺍرﺭ  
ﻼﻓ ﻚﻧﺪﻌﺒﯾﻳ ﷲ ﻦﺑﺎﯾﻳ  ٍﻢﺣاﺍﺰﻣ    ﱞﻞﻜﻓ سﺱﺄﻜﺑ تﺕﻮﻤﻟاﺍ ﻚﺷﻻ بﺏرﺭﺎﺷ  
33 Original Text: 
ﮫﻪﻤﺳاﺍ يﻱﺮﺘﺤﺒﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ ﺪﻌﺠﻟاﺍ.  
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[16] His name is al-Aqraʿ bin Muʿādh.34 (Iṣfahānī 2: 7) 
[17] His name is Mahdī bin al-Malawwaḥ.35 (Iṣfahānī 2: 7) 
The question “Who is he?” becomes increasingly more complicated. What “he” are we 
even talking about? Is he defined by a name? a madness? an origin? a story? Through re-
iteration and variation, the text interrogates knowledge and what it means to know, com-
plicating attempts to find order in the chaos. Akhbār 10-14 seem to build toward reconcil-
iation: he is Qays, they suggest, perhaps the son of Muʿādh or perhaps the son of al-
Malawwaḥ; he was not mad, rather he had a touch of something (lawtha) in him. By kha-
bar 14, we feel we almost have reached some sort of resting place at his father’s grave, 
only to be wrenched away and thrust back into an uncertainty from which there is no es-
cape.  
 These divergent affirmations in akhbār 12 through 17 demand from the audience 
the cultivation of a mind capable of maintaining difference without reducing it to the 
                                                
34 Original Text: 
ﮫﻪﻤﺳاﺍ عﻉﺮﻗﻷاﺍ ﻦﺑ ذﺫﺎﻌﻣ.  
35 Original Text: 
ﮫﻪﻤﺳاﺍ يﻱﺪﮭﻬﻣ ﻦﺑاﺍ حﺡﻮﻠﻤﻟاﺍ.  
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“logic of the same.”36 The performative friction of the introductory section for “Akhbār 
Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” does not produce simple contradiction. Contradiction 
would imply that these akhbār directly negate one another, but they do not. Rather, they 
produce multiple roots. In foregrounding uncertainty through performative friction and 
choosing to present divergent knowledge rather than diverse knowledge that ends up 
converging in resolution, Iṣfahānī suggests the value of multiple truths. The notion that 
the affirmation of difference emerges from the coexistence of what appears to be opposi-
tions but evades dialectical resolution plays a key role in Deleuze’s articulation of differ-
ence in Difference and Repetition. Deleuze’s “discovery of difference” emerges, like 
ʿajab, from the confrontation with the unfamiliar and agitates madness. “Akhbār Majnūn 
Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” sustains the irresolution of these affirmations by repeatedly 
defamiliarizing Majnūn, thus sustaining the pursuit and the sense of wonder it drives.  
 Iṣfahānī presents knowledge of Majnūn not as a static body of facts but as an ac-
tive process of inquiry, where questions breed more questions. Reading the Aghānī is an 
experience—a “spirited” and “arousing” experience—in which we remain in pursuit of 
Majnūn, despite questioning his existence. Indeed, the denials of his madness and exist-
ence are wrapped up in this provocation to wonder, as wondering requires an encounter 
with the unfamiliar. As the linguist Abū Isḥāq al-Zajjāj (d. 923) says of the origin of the 
                                                
36 The “logic of the same” refers to what Todd May calls the delusion that masks differ-
ence, a delusion, he argues that Derrida and Deleuze, among others, try to find ways of 
avoiding (2).  
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word ʿajab in the Lisān al-ʿArab: it emerges from “a person considering that which he 
denies and is rare” (Ibn Manẓūr 1956). This wonder, in turn, cultivates a kind of mad-
ness. 
WONDER AS A MODE OF KNOWLEDGE 
 In classical Arabic literature, we find great resonance with the notion that 
knowledge has the power to capture us as would an object of infatuation (ʿajab). In his 
comprehensive study of the conceptualizations of knowledge in medieval Islam, Franz 
Rosenthal dedicates a chapter to knowledge as a societal force in which he chronicles the 
associations between pleasure and knowledge in medieval Islamic thought. He notes how 
Abū ‘l-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī (d. 991) and al-Tawḥīdī (d. 1023) drew upon Aristotle and Plato 
to equate pleasure (ladhdha) with knowledge (ʿilm) (Rosenthal, Knowledge 241).37 The 
cultural and intellectual shift of 10th-century Arabo-Islamic society, within which 
Iṣfahānī produced his Aghānī, included a “conscious attempt to assimilate and transmit 
the intellectual legacy of Greek antiquity” (Kraemer vii). Engagement with this legacy, 
then, likely informed 10th-century adaptations of the ʿudhrī tradition. In articulating the 
                                                
37 In his Kitāb al-Saʿāda, al-ʿĀmirī (d. 991) cites Aristotle’s conception of “pleasure as 
knowledge” (qtd. in Rosenthal, Knowledge 241). Al-Tawḥīdī (d. 1023) reports Plato say-
ing: “the psyche has two pleasures: a pleasure that is independent of the body and pleas-
ure that is shared with the body. The pleasure that belongs only to the body is ʿilm 
[knowledge] and ḥikma [wisdom] and the pleasure that the body partakes in is food, 
drink, etc” (2: 36) 
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way in which Plato’s Dialogues embed love in knowledge, James Davidson synthesizes 
Plato’s notion of an enterprising love of knowledge as one that consists “of a reaching out 
for knowledge, but not of pinning it to the ground” (267). “This embedding of love in 
knowledge,” he explains, “is the reason why the lover and the beloved who ‘go all the 
way’ are ‘without philosophy’” (Davidson 267). This is the approach to knowledge taken 
in a proverb recorded in al-Mubashshir’s (d. 1106) 11th-century Mukhtār al-Ḥikam wa 
Maḥāsin al-Kilam (Selection of Dicta and Sayings): “One continues to remain knowing 
as long as one seeks knowledge; if he thinks that he knows, he has become ignorant” 
(333).  
 There are parallels between this approach to knowledge and Majnūn’s love for 
Laylā as presented in the Aghānī. Iṣfahānī’s contemporary, Abū Hilal al-ʿAskarī (d. 
1005) explains knowledge (ʿilm) as pleasure: “Since we’ve come to know the pleasure of 
knowledge, neither sweetness nor delight excites wonder in us”38 (426). This echoes the 
effect Laylā has on Majnūn, who takes no interest in food, conversation, or women ex-
cept as they relate to Laylā. When asked by a group of women what he loves most after 
Laylā, he replies: “By God, nothing else excites me to wonder at all” Iṣfahānī 1: 67). 
ʿUdhrī love overshadows all such delights, just as the pleasure of knowledge can render 
all else impotent to provoke wonder.  
                                                
38 Original text: 
ﺬﻣوﻭ ﺎﻨﻓﺮﻋ ةﺓﺬﻟ ﻢﻠﻌﻟاﺍ ﻻ ﺎﻨﺒﺠُﻌﯾﻳ  ُﻮﻠﺤﻟاﺍ ﻻوﻭ بﺏﺬﻌﻟاﺍ  
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 The term “excitement to wonder” (yuʿjib) that al-ʿAskarī employs above is also 
the term that appears throughout the Aghānī’s chapters dedicated to the ʿudhrī poets. 
When a group of women ask Majnūn what about Laylā “excited him to wonder,” for ex-
ample, he replies: “Everything I’ve seen, witnessed, and heard from her excites me to 
wonder” (Iṣfahānī 72: 5). The root ʿ-j-b suggests wonderment, amazement, admiration, 
arousal, and delight. In the ʿudhrī tradition, words derived from this root are most com-
monly employed by both narrators and poets to stage the initial infatuation of the lover 
with his beloved. The experience of “wonder” is what drives the lover toward his be-
loved, who may, as does Majnūn in this introductory section, coyly tease the lover. It also 
appears throughout the chapters on ʿudhrī poets in reference to positive audience re-
sponse upon hearing poetry. When Marwān bin al-Ḥakam ʿUmar bin ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 
bin ʿAwf (d. 653) was out collecting charity taxes, for example, he noticed Majnūn—
before his madness had taken hold—and spoke with him. When Majnūn sang some poet-
ry for him, “he was struck with wonder by him, and so he asked him to go out with him, 
and Majnūn agreed” (Iṣfahānī 2: 17). Iṣfahānī stages ʿUmar bin ʿAbd al-Raḥmān pursuit 
of Majnūn, which is provoked by wonder, as a lover’s pursuit.  
 This wonder drives ʿUmar bin ʿAbd al-Raḥmān to pursue Majnūn as a lover would.  
 While Majnūn pursues Laylā, the audience pursues Majnūn, whose stories and 
poetry instill this sense of wonder. Iṣfahānī places certain knowledge of Majnūn beyond 
our reach. Like that of Majnūn, our pursuit does not end. Rosenthal points out that adab 
anthologies such as the Aghānī “remained a favorite arsenal from which all those longing 
for a general education, for the prestige going with being considered an educated person, 
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could draw their ammunition” (253). For the compiler of such anthologies, then, the po-
tential impact of his presentation of adab knowledge meant he had the opportunity to cul-
tivate in his audience his particular approach to that knowledge. Beyond selecting and 
curating akhbār to bolster one particular political, social, or religious group, the compiler 
can select and organize literary conventions to promote ways of approaching knowledge. 
Iṣfahānī’s introduction to "Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” implicitly asks, 
“What does it mean to know?,” and responds “To become mad and remain in constant 
pursuit of knowledge.” In doing so, Iṣfahānī creates a kind of knowledge that operates 
like ʿudhrī love, provoked by wonder and conveyed by madness.  
 The method to Iṣfahānī’s madness as compiler is this invitation to madness itself. 
Most printed editions of the text imply he collected this akhbār according to topic by of-
fering subheadings for groups of akhbār.39 In the Ḥayʾa al-Maṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 
(The General Egyptian Book Organization) edition, for example, editor al-Najdi Nasif 
adds tags on the printed margins that attempt to organize the akhbār chronicled above 
into the following categories: 
akhbār 1-2: “His lineage and scrutinizing his name” 
khabar 3: “It is said he had a touch of something (lawtha) in him and was not 
Majnūn” 
                                                
39 As Kilpatrick points out, the Dār al-Kutub edition places “the indications of sub-
jects…in the body of the text, thus giving the impression that they belong in the original 
Aghānī” (Great Book 3).  
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akhbār 4-8: “Narrator’s disagreement about his existence” 
akhbār 9-17: “It is said that a boy from Banū Umayya created his story and poetry 
and attributed it to him” 
In the Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya edition, editor ʿAbd al-ʿAlī Muhannā offers no category 
for the first three akhbār and chronicles the rest of the introductory section as follows: 
akhbār 4-10: “Narrator’s disagreement about the existence of Qays and his mad-
ness” 
akhbār 11-21: “Difference of opinion regarding the Madman’s (al-majnūn) 
name” 
Manuscript copyists, however, did not include any such indications of subjects in the ex-
tant manuscripts examined by me or Kilpatrick.40 This attempt by later publishers to 
bring order to the text by dividing it into cohesive, discrete subjects suggests the discom-
fort Iṣfahānī engineers by cycling through topics, weaving them together, and thwarting 
resolution. Rather than extracting, collecting and grouping akhbār topic-by-topic, finish-
ing with one and moving onto the next, he strings us along, returning to old questions that 
                                                
40 This observation is based on my consultation of four manuscripts: Iṣfahānī, Abū ‘l-
Faraj, Kitāb al-Aghānī. MS. TNI 538 - K. al-Maktaba al-Waṭaniyya li-l-Mamlaka al-
Maghribiyya, Rabat; Iṣfahānī, Abū ‘l-Faraj, Kitāb al-Aghānī. MS 1069, Ragıp Paşa. 
Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul; Iṣfahānī, Abū ‘l-Faraj, Kitāb al-Aghānī. MS 926, Yeni 
Cami. Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul; Iṣfahānī, Abū ‘l-Faraj, Kitāb al-Aghānī. MS 868-1, 
Hüsnü Paşa. Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul.   
  52 
take on new meanings and implications. He satisfies our human desire to “move from one 
thing to another,” so that even when we return to an earlier question, we feel “refreshed 
by newness” (Iṣfahānī 1: 5). 
 Robert Irwin points out that “one of the leading features of the Kitāb al-Aghānī 
was its stress on ṭarab, a kind of ecstatic loss of self-control, as the ultimate goal of music 
and poetry” (213). Musicians and poets can bring about such a heightened state of emo-
tion in their audience in part through repetition and variation. By cycling through sub-
jects, Iṣfahānī is able to tap into this play with openness and closure associated with ṭar-
ab. Refrains start to emerge, such as “He is Qays, son of al-Malawwaḥ” and “He wasn’t 
Majnūn, rather there was a touch of something (lawtha) in him like that of Abū Ḥayya al-
Numīrī;” and variations appear: “He is Qays, son of Muʿādh” and “He wasn’t Majnūn, 
rather he had a touch of something (lawtha) in him, which was caused by the passionate 
love (ʿishq) that had possessed him.” This repetition and variation continues and morphs, 
generating performative friction in the remaining fifteen akhbār of the introductory sec-
tion, heightening the sense of disorder and infecting the audience with its own “touch of 
something” (“lawtha”). 
 Iṣfahānī concludes the introductory section of “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa 
Nasabuhu” with a disclaimer, releasing himself of accountability for the authenticity of 
Majnūn’s poetry and akhbār: 
I mention some of what has come to me from a nice group of akhbār about 
[Majnūn] while cleared of (mutabarriʾan min) accountability (ʿuhda) for it. Cer-
tainly, some narrators attribute much of the mentioned poetry in his akhbār to 
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someone else, and those who relate his akhbār attribute it to him. Having present-
ed this stipulation, I am immune (bariʾtu) from the blame of censurers and those 
looking to find fault.41 (Iṣfahānī 2: 11) 
This disclaimer, a rare moment in the text when Iṣfahānī explicitly acknowledges his 
presence, implies that what he has to offer is not credible akhbār but rather lies in his or-
chestration, selection, and organization of the akhbār. Iṣfahānī divests himself of any 
“accountability” (ʿuhda). The term ʿuhda denotes not only “a written statement of a pur-
chase…one recurs to…on an occasion of doubt” but also a fault, defect, or weakness of 
the intellect (Lane 2183). A legal opinion from the Maliki jurist Saḥūn (d. 855) suggests 
this double sense of ʿuhda, implying both accountability and fault that transfer from one 
party to another:  
There is no three-day or year-long ʿuhda of the loaned slave or the borrowed 
slave, or the slave given for reconciliation, or the absent slave sold by description, 
or the slave taken as a payment of debt, or the slave used for sex, or the slave giv-
en as compensation…” (al-Qaṭarī 13: 348).  
When one party transfers ownership of a slave another, the slave’s faults and accountabil-
ity for those faults are also transferred. Iṣfahānī’s declaration that he is cleared of ʿuhda 
                                                
41 Original text: 
ﺎﻧأﺃوﻭ ﺮﻛذﺫأﺃ ﺎﻤﻣ ﻊﻗوﻭ ﻲﻟإﺇ ﻦﻣ هﻩرﺭﺎﺒﺧأﺃ  ًﻼﻤﺟ ،ً٬ﺔﻨﺴﺤﺘﺴﻣ  ً ﺎﺋﺮﺒﺘﻣ ﻦﻣ ةﺓﺪﮭﻬﻌﻟاﺍ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﻓ نﻥﺈﻓ ﺮﺜﻛأﺃ هﻩرﺭﺎﻌﺷأﺃ ةﺓرﺭﻮﻛﺬﻤﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ هﻩرﺭﺎﺒﺧأﺃ 
ﺎﮭﻬﺒﺴﻨﯾﻳ ﺾﻌﺑ ةﺓاﺍوﻭﺮﻟاﺍ ﻰﻟإﺇ هﻩﺮﯿﻴﻏ ﺎﮭﻬﺒﺴﻨﯾﻳوﻭ ﻦﻣ ﺖﯿﻴﻜﺣ ﮫﻪﻨﻋ ،٬ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻟإﺇ اﺍذﺫإﺇوﻭ ﺖﻣﺪﻗ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﺔﻄﯾﻳﺮﺸﻟاﺍ ﺖﺋﺮﺑ ﻦﻣ ﺐﯿﻴﻋ  ٍﻦﻋﺎطﻁ ﻊﺒﺘﺘﻣوﻭ 
بﺏﻮﯿﻴﻌﻠﻟ.  
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for the presented group of akhbār also implies that he claims to be cleared of the 
fault/mental weakness in them, which recalls al-Aṣmaʿī’s qualification that Majnūn had 
“a touch of something” (lawtha) in him. The text, like Majnūn, is infected with mental 
defect, and in clearing himself of that defect and accountability for it, he transfers it onto 
the audience. Rather than promising to uncover the truth or presenting the truth as some-
thing that can be uncovered, Iṣfahānī is stoic and calm amidst the utter confusion into 
which he has thrust us. As Asʿad Khairallah argues, the irony of Iṣfahānī’s serious tone 
here is particularly palpable when considered alongside his use of divergent akhbār and 
playful isnād (54). He says, “Because of the obvious contradictions between the texts 
(amtān, pl. of matn) of the various reports,” he argues, “the isnād has a double, self-
contradictory function: it purports to establish truth of a certain report, but succeeds in 
forfeiting its own validity” (Khairallah 54). In this way, the isnād produces its own sort of 
performative friction. The isnād for akhbār 3 and 6, for example, both include al-Riyāshī 
reporting through al-Aṣmaʿī, while the narrative content of these reports diverges. 
Iṣfahānī’s claim of neutrality, Khairallah points out, only engenders further doubt:  
Comparing both statements…, one cannot help reaching the conclusion that 
someone along the chain of this isnād must have invented something. And my be-
lief, in this connection, is that Iṣfahānī himself, refined artist that he was, is the 
last to be exempted from all responsibility, in spite of his plea for innocence. (54) 
Indeed, to read the Aghānī, and particularly this chapter, as a “veritable storehouse of in-
formation” (Stern 501) or unprocessed raw material is to deny Iṣfahānī his artistry and 
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decline his invitation to know too much, to be excited to wonder, and to enter into the 
madness of the text.  
 Iṣfahānī’s “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” sets the audience onto an 
intoxicating chase in these first seventeen akhbār. The Bahraini poet Qāsim Ḥaddād’s (b. 
1948) lyrical response to it offers a sense of this reception of the text, as it conveys the 
wonder-provoking and maddening effect of the section’s use of performative friction, 
which drives Ḥaddād not only to madness but to wonder and “delight”:  
 He is Qays. And he is Muʿādh bin Kulayb, and he is Qays bin Muʿādh al-
ʿUqaylī, and he is al-Buḥturī bin al-Jaʿd, and he is al-Aqraʿ bin Muʿādh, and he is 
also al-Mahdī. It was said his name is the Qays bin al-Malawwaḥ, from the Banū 
ʿĀmir tribe. When asked about him, those clans denied him one by one: “Base-
less. And how!” Then it was said he was no one. He went through life with an un-
requited heart (qalb mafqūd) and robbed of mind (ʿaql maʾkhūdh). 
 Iṣfahānī told us—based on what he heard from one of the storytellers, who 
was a liar, and thus we believed (fa-ṣaddaqnāhu)—about a man who could see 
invisible people. He said: “There are three men who never were and never were 
known (lam yakūnū qaṭṭu we lā ʿurifū): Ibn Abū-l-ʿAqib, the author of The Epics, 
Ibn al-Qiriyya, and Majnūn of the Banū ʿĀmir.” As for us, we saw our akhbār 
about him in paper scraps tossed around by copyists and celebrated him in our 
dreams…We were pleased by the juiciest parts of the stories taken from Abū 
Miskin, al-Shaybānī, Abū Isḥāq, al-Jawharī, al-Riyāhī, Ibn Shabbah, al-Madaʿini, 
al-Muhallabī, and al-Aṣmaʿī, though the author of the Aghānī, who gave us great 
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 lluf koot ew ;)kkahs-la ʿisāhs āninnaẓ-il aḥāta( snoitpecnocerp ruo tuoba tbuod
 dna snoitcudes rieht gnoma seciohc ruo edam eW…)uhānlabathi-af( egatnavda
 dethgiled tI .dekil ew woh meht ot gnidda ,meht htiw seciohc nwo ruo degnahcxe
 ).p.n dāddaḤ( 24.su dethgiled eh dnA .namdaM eht
-carahc ,soahc dna sexodarap fo lluf ,egdelwonk fo dnik a revocsid ew ,txet s’īnāhafṣI nI
 a hguorht ylno ssecca nac ew taht dna rednow sevird taht ,noitcirf evitamrofrep fo citsiret
 rimĀʿ īnaB nūnjaM rābhkA“ ot noitcudortni eht fo gnilleter s’dāddaḤ .ssendam fo epyt
 sdnatsrednu )”daḥA āL uhannI“( ”eno on si eh yleruS“ seltit eh hcihw ”,uhubasaN aw
 yalp siht gnitaercer yb syevnoc dāddaḤ hcihw ,yalp dnim lufthgiled a sa txet s’īnāhafṣI
 syaQ si eh dna ,byaluK nib hdāʿuM si eh dnA .syaQ si eH“( seciov gnivlosernu hguorht
 dna ,rail a saw ohw“( snoisrevni ,)”eno on si eh“( selzzup ,)”…īlyaqUʿ-la hdāʿuM nib
                                                
 :txet lanigirO 24
 اﺍﻟﻤﮭﻬﺪيﻱ وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﺎذﺫ،٬ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻷﻗﺮعﻉ وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻮ اﺍﻟﺠﻌﺪ،٬ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻟﺒﺤﺘﺮيﻱ وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻮ اﺍﻟﻌﻘﯿﻴﻠﻲ،٬ ﻣﻌﺎذﺫ ﺑﻦ ﻗﯿﻴﺲ وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻮ ﻛﻠﯿﻴﺐ،٬ ﺑﻦ ﻣﻌﺎذﺫ وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻮ ﻗﯿﻴﺲ،٬ ھﮪﮬﻫﻮ
 ،٬(وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﯿﻴﮭﻬﺎتﺕ ﺑﺎطﻁﻞ) وﻭﻗﺎﻟﺖ أﺃﻧﻜﺮﺗﮫﻪ ﺑﻄﻨﺎ ً  ﺑﻄﻨﺎ ً  ﻋﺎﻣﺮ ٍ ﺑﻨﻲ ﺑﻄﻮنﻥ ﻋﻨﮫﻪ ﺳﺌﻠﺖ وﻭﻟﻤﺎ ﻋﺎﻣﺮ ﺑﻨﻲ ﻣﻦ اﺍﻟﻤﻠﻮحﺡ ﺑﻦ ﻗﯿﻴﺲ اﺍﺳﻤﮫﻪ وﻭﻗﯿﻴﻞ
 ﻋﻦ ﻓﺼﺪﻗﻨﺎهﻩ،٬ ﻛﺎذﺫﺑﺎ ً  وﻭﻛﺎنﻥ اﺍﻟﺮاﺍوﻭةﺓ أﺃﺣﺪ ﻋﻦ اﺍﻷﺻﻔﮭﻬﺎﻧﻲ أﺃﺧﺒﺮﻧﺎ ﻣﺄﺧﻮذﺫ ﻞ ٍوﻭﻋﻘ ﻣﻔﻘﻮدﺩ ٍ ﺑﻘﻠﺐ ٍ ﺣﯿﻴﺎﺗﮫﻪ ﻓﻲ ذﺫھﮪﮬﻫﺐ أﺃﺣﺪ ﻻ إﺇﻧﮫﻪ ﻗﯿﻴﻞ ﺛﻢ
 اﺍﻟﻘـﺮﯾﻳـﺔ،٬ وﻭإﺇﺑﻦ اﺍﻟﻤﻼﺣﻢ،٬ ﻗﺼﯿﻴﺪةﺓ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ اﺍﻟﻌﻘﺐ أﺃﺑﻲ اﺍﺑﻦ ﻋﺮﻓﻮاﺍ،٬ وﻭﻻ ﻗﻂ ﯾﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮاﺍ ﻟﻢ ﮐﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻗﺎلﻝ اﺍﻟﻨﺎسﺱ ﻏﯿﻴﺐ ﯾﻳﺮىﻯ رﺭﺟﻞ ٍ
 ﻣﻦ ﯾﻳﺤﻠﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻟﻨﺎ وﻭﻟﺬ…اﺍﻷﺣﻼمﻡ ﺑﮭﻬﺎ وﻭاﺍﺣﺘﻔﺖ اﺍﻟﻮرﺭاﺍﻗﻮنﻥ أﺃﺳﻘﻄﮭﻬﺎ رﺭﻗﻊ ٍ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻨﮫﻪ أﺃﺧﺒﺎرﺭﻧﺎ رﺭأﺃﯾﻳﻨﺎ ﻓﻘﺪ ﻧﺤﻦ أﺃﻣﺎ ﻋﺎﻣﺮ ﺑﻨﻲ وﻭﻣﺠﻨﻮنﻥ
 ﻋﻦ وﻭاﺍﻷﺻﻤﻌﻲ وﻭاﺍﻟﻤﮭﻬﻠﺒﻲ وﻭاﺍﻟﻤﺪاﺍﺋﻨﻲ ﺷﺒﺔ وﻭاﺍﺑﻦ وﻭاﺍﻟﺮﯾﻳﺎﺷﻲ وﻭاﺍﻟﺠﻮھﮪﮬﻫﺮيﻱ إﺇﺳﺤﺎقﻕ ٍ وﻭأﺃﺑﻲ وﻭاﺍﻟﺸﯿﻴﺒﺎﻧﻲ ﻣﺴﻜﯿﻴﻦ ٍ أﺃﺑﻲ ﻋﻦ اﺍﻷﺧﺬ
 ﻓﻲ وﻭزﺯدﺩﻧﺎ اﺍﻷﻧﺨﺎبﺏ،٬ ﻣﻌﮭﻬﻢ وﻭﺗﺒﺎدﺩﻟﻨﺎ ﻏﻮاﺍﯾﻳﺎﺗﮭﻬﻢ،٬ ﻣﻦ ﻓﺎﻧﺘﺨﺒﻨﺎ …ﻓﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺘﺒﻠﻨﺎهﻩ اﺍﻟﺸﻚ ﺷﺎﺳﻊ ﻟﻈﻨﻨﺎ أﺃﺗﺎحﺡ اﺍﻟﺬيﻱ اﺍﻷﻏﺎﻧﻲ،٬ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ
  اﺍﺳﺘﺤﻠﯿﻴﻨﺎهﻩوﻭ ذﺫﻟﻚ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﻨﻮنﻥ ﻓﻄﺎبﺏ ﻧﮭﻬﻮىﻯ،٬ ﻛﻤﺎ ذﺫﻟﻚ
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thus we believed”), chaos (“we saw our akhbār about him in paper scraps tossed around 
by copyists”), and relativities (“the truest of lies”). Iṣfahānī “gave us great doubt about 
our preconceptions,” and as Ḥaddād shows, bends our minds to consider multiplicities. 
The list of affirmed names for Majnūn brings to mind the performative friction of 
Iṣfahānī’s text around Majnūn’s name and prompts the audience to read the title (“It is 
that he is no one”/“Innahu Lā Aḥad”), which is repeated in the text itself, as he is many, 
that is, he is the repetition of differences.  
 As a reader, Ḥaddād’s confrontation with the performative friction of the diverse 
knowledge Iṣfahānī arranges drives him into Majnūn’s madness. This madness leads him 
to acquire a particular kind of knowledge: that Majnūn is no one. That is, he is not one 
individual but many, a multiplicity. It is a knowledge that is attained through an openness 
to multiplicity, which imbues in him a strong sense of wonder: “It delighted the Madman. 
And he delighted us.” Indeed, these first seventeen akhbār with which we come into con-
tact in the introductory section not only provide us with diverse knowledge about 
Majnūn’s name, origin, and madness, leading us to question Majnūn’s very existence, but 
also compel us to question our confidence in our knowledge and to manage the complexi-
ty, paradoxes, and relativity of that knowledge. 
CONCLUSION 
 The question of who or what is Majnūn is an open one in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī 
ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu.” Iṣfahānī presents Majnūn in pieces of narrative in prose and poetry 
that unsettle preconceptions of Majnūn’s identity and escape resolution. The “performa-
tive friction” of the introductory section forces the audience to overcome the dualism in-
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herent in questions such as: Is his name Qays or not? Is he mad or not? Is he real or not? 
Does he exist? The puzzle of Majnūn, with which we are presented, can be solved by 
thinking in multiplicities and relativities, and it is a knowledge characterized by multi-
plicities and relativities that we gain from the text. Iṣfahānī transfers responsibility of au-
thority to us by compelling us to doubt narrators and the authorizing function of isnād 
and by divesting himself of any “accountability” for the text’s mental defect (ʿuhda). 
 Indeed, the text, like Majnūn, is infected with mental defect, and in turn, invites 
the audience to approach it with a touch of madness. Like the Deleuzian ethics of “imma-
nence,” what Iṣfahānī’s text calls for is the pursuit of “the Madman.” It is a pursuit fueled 
by the confrontation with the unfamiliar (ʿajab), mirroring Majnūn’s mad pursuit of 
Laylā. The introductory section of “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” invites us 
to become mad, as the type of knowledge to be gained from this chapter requires the 
mind to be altered in some way, to be infected with some “lawtha,” the implication of 
which I explore in Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
  
  59 
 
 
Chapter 2 
A Touch of Something  
The Story of Majnūn Laylā 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 As we have seen in Chapter 1, having been invited to become mad, the audience, 
like Majnūn, is especially susceptible to the transformative, performative potential of 
language and speech in “The Lore and Origin of Majnun of the Banu Amir” (“Akhbār 
Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu”). After inviting us into madness, however, Iṣfahānī 
keeps framing and reframing majnūn/Majnūn in paradoxical ways and stages junūn 
(madness) as diverse and multi-faceted.  
 The notion of madness is immediately complicated in Iṣfahānī’s narration of 
Majnūn’s story. Iṣfahānī addresses Majnūn’s madness in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa 
Nasabuhu” even before raising questions about the poet’s historicity. The first divergence 
among akhbār in the chapter revolves around Majnūn’s status as a madman. While the 
second khabar implicitly confirms this status (“The Majnūn’s name is Qays bin al-
Malawwaḥ” (Iṣfahānī 2: 3), al-Aṣmaʿī challenges this label outright in the khabar that 
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follows: “He was not Majnūn, rather he had some ‘lawtha’43 in him like the ‘lawtha’ of 
Abū Ḥayya al-Numīrī” (Iṣfahānī 2: 3). The pronoun “he” here refers to Majnūn Banī 
ʿĀmir, from whom the chapter gets its title. Thus, this khabar not only diverges from 
what came before but also diverges internally. 
 This puzzling khabar appears in altered form throughout the text. Three such 
akhbār appear within the first seventeen of the chapter,44 each of which is attributed to al-
Aṣmaʿī, and it appears three more times in the narratives that follow these introductory 
akhbār. Furthermore, as the story unfolds, Iṣfahānī continues to reframe Majnūn’s mad-
ness and to complicate the question of what it is to be mad in various ways. Iṣfahānī pre-
sents akhbār that use diverse terms to refer to madness. Narrators describe Majnūn as 
having “lost his reason,” “become wild,” “become muddled,” and “become confused.” 
Furthermore, the cause and cure of madness overlap. The mention of Majnūn’s beloved 
Laylā and his poetry are at times what causes him to lose his reason or become muddled, 
while at other times, they are what brings his reason back. 
 The positivist approach to the Aghānī, as discussed in the Introduction, would 
seek to pin down madness in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” in order to 
tame the text. Iṣfahānī’s presentation of the akhbār here, however, makes madness very 
                                                
43 The Dār al-Kutub Al-ʿIlmiyya edition of the Aghānī gives both the words lawtha and 
lūtha in the body of the text in each instance discussed here, which it indicates by double-
voweling.  
44 See akhbār 3, 11, and 19 
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difficult to pin down. Attempting to do so, then, would foreclose analysis of the diver-
gence and performative friction with which Iṣfahānī confronts us. Exploring instead the 
question of why Iṣfahānī confronts us with this divergence and performative friction and 
its performative effect, I propose, produces a more productive approach to Iṣfahānī’s 
presentation of madness in this chapter of the Aghānī.   
 In approaching madness in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” in this 
way, I draw once again upon Bakhtin’s theory of “dialogism” to consider not only the 
ways in which Iṣfahānī composes “languages of heteroglossia” to indirectly express “his 
intentions and values” (Dialogic Imagination 291-92) but also how he arranges akhbār 
and poetry to mediate Majnūn’s “pure and direct expression of his own intention” by the 
diverse languages of the text (Dialogic Imagination 285). I also engage Shoshana Fel-
man’s work on the issue of madness and literature, in which she examines literary texts 
for which questions of the “meaning” and “sense” of madness “do not permit a simple, 
unambiguous answer” (Writing and Madness 252-3). She suggests that we might be able 
to “define the very specificity of literature as that which suspends the answer to the ques-
tion of knowing whether the madness literature speaks is literal or figurative” (253). That 
is, we might approach literature and consider the ways in which it is able to blur the 
boundaries between madness as symptom and as metaphor, or more specifically, “be-
tween psychosis and stereotype” (253).  
 In Felman’s consideration of Henry James’s The Turn of the Screw, she demon-
strates the way in which the novel’s critical reception reproduces the thematic concerns 
of the story itself, wherein the “scene of the critical debate is…a repetition of the scene 
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dramatized in the text” (Writing and Madness 148). It is in the reading of the text, she 
suggests, that the text “acts itself out” (Writing and Madness 148). Because The Turn of 
the Screw itself “fails to mean,” and instead dramatizes the “very functioning of meaning 
as division and as conflict” through “a clash of meanings,” The Turn of the Screw engen-
ders “a conflict of interpretations, a critical debate, and discord precisely like the polemic 
that surrounds” because it “fails to mean,” and instead dramatizes the “very functioning 
of meaning as division and as conflict” through “a clash of meanings,” (159). The text’s 
openness, that is, implicates readers in its scandal, not only at the time of its publication, 
but with each reception.  
 We have seen in Chapter 1 the way in which the first seventeen akhbār of 
“Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” foreground such a “clash of meanings,” 
which produces a sort of performative friction that similarly invites the reader into its 
thematic concerns, namely madness and wonder. As an akhbār text, the Aghānī not only 
relates the story of Majnūn Laylā but also layers of critical response through narrators 
who have been pulled into the madness of the pursuit of the out-of-reach Majnūn, inter-
twining the story and the response to it, such that we cannot tease out one from the other. 
 As I argue in this chapter, Iṣfahānī’s invitation to the audience to enter into the 
madness of the text as demonstrated in Chapter 1 is integral to the notion of madness that 
is at play in this story. This invitation blurs the boundaries between what is inside and 
outside the text and what is inside and outside of madness. That is, the text implicates the 
audience in its madness and the madness of Majnūn’s pursuit while also compelling it to 
participate in the rhetoric of madness—is Majnūn mad?—and thus questioning its own 
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madness. Drawing upon Shoshana Felman’s theory of the “reading-effect,” I argue that 
Iṣfahānī constantly frames and reframes madness throughout “Akhbār Majnūn Banī 
ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu,” staging it as ubiquitous and relative in such a way that confronts 
the audience with a culture subsumed by madness and toys with cultural normativity.  
“HE WAS NOT MAJNŪN” 
 Al-Aṣmaʿī’s declaration—“He was not Majnūn, rather he had some ‘lawtha’ in 
him like the ‘lawtha’ of Abū Ḥayya al-Numīrī ” (Iṣfahānī 2: 3)—calls attention to the 
polyvalence of the word “majnūn” and the extent to which Majnūn’s name, identity, and 
even existence are inextricably linked to the question of his madness. As a descriptive 
adjective—“mad”—it implies a character trait, as a noun—“madman”—it implies a gen-
eralized, identifying trait, and as a name—“Majnūn”—it functions as a totalizing marker 
of his identity and existence. The polyvalence of this challenge continues to reverberate, 
even as the second clause of the khabar focuses the challenge on his madness: “rather he 
had some ‘lawtha’ in him like the ‘lawtha’ of Abū Ḥayya al-Numīrī” (Iṣfahānī 2: 3).45 
This clause qualifies the challenge and draws the term “majnūn” toward the first sense 
indicated above: “mad.” It invokes the aspect of “majnūn” that implies madness, howev-
er, only to challenge its applicability to Majnūn, and in doing so, the challenge in the 
clause topples over all senses of “majnūn.” If he is not mad, surely he is no madman, and 
thus he is not “majnūn.” Challenging his madness becomes a challenge to his identity and 
existence.  
                                                
45 See khabar 3 
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 The seemingly self-contradictory nature of the first clause of the khabar—“He 
was not Majnūn”—raises questions about the soundness, or madness, of such a challenge 
and the distinction between what is and is not mad. In providing the name of the poet as 
“Majnūn” in the chapter title, Iṣfahānī asserts a community in which Majnūn’s 
M/majnūn-ness is taken for granted. He is the poet of the Banū ʿĀmir known for his 
madness. He is the madman. We also learn, however, that “he was not majnūn” (Iṣfahānī 
2: 3). Iṣfahānī’s presentation of Majnūn equates to a paradox and a complication of ac-
cepted knowledge: “Majnūn was not majnūn.” Trinh T. Minh-ha reminds us that, at least 
for a modern-day audience, “those who run around yelling that X is not X and X can be 
Y usually land in a hospital, a rehabilitation center, a concentration camp, or a res-er-va-
tion [sic.]…and can easily fit into the categories of the ‘mentally ill’ or the ‘mentally un-
derdeveloped’” (236). In challenging Majnūn’s madness, al-Aṣmaʿī and thus the Iṣfahānī 
of the Aghānī, assert their own madness, which implies a madness at work in the text it-
self. However, what calls the soundness of the speakers’ minds into question also calls 
into question the line between the sound and the unsound mind. The challenge compli-
cates the boundaries of madness itself, and as Steven M. Rosen argues, this sort of para-
dox “boggles our minds because the human mind is a reflective organ whose principal 
function is to draw clear-cut boundaries” (18). In repeating the refrain of this paradoxical 
challenge, the text orients the audience away from this function and toward ambiguity.  
 Like the initial khabar, all but one of the repetitions present the same qualifica-
tion: that Majnūn was not mad, but he had some “lawtha” in him. The structure of excep-
tion sets up a relationship between madness and lawtha. Having lawtha, it implies, can be 
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mistaken for madness. “Lawtha” derives from the root l-w-th, meaning to twist or turn 
around, like the twisting of a turban. As the act of twisting has the potential to both en-
hance and subvert, to strengthen or weaken, the root takes on both divergent meanings. 
Dictionary glosses of lawtha reflect this polyvalence inherent in the root. In al-Murtaḍā 
al-Zabīdī’s 18th-century dictionary Tāj al-ʿArūs, Ibn Sīda (d. 1066) quotes al-Aṣmaʿī, the 
final narrator in all but one of the six akhbār, as equating “lawtha” with both resolution 
of mind (ʿazmat al-ʿaql) and foolishness/stupidity (ḥumqa)46 (1303). Edward Lane’s lexi-
con gives meanings for the term that range from strength, weakness of judgment, 
weak/incomplete evidence, repetition, stuttering, slowness, stupidity, a touch of madness, 
and a state of excitement ( 2678).  
 The expression of lawtha in this challenge—as something one has or possesses—
is the expression we find for the term in the other instances in which it appears in the 
Aghānī. In “Akhbār Maʿn bin ʾAws wa Nasabuhu,” the chapter Iṣfahānī devotes to the 
mukhaḍram poet Maʿn bin ʾAws, Saʿīd bin ʿAmr al-Zubayrī relates: 
Maʿn bin ʾAws had a woman called Thūr whom he doted on out of love. She was 
a village woman who had been raised in al-Shām. Maʿn bin ʾAws had some Bed-
                                                
46 Original text: 
ﺮﻛذﺫوﻭ ﻦﯿﻴﮭﻬﺟﻮﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑاﺍ هﻩﺪﯿﻴﺳ ﻲﻓ ،٬ﻢﻜﺤﻤﻟاﺍ ﻦﻋ ﻦﺑاﺍ ﻲﺑاﺍﺮﻋﻷاﺍ. ﺔﺛﻮﻠﻟاﺍ  : ﺞﯿﻴﮭﻬﻟاﺍ  ،٬ ﺢﺘﻔﺑ ،٬نﻥﻮﻜﺴﻓ  ﺲﻣوﻭ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻟاﺍ  ،٬ ﻦﻋوﻭ 
ﻲﻌﻤﺻﻷاﺍ: ﺔﺛﻮﻠﻟاﺍ: ،٬ﺔﻘﻤﺤﻟاﺍ ﺔﺛﻮﻠﻟاﺍوﻭ: ﺔﻣﺰﻌﻟاﺍ ﻞﻘﻌﻟﺎﺑ.  
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ouin Arabness (aʿrābiyya) and lawtha in him. So, she would laugh at the rough-
ness of his speech/manner (ʿajrafiyyatihi).47 (Iṣfahānī 12: 72-3) 
This narrative compares and contrasts lawtha with both village cosmopolitanism and 
Bedouin Arabness and thus directly links the possession of lawtha with identity, upbring-
ing, and lineage. Perhaps, then, the best rendering of lawtha here would be “something 
else mixed in.” Like his Bedouinness, lawtha is what makes Maʿn bin ʾAws walk and 
talk funny, but what constitutes lawtha is unknown and unspoken. It is not an invariable 
essence, but rather the unfamiliar, foreign, outside thing that mixes with the known, a 
marker of difference that can charm or repulse.  
 Another illustrative use of the term lawtha in the Aghānī comes in the following 
story from the chapter on the Jāhilī poet Zuhayr bin Janāb, “Akhbār Zuhayr bin Janāb wa 
Nasabuhu”: 
Zuhayr bin Janāb and his brother Ḥāritha came to some of the kings of Ghassān. 
When they both entered upon the king, they spoke to him and recited poetry for 
him. He was delighted by them and drank with them. One day, he said to them: 
“My mother is very ill, and my treatment for her isn’t working. Do you know of a 
remedy for her?” Ḥāritha said: “Hot kumayra (kumayra ḥārra)”—he had some 
lawtha in him—so, the king asked: “What was it that you said?” Zuhayr said: 
                                                
47 Original Text: 
نﻥﺎﻛ ﻦﻌﻤﻟ ﻦﺑ سﺱوﻭأﺃ  ًةﺓأﺃﺮﻣاﺍ لﻝﺎﻘﯾﻳ ﺎﮭﻬﻟ رﺭﻮﺛ نﻥﺎﻣوﻭ ﺎﮭﻬﻟ ،ً٬ﺎﺒﺤﻣ ﺖﻧﺎﻛوﻭ ﺔﯾﻳﺮﻀﺣ تﺕﺄﺸﻧ ،٬مﻡﺎﺸﻟﺎﺑ ﺖﻧﺎﻛوﻭ ﻲﻓ ﻦﻌﻣ ﺔﯿﻴﺑاﺍﺮﻋأﺃ ﺔﺛﻮﻟوﻭ ،٬ 
ﺖﻧﺎﻜﻓ ﻚﺤﻀﺗ ﻦﻣ ﮫﻪﺘﯿﻴﻓﺮﺠﻋ  
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“Hot truffles (kumayʾa ḥārra) should be fed to her.” The king stood up, and hav-
ing understood both the former and the latter, showed them that he was ordering a 
truffle to be prepared for her and dreamt about Ḥāritha’s treatise. Ḥāritha said to 
Zuhayr: “Zuhayr, twist what you want to be twisted.” And he delivered it as a les-
son (mathal).48 (Iṣfahānī 19: 24) 
When Ḥāritha seems to mispronounce the word kumayʾa as kumayra, the narrator tells us 
that “he had some lawtha in him” (Iṣfahānī 19: 24), suggesting that lawtha indicates 
some speech impediment. One might surmise from this story that the word “kumayra” is 
a nonsense word, and, indeed, it does not appear in the many dictionaries or lexicons I 
have consulted, nor does it appear in Brigham Young University’s Arabic Corpus, out-
side of its citation of this story from the Aghānī. The root k-m-r, however, from which 
kumayra would be derived, does give the noun “kamara,” which refers to “the head of 
the penis” (raʾs al-dhakar) and could resemble a truffle, which is the treatment Zuhayr 
later suggests and the king “dreamt about” (Ibn Manẓūr 3929). In the context of suggest-
                                                
48 Original text: 
ﺪﻓوﻭ ﺮﯿﻴھﮪﮬﻫزﺯ ﻦﺑ بﺏﺎﻨﺟ هﻩﻮﺧأﺃوﻭ ﺔﺛرﺭﺎﺣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺾﻌﺑ كﻙﻮﻠﻣ ،٬نﻥﺎﺴﻏ ﺎﻤﻠﻓ ﻼﺧدﺩ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻠﻋ هﻩﺎﺛﺪﺣ ،٬هﻩاﺍﺪﺸﻧأﺃوﻭ ﺐﺠﻋﺄﻓ ﺎﻤﮭﻬﺑ ،٬ﺎﻤﮭﻬﻣدﺩﺎﻧوﻭ 
لﻝﺎﻘﻓ  ً ﺎﻣﻮﯾﻳ ﺎﻤﮭﻬﻟ: نﻥإﺇ ﻲﻣأﺃ ﺔﻠﯿﻴﻠﻋ ةﺓﺪﯾﻳﺪﺷ ،٬ﺔﻠﻌﻟاﺍ ﺪﻗوﻭ ﻲﻧﺎﯿﻴﻋأﺃ ،٬ﺎھﮪﮬﻫؤﺅاﺍوﻭدﺩ ﻞﮭﻬﻓ نﻥﺎﻓﺮﻌﺗ ﺎﮭﻬﻟ ؟ءاﺍوﻭدﺩ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﺔﺛرﺭﺎﺣ: ﯿﻴﻤﻛةﺓﺮ ةﺓرﺭﺎﺣ -
ﺖﻧﺎﻛوﻭ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻓ ﺔﺛﻮﻟ - لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﻚﻠﻤﻟاﺍ: يﻱأﺃ ءﻲﺷ ؟ﺖﻠﻗ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﮫﻪﻟ ﺮﯿﻴھﮪﮬﻫزﺯ: ﺔﺌﯿﻴﻤﻛ ةﺓرﺭﺎﺣ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﻤﻌﻄﺗ ﺐﺛﻮﻓ ﻚﻠﻤﻟاﺍ -ﺪﻗوﻭ ﻢﮭﻬﻓ ﻰﻟوﻭﻷاﺍ 
ةﺓﺮﺧﻵاﺍوﻭ - ﺎﻤﮭﻬﯾﻳﺮﯾﻳ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ ﺮﻣﺄﯾﻳ حﺡﻼﺻﺈﺑ ةﺓﺄﻤﻜﻟاﺍ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﻟ ﻢﻠﺣوﻭ ﻦﻋ ﺔﻟﺎﻘﻣ. لﻝﺎﻗوﻭ ﺔﺛرﺭﺎﺣ ﺮﯿﻴھﮪﮬﻫﺰﻟ: ﺎﯾﻳ ﺮﯿﻴھﮪﮬﻫزﺯ ﺐﻠﻗاﺍ ﺎﻣ ﺖﺌﺷ ،٬ﺐﻠﻘﻨﯾﻳ 
ﺎﮭﻬﻠﺳرﺭﺄﻓ  ًﻼﺜﻣ.  
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ing treatment for a king’s mother, the idea of a “hot glans” as a remedy may appear devi-
ant and perverse. Ḥāritha’s “lesson” to his brother Zuhayr—“flip what you want to be 
flipped”—itself flips or twists the situation on its head, suggesting that it was Zuhayr, not 
Ḥāritha, who twisted something when he corrected his brother by saying “truffle.” What 
causes Ḥāritha to “misspeak”—this lawtha—also causes him to twist norms and expecta-
tions, which recalls the core meaning of l-w-th: to be twisted. Indeed, the khabar directly 
following this story in the chapter tells of Zuhayr losing his mind.  
 In both the stories from the Aghānī cited above, lawtha marks difference, differ-
ence that manifests in speech. It is intangible precisely because it only asserts itself or 
arises as a “symptom” in a particular context, that is, in relation to surrounding norms. At 
the same time, however, lawtha embraces that which is normative along with that which 
is non-normative: which is which when they can be flipped? To be mad, or “majnūn,” on 
the other hand, implies a state of jinn (spirit) possession independent of time and place. 
When the Qurʾān rebuts disbelievers calling the Prophet Muḥammad “majnūn,” it is as an 
accusation and an attempt to discredit him. The narrators in these stories use lawtha not 
as part of an accusation or attempt at labeling a character but rather an explanation for the 
events in the story. Lawtha is the answer to the questions: Why does Thūr laugh at Maʿn 
bin ʾAws’ speech? Why does his speech seem rough to her? Why does Ḥāritha suggest to 
the king that he treat his mother's ailment with “hot glans”? As an answer, however, law-
tha leaves a great deal of ambiguity.  
 The refrain of “He was not majnūn, rather he had some ‘lawtha’ in him” in 
“Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” foregrounds the question of Majnūn’s mad-
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ness, while also connecting it with questions of his identity and existence. The chapter 
implies in its title that he is majnūn, evoking the stereotypical expectations of spiritual 
inspiration and possession. The paradox of “He was not majnūn” challenges the audi-
ence’s assumptions and tendency to look for clear-cut boundaries, while the qualification 
that “he had some ‘lawtha’ in him” refocuses the question of madness toward this notion 
of lawtha, of in-betweenness, of what is and is not normative. In casting madness as so-
cially contingent, this challenge also suggests that Majnūn’s “madness” is neither a pro-
ductive state or a detrimental one, but rather a distinctive and enigmatic potential for both 
weakness and strength, charm and repulsion. In confronting Majnūn’s madness as lawtha, 
the audience is invited to acknowledge its own role in reframing madness and difference 
and also to question norms and its relationship to them.  
SUBSUMED BY MADNESS 
 The word “majnūn” appears approximately 150 times in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī 
ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu.” The polyvalence of the word and the confusion around Majnūn’s 
identity and existence lead us not only to ask to what majnūn refers—an adjective (mad), 
a label (madman), a name (Majnūn)—but also to whom it refers. We can read Ibn al-
Aʿrābī’s declaration in khabar 21 that “Muʿādh bin Kulayb was majnūn” (Iṣfahānī 2: 9), 
for example, as a declaration that this Muʿādh was mad, or that he was a madman, or that 
he was a “Majnūn.” If we take it to refer to a “Majnūn,” which one? Indeed, “Akhbār 
Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” presents a world full of many Majnūns 
(majānīn)/madmen. In khabar 5, for example, we encounter Ibn Daʾab asking a man from 
the Banū ʿĀmir tribe about Majnūn. In response, the man exclaims, “Have we exhausted 
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all the poetry of the wise men, to the point that we are reciting the poems of the mad 
ones! Indeed, they are many!” (Iṣfahānī 2: 4).  
 “Majnūn” is a passive participle from the root j-n-n, which not only conveys be-
ing or becoming “possessed” or “mad, insane, unsound in mind or intellect,” but also 
evokes veiling, concealing, or hiding (Lane 462). Engaging the latter sense of j-n-n, we 
might read “majnūn” as “covered” or “that who is hidden.” As the akhbār in the introduc-
tion to the chapter proceed, Majnūn seems to disappear under the cover of other madmen, 
other lovers, and other poets. The akhbār leading up to the story of Majnūn increasingly 
raise doubts about his claim to the poetry attributed to him and his existence. The akhbār 
continuously complicate and challenge the notion of “majnūn.” Then, in akhbār 31 and 
32, we find that the characters being asked about Majnūn have never heard of him: 
[31] I recited to ʾAyūb bin ʿAbāya these two verses: 
My friends, you told me that Taymāʾ is Laylā's home 
 Whenever summer has thrown down its anchor 
But these summer months have passed us by 
 So to where has the distance flung Laylā? 
I asked him about who said them. He said: “Jamīl.” So, I told him: “People recite 
them as Majnūn’s.” He responded: “Who is Majnūn?” I told him, and he said: 
“This has no truth to it, and I’ve not heard about it.”49  
                                                
49 Original text: 
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 :ﻓﻘﺎلﻝ اﺍﻟﺒﯿﻴﺘﯿﻴﻦ ھﮪﮬﻫﺬﯾﻳﻦ ﻋﻦ اﺍﻟﻌﺪوﻭيﻱ ﺑﻜﺮ أﺃﺑﺎ ﺳﺄﻟﺖ :ﻗﺎلﻝ اﺍﻟﻔﺮوﻭيﻱ ﻣﻮﺳﻰ ﺑﻦ ھﮪﮬﻫﺎرﺭوﻭنﻥ ﺑﻦ ﺷﺒﯿﻴﺐ ﺑﻦ ﷲ ﻋﺒﺪ ﻋﻦ ﻋﻤﻲ وﻭأﺃﺧﺒﺮﻧﻲ
  :وﻭأﺃﻧﺸﺪﻧﻲ ﻧﻌﻢ،٬ :ﻗﺎلﻝ ﻏﯿﻴﺮھﮪﮬﻫﻤﺎ؟ ﻣﻌﮭﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﮭﻬﻞ :ﻓﻘﻠﺖ اﺍﻟﻤﺠﻨﻮنﻥ،٬ ﯾﻳﻌﺮفﻑ وﻭﻟﻢ ﻟﺠﻤﯿﻴﻞ،٬ ھﮪﮬﻫﻤﺎ
  ھﮪﮬﻫﻲ ﻛﻤﺎ إﺇﻟﯿﻴﻚ ﺣﺎﺟﺎتﺕ ٌ اﺍﻟﻨﻔﺲ وﻭﻓﻲ ﻓـﺠـﺎءةﺓً  أﺃﻣﻮتﺕ أﺃنﻥ ﻷﺧﺸﻰ وﻭإﺇﻧﻲ
  ﺑـﯿﻴﺎ ﻣـﺎ أﺃﺑـﺜـﻚ أﺃنﻥ ﯾﻳﻮﻣﺎ ً  ﻟﻘﯿﻴﺘﻚ   ﻛـﻠـﻤـﺎ ﻟﻘـﺎؤﺅكﻙ ﻟﯿﻴﻨﺴﯿﻴﻨﻲ وﻭإﺇﻧﻲ
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Majnūn’s identity is subsumed under others’ identities. These akhbār suggest that 
“Majnūn” had become an archetype among certain “people,” a category for amorous 
verse about Laylā. Rather than distinguishing him, his madness and love of Laylā make 
Majnūn indistinguishable in a world of mad lovers.  
 The overwhelming majority of utterances of the word “Majnūn” in the chapter 
come in the definite form; narrators most often refer to the poet as “the Majnūn.” Under-
stood in this way, “the Majnūn” is less a nickname and more an attempt to distinguish 
one particular Majnūn in a world filled with Majnūns (majānīn). That madness was not a 
particularly unique trait, at least among the members of the Banū ʿĀmir tribe, is echoed 
in khabar 20.51 In it, al-Aṣmaʿī speaks of a time he asked a man from the Banū ʿĀmir 
                                                                                                                                            
اﺍﻮﻟﺎﻗوﻭ ﮫﻪـﺑ  ٌءاﺍدﺩ  ٌءﺎﯿﻴـﻋ ﮫﻪـﺑﺎـﺻأﺃ  ﺪﻗوﻭ ﺖﻤﻠﻋ ﻲﺴﻔﻧ نﻥﺎـﻜـﻣ ﺎﯿﻴﺋاﺍوﻭدﺩ  
51 Original text: 
ﻲﻧﺮﺒﺧأﺃوﻭ ﺮﻤﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺪﺒﻋ ﷲ ﺑﻦ  ٍﻞﯿﻴﻤﺟ ﻲﻜﺘﻌﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ ﺎﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﺮﻤﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺔﺒﺷ لﻝﺎﻗ ﺎﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﻲﻌﻤﺻﻷاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺖﻟﺄﺳ  ً ﺎﯿﻴﺑاﺍﺮﻋأﺃ ﻦﻣ ﻲﻨﺑ 
ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺔﻌﺼﻌﺻ ﻦﻋ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ يﻱﺮﻣﺎﻌﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ: ﻦﻋ ﻢﮭﻬﯾﻳأﺃ ؟ﻲﻨﻟﺄﺴﺗ ﺪﻘﻓ نﻥﺎﻛ ﺎﻨﯿﻴﻓ  ٌﺔﻋﺎﻤﺟ اﺍﻮﻣرﺭ ،٬نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻟﺎﺑ ﻦﻌﻓ ﻢﮭﻬﯾﻳأﺃ 
؟لﻝﺄﺴﺗ ﺖﻠﻘﻓ: ﻦﻋ يﻱﺬﻟاﺍ نﻥﺎﻛ ﺐﺒﺸﯾﻳ ،٬ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻠﺑ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ: ﻢﮭﻬﻠﻛ نﻥﺎﻛ ﺐﺒﺸﯾﻳ ،٬ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻠﺑ ﺖﻠﻗ: ﻲﻧﺪﺸﻧﺄﻓ ﺒﻟ،٬ﻢﮭﻬﻀﻌ ﻲﻧﺪﺸﻧﺄﻓ ﻢﺣاﺍﺰﻤﻟ ﻦﺑ 
ثﺙرﺭﺎﺤﻟاﺍ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ:  
ﻻأﺃ ﺎﮭﻬﯾﻳأﺃ ﺐﻠﻘﻟاﺍ يﻱﺬﻟاﺍ ﺞﻟ  ً ﺎـﻤﺋﺎھﮪﮬﻫ   ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻠﺑ  ًاﺍﺪﯿﻴﻟوﻭ ﻢﻟ ﻊﻄﻘﺗ ﮫﻪـﻤﺋﺎﻤﺗ  
ﻖﻓأﺃ ﺪﻗ قﻕﺎﻓأﺃ نﻥﻮﻘﺷﺎﻌﻟاﺍ ﺪﻗوﻭ ﻰﻧأﺃ  ﻚﻟ مﻡﻮﯿﻴﻟاﺍ نﻥأﺃ ﻰﻘﻠﺗ  ً ﺎﺒﯿﻴﺒطﻁ ﮫﻪﻤﺋﻼﺗ  
كﻙﺪﺟأﺃ ﻻ ﻚﯿﻴﺴﻨﺗ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ  ٌﺔﻤـﻠـﻣ  ﻢﻠﺗ ﻻوﻭ  ٌﺪﮭﻬﻋ لﻝﻮﻄﯾﻳ ﮫﻪـﻣدﺩﺎـﻘﺗ  
ﺖﻠﻗ: ﻲﻧﺪﺸﻧﺄﻓ هﻩﺮﯿﻴﻐﻟ ،٬ﻢﮭﻬﻨﻣ ﻲﻧﺪﺸﻧﺄﻓ ذﺫﺎﻌﻤﻟ ﺑﻦ  ٍﺐﯿﻴﻠﻛ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ:  
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tribe about “al-Majnūn al-ʿĀmirī” (the madman of the Banū ʿĀmir tribe) (Iṣfahānī 2: 8). 
The man replied: “About which one of them do you ask—we’ve had a group of us who 
were thrown into madness, so about which one of them do you ask?” (Iṣfahānī 2: 8). Al-
Aṣmaʿī explains that he is asking about “the one that would compose love poems about 
Laylā,” to which the man answers: “All of them would compose love poems about 
Laylā” (Iṣfahānī 2: 8). Upon al-Aṣmaʿī’s request, the man recites verse for three such 
madmen—Muzāḥim, bin Ḥārith, Muʿādh bin Kulayb, and Mahdī bin al-Malawwaḥ 
(Iṣfahānī 2: 8). When asked to continue to recite verse for the rest of the mad Banū ʿĀmir 
who rhapsodized about Laylā, the man declines: “That’s enough for you! By God, even 
just one of them is equal to your wise men today” (Iṣfahānī 2: 9). Al-Aṣmaʿī’s pursuit of 
Majnūn reenacts Majnūn’s pursuit of Laylā, dramatically reproducing and participating in 
the story of Majnūn in a way akin to the critical interpretation of The Turn of the Screw 
reproduces the text and “unwittingly participates in it,” as Felman argues (148). Al-
                                                                                                                                            
ﻻأﺃ ﺎﻤﻟﺎطﻁ ﺖﺒﻋﻻ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ ﻲـﻧدﺩﺎـﻗوﻭ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﻮﮭﻬﻠﻟاﺍ  ٌﺐﻠﻗ نﻥﺎﺴﺤﻠﻟ عﻉﻮـﺒـﺗ  
لﻝﺎطﻁوﻭ ءاﺍﺮﺘﻣاﺍ قﻕﻮﺸﻟاﺍ ﻲﻨﯿﻴﻋ ﺎﻤﻠﻛ  ﺖﻓﺰﻧ  ً ﺎﻋﻮﻣدﺩ ﺪـﺠـﺘﺴﺗ عﻉﻮـﻣدﺩ  
ﺪﻘﻓ لﻝﺎطﻁ ﻲﻛﺎﺴﻣإﺇ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺪﺒﻜﻟاﺍ ﻲﺘﻟاﺍ  ﺎﮭﻬﺑ ﻦﻣ ىﻯﻮھﮪﮬﻫ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ ةﺓاﺍﺪﻐﻟاﺍ عﻉوﻭﺪﺻ  
ﺖﻠﻗ: ﻲﻧﺪﺸﻧﺄﻓ ﺮﯿﻴﻐﻟ ﻦﯾﻳﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﻦﻤﻣ ،٬تﺕﺮﻛذﺫ ﻲﻧﺪﺸﻧﺄﻓ يﻱﺪﮭﻬﻤﻟ ﻦﺑ حﺡﻮﻠﻤﻟاﺍ:  
ﻮﻟ نﻥأﺃ ﻚﻟ ﺎﯿﻴﻧﺪﻟاﺍ ﺎﻣوﻭ ﺖﻟﺪﻋ ﮫﻪﺑ   ﺎھﮪﮬﻫاﺍﻮﺳ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟوﻭ  ٌﻦﺋﺎﺑ ﻚﻨﻋ ﺎﮭﻬﻨﯿﻴﺑ  
ﺖﻨﻜﻟ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ  ًاﺍﺮﯿﻴﻘﻓ ﺎـﻤﻧإﺇوﻭ  دﺩﻮﻘﯾﻳ ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﻟإﺇ دﺩوﻭ ﻚﺴﻔﻧ ﺎـﮭﻬﻨﯿﻴﺣ  
ﺖﻠﻗ ﮫﻪﻟ: ﻲﻧﺪﺸﻧﺄﻓ ﻦﻤﻟ ﻲﻘﺑ ﻦﻣ ،٬ءﻻﺆھﮪﮬﻫ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ: ﻚﺒﺴﺣ! ﷲﻮﻓ نﻥإﺇ ﻲﻓ ﺪﺣاﺍوﻭ ﻦﻣ ءﻻﺆھﮪﮬﻫ ﻦﻤﻟ نﻥزﺯﻮﯾﻳ ﻢﻜﺋﻼﻘﻌﺑ مﻡﻮﯿﻴﻟاﺍ.  
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Aṣmaʿī’s madness, like Majnūn’s, is the madness of the pursuit of the unattainable, and 
as an audience, we are similarly set on a pursuit of Majnūn, continuing the performance 
of madness in the text and filling up the space of the text with even more madmen.     
 Whereas the repeated challenges to Majnūn’s madness substitute the notion of 
“lawtha” for madness, khabar 4 and khabar 20, in which Ibn Daʾab and al-Aṣmaʿī, re-
spectively, relate anecdotes about asking the Banū ʿĀmir about al-Majnūn, further chal-
lenge Majnūn’s status as the archetypal mad poet, as his madness becomes a common-
place madness and his poetry indistinguishable from other madmen. The question is no 
longer one of whether Majnūn was mad. Rather, these akhbār interrogate the notion of 
madness itself; indeed, what does it mean to be mad among a tribe of madmen? Shoshana 
Felman poses a similar question in Writing and Madness: “Why is everyone today med-
dling with madness? What does it mean to talk about madness? How can madness thus 
become commonplace?” (13). While madness “usually occupies a position of exclusion,” 
she reasons, “madness that is common place occupies a position of inclusion” in such a 
way that an entire era would “become subsumed within the space of madness” (Felman, 
Writing and Madness 14). Through these akhbār, whose arrangement frames them as an 
exploration of madness, Iṣfahānī invites the audience to confront this scenario, in which 
the boundary designating what is outside of madness and what is inside of it has disap-
peared. As a discourse on madness, the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” is 
simultaneously exterior to and interior to the madness at hand. But whereas Felman’s 
questions problematize the paradoxical ubiquity of madness in the contemporary world, 
Iṣfahānī raises the question of a culture subsumed by madness by raising the notion of its 
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ubiquity as well its relativity: one tribe’s madman is another tribe’s wise man, as the mys-
terious Bedouin tells al-Aṣmaʿī.  
IN AND OUT OF MADNESS 
 Thus far, my investigation of madness in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa 
Nasabuhu” has focused on the first 32 akhbār that constitute the introductory section of 
the chapter and their arrangement, which raise the questions “What does it mean to be 
Majnūn?” and “What does it mean to call someone Majnūn?” In the akhbār that follow 
the introduction, Majnūn’s story unfolds as an investigation of the nature and cause of his 
“madness.” The short akhbār of the introduction grow into longer narratives, in which the 
term “junūn,” the noun related to “Majnūn” and denoting “madness,” only appears once 
outside of poetic verse. With the inclusion of more descriptive and active terms and 
phrases, the notion of madness expands beyond junūn.  
These akhbār speak of madness with verbs such as “ikhtalaṭa” (to be muddled), 
“khūliṭa” (to be mixed), and “iltabasa” (to be confused), suggesting that becoming mad is 
an event, a transformative becoming brought on by confusion. Deriving from the root kh-
l-ṭ, ikhtalaṭa and khūliṭa suggest mixing and blending and thus take on connotations of 
being or becoming confused and muddled. The reflexive verb ikhtalaṭa and its related 
verbal noun ikhtilāṭ  appear eight times in the main narratives that follow the introductory 
section, and a variety of narrators employ them. In each instance, Majnūn’s confusion is 
preceded by an adverb of time,—ḥaynaʾidhin (at that time), qablu (before), baʿda (after), 
and lammā (when)—emphasizing the sense of his becoming confused and muddled. This 
moment of transformation indicated by his ikhtilāṭ purports to organize time into catego-
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ries of before and after. Like Jesus’s birth, the hijra, and Creation, the moment at which 
Majnūn’s mind became muddled presents itself as a marker of an episode one that is in-
ternal to the story. Although this temporal “dichotomy” initially seems straightforward, 
as the stories progress, the way in which narrators employ it reveals the marker to be 
problematic. The following excerpts list the uses of the verb ikhtalaṭa and the verbal 
noun ikhtilāṭ in the order in which they appear in the text: 
[1] His father died before his becoming muddled.52 (Iṣfahānī 2: 6) 
[2] Laylā promised him before he became muddled that she would try to visit him 
at night if she had the chance.53 (Iṣfahānī 2: 27) 
[3] When the mind of Qays bin al-Malawwaḥ become muddled and he abandoned 
food and drink, his mother went to Laylā.54 (Iṣfahānī 2: 34) 
[4] His father died before his becoming muddled and wild.55 (Iṣfahānī 2: 65) 
                                                
52 Original text: 
هﻩﺎﺑأﺃ تﺕﺎﻣ ﻞﺒﻗ ﮫﻪطﻁﻼﺘﺧاﺍ  
53 Original text: 
ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ ﮫﻪﺗﺪﻋوﻭ ﻞﺒﻗ نﻥأﺃ ﻂﻠﺘﺨﯾﻳ نﻥأﺃ هﻩﺮﯾﻳﺰﺘﺴﺗ  ًﺔﻠﯿﻴﻟ اﺍذﺫإﺇ تﺕﺪﺟوﻭ  ًﺔﺻﺮﻓ ﻚﻟﺬﻟ  
54 Original text: 
 ﺎﻤﻟ ﻂﻠﺘﺧاﺍ ﻞﻘﻋ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ حﺡﻮﻠﻤﻟاﺍ كﻙﺮﺗوﻭ مﻡﺎﻌﻄﻟاﺍ ،٬بﺏاﺍﺮﺸﻟاﺍوﻭ ﺖﻀﻣ ﮫﻪﻣأﺃ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ  
55 Original text: 
 تﺕﺎﻣوﻭ ﻞﺒﻗ ﮫﻪطﻁﻼﺘﺧاﺍ ﮫﻪﺸﺣﻮﺗوﻭ  
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[5] Al-Majnūn fell ill before his becoming muddled. His qawm and their women 
visited him, but Laylā was not among them.56 (Iṣfahānī 2: 66) 
[6] Al-Majnūn became very sickly before his becoming muddled to the point of 
near-death. His father came to him in order to cure him, and he found him singing 
these verses and sobbing feverishly: 
O heart that clings to Laylā out of a mad kind of love 
 Like a boy whose amulets were not yet severed 
Recover! The other lovers have recovered and the time has come  
 For you to meet a doctor with whom you agree57 (Iṣfahānī 2: 72) 
[7] I passed by Majnūn while he was looking down upon a valley in the spring-
time, and that was before he became muddled. He was singing poetry I was not 
able to understand58 (Iṣfahānī 2: 85) 
                                                
56 Original text: 
ضﺽﺮﻣ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ ﻞﺒﻗ نﻥأﺃ ﻂﻠﺘﺨﯾﻳ هﻩدﺩﺎﻌﻓ ﮫﻪﻣﻮﻗ ﻢھﮪﮬﻫؤﺅﺎﺴﻧوﻭ ﻢﻟوﻭ هﻩﺪﻌﺗ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ ﻦﻤﯿﻴﻓ هﻩدﺩﺎﻋ  
57 Original text: 
نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ ﻢﻘﺳ ﺎﻣﺎﻘﺳ  ًاﺍﺪﯾﻳﺪﺷ ﻞﺒﻗ ﮫﻪطﻁﻼﺘﺧاﺍ ﻰﺘﺣ ﻰﻔﺷأﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ،٬كﻙﻼﮭﻬﻟاﺍ ﻞﺧﺪﻓ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻟإﺇ هﻩﻮﺑأﺃ ﮫﻪﻠﻠﻌﯾﻳ هﻩﺪﺟﻮﻓ ﺪﺸﻨﯾﻳ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ تﺕﺎﯿﻴﺑﻷاﺍ ﻲﻜﺒﯾﻳوﻭ 
ﺮﺣأﺃ ءﺎﻜﺑ ﺞﺸﻨﯾﻳوﻭ ﺮﺣأﺃ ﺞﯿﻴﺸﻧ:  
ﻻأﺃ ﺎﮭﻬﯾﻳأﺃ ﺐﻠﻘﻟاﺍ يﻱﺬﻟاﺍ ﺞـﻟ  ً ﺎـﻤﺋﺎـھﮪﮬﻫ  ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻠﺑ  ًاﺍﺪﯿﻴﻟوﻭ ﻢﻟ ﻊﻄﻘﺗ ﮫﻪـﻤﺋﺎـﻤـﺗ  
ﻖﻓأﺃ ﺪﻗ قﻕﺎﻓأﺃ نﻥﻮﻘﺷﺎﻌﻟاﺍ ﺪﻗوﻭ أﺃﻰـﻧ  ﻚﻟﺎﺤﻟ نﻥأﺃ ﻰﻘﻠﺗ  ً ﺎـﺒﯿﻴﺒطﻁ ﮫﻪـﻤﺋﻼـﺗ  
58 Original text: 
تﺕرﺭﺮﻣ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟﺎﺑ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ  ٌفﻑﺮﺸﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ  ٍدﺩاﺍوﻭ ﻲﻓ مﻡﺎﯾﻳأﺃ ،٬ﻊﯿﻴﺑﺮﻟاﺍ كﻙاﺍذﺫوﻭ ﻞﺒﻗ نﻥأﺃ ،٬ﻂﻠﺘﺨﯾﻳ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ ﻰﻨﻐﺘﯾﻳ ﺮﻌﺸﺑ ﻢﻟ ﮫﻪﻤﮭﻬﻓأﺃ  
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[8] Al-Majnūn passed by Laylā after his becoming muddled while she was walk-
ing in Ẓāhir al-Buyūt.59 A long period of separation had passed. When he saw her, 
he cried until he fell on his face in a swoon. She took off, scared that her family 
would find her with him.60 (Iṣfahānī 2: 86)  
The first four excerpts seem to present Majnūn’s ikhtilāṭ (becoming-muddled) as a singu-
lar moment in time. In particular, excerpts 1 and 4 relate it temporally to the singular 
moment of the death of his father, suggesting each as an event fixed in time. The use of 
his ikhtilāṭ as an organizing principle, however, quickly becomes confused. In the pages 
between these two reports, we find a long akhbār in which Majnūn’s father recounts 
Majnūn’s story with Laylā and his losing his mind: 
He became hot and fainted and then awoke having lost his mind. He wouldn’t 
wear a robe without tearing it off, he wouldn’t walk around without being com-
pletely naked, and he would play with dirt and gather bones around himself. 
Whenever Laylā was mentioned to him, he would start speaking about her ration-
ally, without missing a syllable. He had given up prayer (ṣalāh), and when it was 
said to him: “What’s wrong? Why don’t you pray?!” He wouldn’t utter a syllable. 
We would lock him up and tie him down, so he bit his tongue and his lip until we 
                                                
59 Ẓāhir al-Buyūt is a location in al-Ṣaʿda in Yemen.  
60 Original text: 
ﺮﻣ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ ﺪﻌﺑ ﮫﻪطﻁﻼﺘﺧاﺍ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻠﺑ “ﻲھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ” ﻲﺸﻤﺗ ﻲﻓ ﺮھﮪﮬﻫﺎظﻅ تﺕﻮﯿﻴﺒﻟاﺍ ﺪﻌﺑ  ٍﺪﻘﻓ ﺎﮭﻬﻟ ،٬ﻞﯾﻳﻮطﻁ ﺎﻤﻠﻓ ﺎھﮪﮬﻫآﺁرﺭ ﻰﻜﺑ ﻰﺘﺣ ﻂﻘﺳ ﻰﻠﻋ 
ﮫﻪﮭﻬﺟوﻭ  ً ﺎﯿﻴﺸﻐﻣ ،٬ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻠﻋ ﺖﻓﺮﺼﻧﺎﻓ  ً ﺎﻓﻮﺧ ﻦﻣ ﺎﮭﻬﻠھﮪﮬﻫأﺃ نﻥأﺃ ﺎھﮪﮬﻫﻮﻘﻠﯾﻳ هﻩﺪﻨﻋ  
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became afraid for his safety. So, we let him go on his way, and so he wandered 
around in love.61 (Iṣfahānī 2: 17) 
The akhbār continue to complicate the singularity of his ikhtilāṭ, i.e., becoming mad. In 
excerpts 5 and 6 we learn that Majnūn was sick and on the verge of death before he be-
came muddled. It was also before Majnūn’s becoming muddled that the narrator of ex-
cerpt 7 reports to have found him singing incomprehensible poetry atop a mountain. The-
se akhbār stage performances of symptoms of his madness—illness, wandering, and in-
comprehensibility—yet the narrators have placed them “before his becoming muddled.” 
What, then, does it mean that he became muddled? In other words, what distinguishes 
what came before from what came after? Madness and mental muddling are not so easy 
to differentiate from sanity in Iṣfahānī’s retelling of the Majnūn Laylā romance. 
Majnūn’s madness, as Iṣfahānī presents it to us, is itself muddled.  
 Kilpatrick (“Modernity”) and Khan have suggested that Iṣfahānī organizes 
Majnūn’s akhbār to create three story cycles, such that each cycle offers different chro-
nologies of events as well as different versions of events. While I am unable to identify 
three distinct story cycles as they have, their observations reinforce the argument that de-
                                                
61 Original text: 
ﺮﺨﻓ  ً ﺎﯿﻴﺸﻐﻣ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻠﻋ ﻢﺛ قﻕﺎﻓأﺃ  ًاﺍﺪﻗﺎﻓ ،٬ﮫﻪﻠﻘﻋ نﻥﺎﻜﻓ ﻻ ﺲﺒﻠﯾﻳ  ً ﺎﺑﻮﺛ ﻻإﺇ ﮫﻪﻗﺮﺧ ﻻوﻭ ﻲﺸﻤﯾﻳ ﻻإﺇ  ً ﺎﯾﻳرﺭﺎﻋ ﺐﻌﻠﯾﻳوﻭ بﺏاﺍﺮﺘﻟﺎﺑ ﻊﻤﺠﯾﻳوﻭ مﻡﺎﻈﻌﻟاﺍ 
،٬ﮫﻪﻟﻮﺣ اﺍذﺫﺈﻓ تﺕﺮﻛذﺫ ﮫﻪﻟ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ ﺄﺸﻧأﺃ ثﺙﺪﺤﯾﻳ ﺎﮭﻬﻨﻋ  ًﻼﻗﺎﻋ ﻻوﻭ ءﻰﻄﺨﯾﻳ ،ً٬ﺎﻓﺮﺣ كﻙﺮﺗوﻭ ،٬ةﺓﻼﺼﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫﺈﻓ ﻞﯿﻴﻗ ﮫﻪﻟ: ﺎﻣ ﻚﻟ ﻻ ﻲﻠﺼﺗ! ﻢﻟ 
دﺩﺮﯾﻳ ،ً٬ﺎﻓﺮﺣ ﺎﻨﻛوﻭ ﮫﻪﺴﺒﺤﻧ ،٬هﻩﺪﯿﻴﻘﻧوﻭ ﺾﻌﯿﻴﻓ ﮫﻪﻧﺎﺴﻟ ،٬ﮫﻪﺘﻔﺷوﻭ ﻰﺘﺣ ﺎﻨﯿﻴﺸﺧ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻠﻋ ﺎﻨﯿﻴﻠﺨﻓ ﮫﻪﻠﯿﻴﺒﺳ ﻮﮭﻬﻓ ﻢﯿﻴﮭﻬﯾﻳ.  
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spite attempts to find one narrative chronology in Iṣfahānī’s organization of the “Akhbār 
Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu,” the audience struggles to anchor its experience of the 
chapter in linear time. Especially with the slipperiness of terms like ikhtilāṭ, the audience 
finds little support upon which to rely and to determine Majnūn’s mental state at any giv-
en time. The incongruity between descriptive terms of madness and narrated events again 
produces performative friction foregrounds the question of madness while complicating 
the notion of it. Far from defining his mental state in dualistic terms (mad/not mad), 
Iṣfahānī’s presentation of the akhbār offers a nuanced exploration of Majnūn’s mental 
state that calls attention to moments of transition and stages episodes on a spectrum of 
counter-normativity.  
 Not only do the incongruities between akhbār call attention to Majnūn’s changing 
mental states, but the akhbār Iṣfahānī presents themselves stage madness as changeable. 
“Madness” is not a fixed state in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu.” Narrators 
dramatize this changeability in the following narrative, the isnād of which relates three 
chains of transmission that come together with the words “they said altogether” (qālū 
jamīʿan) (Iṣfahānī 2: 48): 
When al-Majnūn and Laylā were young, they would care for her family’s sheep 
atop a mountain in their country called al-Tawbād.62 When his mind left and he 
became wild (tawaḥḥasha), he went to that mountain and dwelled there. When he 
remembered the days he spent roaming the mountain with Laylā, he let out a in-
                                                
62 Al-Tawbād is a mountain approximately 200 miles southwest of Riyadh.  
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tense outburst of grief and became troubled and lonely (istawḥasha). Then, he 
wandered about deliriously until he reached the outskirts of al-Shaʾm63. When he 
recovered his mind, he saw a country he didn’t know and said to the people he 
met there: “Please, where is al-Tawbād of the land of the Banū ʿĀmir?” They re-
plied: “You couldn't be further from the lands of the Banū ʿĀmir! You're in the 
Levant (al-shaʾm). You must follow these stars and he was shown the way.” 
Then, he set out towards those stars until he reached the land of Yemen (al-
yaman).64 (Iṣfahānī 2: 48-49) 
This anecdote is one of many that stage Majnūn’s “madness” as a transitory state. Not 
only are his mad states of mind temporary, they are of different sorts and exist along a 
spectrum of counter-normativity. First he becomes dispossessed of his mind (dhahaba 
‘aqluhu) and wild (tawaḥḥasha), next he becomes troubled and lonely (istawḥasha) and 
                                                
63 Al-Shaʾm indicates the Levant region and also invites associations with despondency 
and the verbal noun al-shaʾm, which denotes attracting bad luck.  
64 Original text: 
نﻥﺎﻛ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟوﻭ ﺎﻤھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ نﻥﺎﯿﻴﺒﺻ نﻥﺎﯿﻴﻋﺮﯾﻳ  ً ﺎﻤﻨﻏ ﺎﮭﻬﻠھﮪﮬﻫﻷ ﺪﻨﻋ  ٍﻞﺒﺟ ﻲﻓ ﺎﻤھﮪﮬﻫدﺩﻼﺑ لﻝﺎﻘﯾﻳ ﮫﻪﻟ ،٬دﺩﺎﺑﻮﺘﻟاﺍ ﻤﻠﻓﺎ ﺐھﮪﮬﻫذﺫ ﮫﻪﻠﻘﻋ ،٬ﺶﺣﻮﺗوﻭ 
نﻥﺎﻛ ءﻲﺠﯾﻳ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﻚﻟذﺫ ﻞﺒﺠﻟاﺍ ﻢﯿﻴﻘﯿﻴﻓ ،٬ﮫﻪﺑ اﺍذﺫﺈﻓ ﺮﻛﺬﺗ مﻡﺎﯾﻳأﺃ نﻥﺎﻛ ﻒﯿﻴﻄﯾﻳ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟوﻭ ﮫﻪﺑ عﻉﺰﺟ  ً ﺎﻋﺰﺟ  ًاﺍﺪﯾﻳﺪﺷ ﺶﺣﻮﺘﺳاﺍوﻭ مﻡﺎﮭﻬﻓ ﻰﻠﻋ 
ﮫﻪﮭﻬﺟوﻭ ﻰﺘﺣ ﻲﺗﺄﯾﻳ ﻲﺣاﺍﻮﻧ ،٬مﻡﺄﺸﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫﺈﻓ بﺏﺎﺛ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻟإﺇ ﮫﻪﻠﻘﻋ ىﻯأﺃرﺭ  ًاﺍﺪﻠﺑ ﻻ ﮫﻪﻓﺮﻌﯾﻳ لﻝﻮﻘﯿﻴﻓ سﺱﺎﻨﻠﻟ ﻦﯾﻳﺬﻟاﺍ ﻢھﮪﮬﻫﺎﻘﻠﯾﻳ: ﻲﺑﺄﺑ ،٬ﻢﺘﻧأﺃ ﻦﯾﻳأﺃ دﺩﺎﺑﻮﺘﻟاﺍ 
ﻦﻣ ضﺽرﺭأﺃ ﻲﻨﺑ ؟ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﺎﻘﯿﻴﻓلﻝ ﮫﻪﻟ: ﻦﯾﻳأﺃوﻭ ﺖﻧأﺃ ﻦﻣ ضﺽرﺭأﺃ ﻲﻨﺑ ﺮﻣﺎﻋ! ﺖﻧأﺃ مﻡﺄﺸﻟﺎﺑ ﻚﯿﻴﻠﻋ ﻢﺠﻨﺑ اﺍﺬﻛ ،٬ﮫﻪﻣﺄﻓ ﻲﻀﻤﯿﻴﻓ ﻰﻠﻋ ﮫﻪﮭﻬﺟوﻭ 
ﻮﺤﻧ ﻚﻟذﺫ ﻢﺠﻨﻟاﺍ ﻰﺘﺣ ﻊﻘﯾﻳ ضﺽرﺭﺄﺑ ﻦﻤﯿﻴﻟاﺍ  
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wanders about like a madman (hām ʿalā wajhihi) (Iṣfahānī 1: 48-49). Then, he recovers 
his mind (thāb ilayhi ʿaqluhu) (Iṣfahānī 2: 49). These varied sorts of madness produce 
their own performative friction that opens up many “truths” about madness.  
 While the above khabar emphasizes the temporality and divergence of his “mad-
ness,” other akhbār call attention to the temporality of his sanity. For example, Abū Naṣr 
Aḥmad bin Ḥātim (d. 845) tells a story on the authority of an unspecified “group of narra-
tors” in which ʿUmar bin ʿAbd al-Raḥmān bin ʿAwf (d. 652), one of the companions of 
the prophet Muḥammad, having agreed to attend a gathering with Majnūn, rescinds, 
which leads Majnūn to despair (ʾāyisan) and “return to his original state” (fa ʿād ʾilā 
ḥālihi al-ʾūlā) (Iṣfahānī 2: 17-18). His “original state,” as the narrators employ the term 
here, refers to his “confused” state, as the rest of the khabar indicates as it continues to 
chronicle Majnūn’s transitions: 
That remained his condition (ḥālahu), even when he was not out in the uninhabit-
ed desert (mustawḥish). Rather, he would be in the outskirts of the village, with-
drawn and naked. He wouldn’t wear a robe without tearing it; he was delirious, 
drawing lines in the ground, playing with dirt and rocks, not responding to anyone 
asking about anything. When they wanted him to talk or come back to his mind, 
they would mention Laylā. Then, he would say, “I would give up my father to 
free her, and my mother!” Then his mind would return to him. They would speak 
to him and he would respond. The events of the village would come to him and 
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they would talk to him about them and recite for him love poetry. He would re-
spond positively and recite his own verse to them.65 (Iṣfahānī 2: 18) 
Iṣfahānī stages Majnūn’s “original state” as a mindless state of delirium that entails a 
sense of psychic withdrawal and physical nakedness. This mindless state, it suggests, is 
his default setting, while sanity, i.e., possession of his mind, comes and goes. Further, this 
withdrawal and delirium does not require his being out in the uninhabited desert (musta-
wḥish). Often an adjective describing land, mustawḥish invokes a sense of desertion, a 
place filled with animals but “destitute of human beings” (Lane 2929), and the sentence 
that follows “Rather, he would be on the outskirts of the village” reinforces this sense of 
mustawḥish as his geographical setting. Mustawḥish might also imply a psychic state, 
however, as it can be understood as “become wild (beast)” and “savage, uncivilized” 
(Hava 847). He is mustawḥish (becoming wild) without being mustawḥish (out in the un-
inhabited desert). By raising the point that Majnūn is not geographically mustawḥish, 
Iṣfahānī foregrounds the sense of his being psychically mustawḥish, i.e., “becoming 
wild” or “becoming beast,” that it then dramatizes: “he wouldn’t wear a robe without 
tearing it; he was delirious, drawing lines in the ground, playing with dirt and rocks, not 
                                                
65 Original text: 
ﻢﻠﻓ لﻝﺰﺗ ﻚﻠﺗ ،٬ﮫﻪﻟﺎﺣ ﻻإﺇ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ ﺮﯿﻴﻏ ،٬ٍﺶﺣﻮﺘﺴﻣ ﺎﻤﻧإﺇ نﻥﻮﻜﯾﻳ ﻲﻓ تﺕﺎﺒﻨﺟ ﻲﺤﻟاﺍ  ًاﺍدﺩﺮﻔﻨﻣ  ً ﺎﯾﻳرﺭﺎﻋ ﻻ ﺲﺒﻠﯾﻳ  ً ﺎﺑﻮﺛ ﻻإﺇ ،٬ﮫﻪﻗﺮﺧ يﻱﺬﮭﻬﯾﻳوﻭ 
ﻂﻄﺨﯾﻳوﻭ ﻲﻓ ضﺽرﺭﻷاﺍ ﺐﻌﻠﯾﻳوﻭ بﺏاﺍﺮﺘﻟﺎﺑ ،٬ةﺓرﺭﺎﺠﺤﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻻوﻭ ﺐﯿﻴﺠﯾﻳ  ًاﺍﺪﺣأﺃ ﮫﻪﻟﺄﺳ ﻦﻋ ،٬ءﻲﺷ اﺍذﺫﺈﻓ اﺍﻮﺒﺣأﺃ نﻥأﺃ ﻢﻠﻜﺘﯾﻳ وﻭأﺃ بﺏﻮﺜﯾﻳ ﮫﻪﻠﻘﻋ 
اﺍوﻭﺮﻛذﺫ ﮫﻪﻟ ،٬ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ لﻝﻮﻘﯿﻴﻓ: ﻲﺑﺄﺑ ﻲھﮪﮬﻫ ،٬ﻲﻣأﺃوﻭ ﻢﺛ ﻊﺟﺮﯾﻳ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻟإﺇ ﮫﻪﻠﻘﻋ ﮫﻪﻧﻮﺒطﻁﺎﺨﯿﻴﻓ ،٬ﻢﮭﻬﺒﯿﻴﺠﯾﻳوﻭ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﺗﺄﯾﻳوﻭ ثﺙاﺍﺪﺣأﺃ ﻲﺤﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﻧﻮﺛﺪﺤﯿﻴﻓ ﺎﮭﻬﻨﻋ 
ﮫﻪﻧوﻭﺪﺸﻨﯾﻳوﻭ ﺮﻌﺸﻟاﺍ ،٬لﻝﺰﻐﻟاﺍ ﻢﮭﻬﺒﯿﻴﺠﯿﻴﻓ  ً ﺎﺑاﺍﻮﺟ  ً ﺎﺤﯿﻴﺤﺻ ﻢھﮪﮬﻫﺪﺸﻨﯾﻳوﻭ  ًاﺍرﺭﺎﻌﺷأﺃ ﺎﮭﻬﻟﺎﻗ  
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responding to anyone asking about anything.” Majnūn’s delirious state, we learn, is not 
merely his original state when he is out in the open desert with the animals, but remains 
his “original state” even when in the village. 
 As this story continues, the narrators explain that two years later, when ʿUmar bin 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Nawfal bin Musāḥiq came to collect alms tax from the tribe, he found 
Majnūn naked and playing with dirt (Iṣfahānī 2: 18). When Nawfal gave him a robe to 
wear, someone explained to him that this was the son of the village’s chief, who does not 
wear clothes or do anything more than what he was doing at that moment (Iṣfahānī 2: 
18). Nawful failed to engage Majnūn in coherent conversation, so the tribesmen instruct-
ed him to mention Laylā, which succeeded in bringing his reason back (Iṣfahānī 2: 18).  
 This story stages Majnūn’s confusion and mindlessness as his default state, while 
sanity, i.e., possession of his mind, visits now and again. As I have tried to demonstrate 
through this examination of these two akhbār, the narrators of “Akhbār Majnūn Banī 
ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” adopt different orientations toward Majnūn’s psychic state, such 
that we could quite easily become confused about what such a phrase as “his original 
state” refers.  He so often moves from one state to another that the audience itself be-
comes confused with regard to which state he is in and which condition is his “original 
state.”   
 Further complicating the matter, we find that the akhbār do not always present 
this movement as a process that necessarily reaches completion, as the following anec-
dote indicates: 
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When Qays bin al-Malawwaḥ’s mind became muddled and he abandoned food 
and drink, his mother went to Laylā and said: “Qays’s love for you has robbed 
him of his mind and he has abandoned food and drink. If you were to go to him 
for a bit, I expect that some of his mind would be returned to him.”66 (Iṣfahānī 2: 
34) 
In this khabar, Qays’s mother suggests that a visit from Laylā would return “some of his 
mind” to him. Not only, then, does he move between states of apparent sanity and mad-
ness, but these states are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, while the akhbār in this section 
of the text continue to diverge, these divergences become increasingly nuanced. Either-or 
questions about madness have disappeared, and the notion of madness becomes increas-
ingly complex. 
 Renate Jacobi, Stefan Sperl, and Suzanne Stetkevych (Early Islamic Poetry) have 
pointed out that what differentiates ʿudhrī ghazal poets from the poets of the tripartite 
qaṣīda is their orientation away from social integration and toward wild abandonment 
(Jacobi , Sperl , Stetkevych, Mantle Odes 89). The latter move away from the loneliness 
of the beloved’s deserted campsite toward civilized society. The poet of the ʿudhrī tradi-
tion, however, “quite explicitly refuses to move psychologically or poetically beyond his 
                                                
66 Original text: 
 ﺎﻤﻟ ﻂﻠﺘﺧاﺍ ﻞﻘﻋ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ حﺡﻮﻠﻤﻟاﺍ كﻙﺮﺗوﻭ مﻡﺎﻌﻄﻟاﺍ ،٬بﺏاﺍﺮﺸﻟاﺍوﻭ ﺖﻀﻣ ﮫﻪﻣأﺃ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ ﺖﻟﺎﻘﻓ ﺎﮭﻬﻟ: نﻥإﺇ  ً ﺎﺴﯿﻴﻗ ﺪﻗ ﺐھﮪﮬﻫذﺫ ﻚﺒﺣ ،٬ﮫﻪﻠﻘﻌﺑ 
كﻙﺮﺗوﻭ مﻡﺎﻌﻄﻟاﺍ ،٬بﺏاﺍﺮﺸﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻮﻠﻓ ﮫﻪﺘﺌﺟ  ً ﺎﺘﻗوﻭ تﺕﻮﺟﺮﻟ نﻥأﺃ بﺏﻮﺜﯾﻳ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻟإﺇ >ﺾﻌﺑ< ﮫﻪﻠﻘﻋ  
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love obsession” (S. Stetkevych, Mantle Odes 89). Sperl emphasizes the single-
mindedness of the ʿudhrī ghazal, the poets of which, he argues, emphasize “the unchang-
ing presence of a certain state of mind and positively rejecting any reorientation towards 
a different goal” (67). In isolation, the ʿudhrī ghazal may indeed be monothematic and 
monologic. However, Iṣfahānī’s presentation of Majnūn and performance of his story and 
poetry inserts itself into the ʿudhrī tradition. Although the ghazal remains an integral 
component, his performance of it mixes it with akhbār and stages the poet as both author 
and character. Just as its becoming “mixed” (ikhtalāṭ) makes his mind muddled and con-
fused, the mixing of his poetry and lore muddle and confuse the nature of the ghazal as 
presented in Stetkevych and Sperl’s analyses. Iṣfahānī arranges and rearranges Majnūn’s 
poetry amidst lore, subverting this unidirectionality and placing it in dialogue with other 
voices. In Bakhtinian terms, this arrangement allows the poet’s “pure and direct expres-
sion of his own intention” to be “mediated” by the diverse languages of the text (Bakhtin, 
Dialogic Imagination 285). The many-voiced discourse of Iṣfahānī’s narrative maximizes 
the dialogic nature of Majnūn’s words. Within the framework of “Akhbār Majnūn Banī 
ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu,” Majnūn’s state of mind is far from unchanging. As the akhbār 
move back and forth through time and warps our notions of before and after, we encoun-
ter Majnūn’s mind moving back and forth, before and after his becoming transformed. 
LAYLĀ: CAUSE OR CURE? 
 The question of cause and cure hover over these stories of Majnūn’s changing 
mental state—what is it that catalyzes the transformation from one state to the other? The 
story of Majnūn’s return to al-Tawbād focuses on what triggers his various states of mad-
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ness—remembering his childhood days with Laylā—and ignores the question of what 
triggers his return to reason. Meanwhile, the story of Ibn ʿAwf’s broken promise does the 
reverse. Without raising the question of why he becomes mad, the story illustrates the 
efficacy of mentioning Laylā in triggering the return of his mind. In implicitly proposing 
different sorts of states as his default, these stories also take different interests with regard 
to cause and cure.   
 By alternating between different presumptions of Majnūn’s “original state,” we 
learn that it is unknowable and contingent upon narrative constructs. As these mental 
states seem to overlap in terms of both their madness and naturalness, the cause and cure 
become one and the same. That which carries Majnūn’s mind away is also what returns it 
to him: thoughts of Laylā.67 While Iṣfahānī often stages the mentioning of Laylā as a 
means to bring back Majnūn’s mind, he often becomes muddled or mad when he hears or 
recites poetry about her: 
                                                
67 Majnūn sings of this paradox in his poetry: 
Whenever Laylā is mentioned, I become reasonable, and 
 My mental powers return from a many-sided passion 
They say: He is healthy, without a touch of insanity, 
 Or troubles, except for the lies he invents. 
The tears from my eyes bear witness to my passion, and my love of her 
 Makes my flesh waste away from my ribs and sides (Iṣfahānī 2: 19) 
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The cause of his becoming wild was that one day he was sitting alone in Ḍariyya 
when he heard someone calling out to him from the mountain:  
Each of us, my brother, love Laylā 
 In my mouth and yours is the dust of Laylā  
She confused your heart and then it doubled 
 In my heart, which is troubled and afflicted 
I shared with you a love for one about whom the days 
 Reveal nothing to us except avoidance  
He let out a deep sigh and fainted. This was the cause of his becoming wild. There 
was no sign of him until Nawful bin Misāḥiq found him.68 (Iṣfahānī 2: 60) 
A variation on this story claims that when Muzāḥim bin al-Ḥārith al-ʿUqaylī recited these 
verses to him, he became confused (iltabasa) and muddled in his mind (khūliṭa fī ʿaqlihi). 
In a third khabar, it is once again a disembodied voice that he heard calling out at night: 
                                                
68 Original text: 
ﺐﺒﺳ ﮫﻪﺸﺣﻮﺗ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ نﻥﺎﻛ  ً ﺎﻣﻮﯾﻳ ﺔﯾﻳﺮﻀﺑ  ً ﺎﺴﻟﺎﺟ هﻩﺪﺣوﻭ ذﺫإﺇ هﻩاﺍدﺩﺎﻧ  ٍدﺩﺎﻨﻣ ﻦﻣ ﻞﺒﺠﻟاﺍ:  
ﺎﻧﻼﻛ ﺎﯾﻳ ﻲـﺧأﺃ ﺐـﺤﯾﻳ ﻰـﻠﯿﻴـﻟ   ﻲﻔﺑ ﻚﯿﻴﻓوﻭ ﻦﻣوﻭ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ بﺏاﺍﺮـﺘﻟاﺍ  
ﺪﻘﻟ ﺖﻠﺒﺧ كﻙدﺩاﺍﺆـﻓ ﻢـﺛ ﺖـﻨـﺛ  ﻲﺒﻠﻘﺑ ﻮﮭﻬﻓ مﻡﻮﻤﮭﻬﻣ بﺏﺎـﺼـﻣ  
ﺷﻚﺘﻛﺮ ﻲﻓ ىﻯﻮھﮪﮬﻫ ﻦﻣ ﺲﯿﻴﻟ يﻱﺪﺒﺗ  ﺎﻨﻟ مﻡﺎﯾﻳﻷاﺍ ﮫﻪﻨﻣ ىﻯﻮﺳ بﺏﺎـﻨـﺘﺟاﺍ  
لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺲﻔﻨﺘﻓ ءاﺍﺪﻌﺼﻟاﺍ ﻲﺸﻏوﻭ ،٬ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻠﻋ نﻥﺎﻛوﻭ اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﺐﺒﺳ ﮫﻪﺸﺣﻮﺗ ﻢﻠﻓ ﺮﯾﻳ ﮫﻪﻟ  ٌﺮﺛأﺃ ﻰﺘﺣ هﻩﺪﺟوﻭ ﻞﻓﻮﻧ ﻦﺑ  ٍﻖﺣﺎﺴﻣ  
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Abū ʿAmr al-Shaybānī mentioned that he (Majnūn) heard a voice calling out these 
verses at night, which was the reason for his madness (junūn).69 (Iṣfahānī 2: 9) 
These stories illustrate the transformative power of language, which can both cause and 
cure one of what is called madness. In his Canon of Medicine, Ibn Sīna (d. 1037) dedi-
cates a chapter to love sickness (ʿishq) in which he notes this connection between lan-
guage and changing mental states: “His condition changes from exhilaration and laughter 
to sadness and weeping when he hears love poetry, especially when he remembers the 
separation and distance from his beloved” (qtd. in Dols 484). This transformative, per-
formative potential of language and speech, particularly poetry, is a driving force in 
Iṣfahānī’s story of Majnūn Laylā. As we have seen in Chapter 1, having been invited to 
become mad, the audience, like Majnūn, is especially susceptible to this power. 
 Majnūn’s constant susceptibility to various states of madness emerges from his 
desire for Laylā. While mentions of her stir his psyche, it is his initial infatuation that 
opens him up to being wholly affected by language. Iṣfahānī’s repetition of al-Aṣmaˇī’s 
claim “he wasn’t Majnūn rather he had some lawtha in him,” serves as a reminder of his 
potential for both mental strength and weakness. Laylā is not only the cause of the mind 
going but also its return.  
                                                
69 Original text: 
ﺮﻛذﺫوﻭ ﻮﺑأﺃ وﻭﺮﻤﻋ ﻲﻧﺎﺒﯿﻴﺸﻟاﺍ: ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ ﻊﻤﺳ ﻲﻓ ﻞﯿﻴﻠﻟاﺍ  ً ﺎﻔﺗﺎھﮪﮬﻫ ﻒﺘﮭﻬﯾﻳ هﻩﺬﮭﻬﺑ ،٬تﺕﺎﯿﻴﺑﻷاﺍ ﺖﻧﺎﻜﻓ ﺐﺒﺳ ﮫﻪﻧﻮﻨﺟ  
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CONCLUSION 
 Iṣfahānī frames and reframes madness throughout “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir 
wa Nasabuhu.” The akhbār stage madness as lost reason, being wild, being muddled, be-
ing confused, and possessing lawtha. Not only is madness of many sorts, it has no invari-
able essence and knows no boundaries. As lawtha, it is both strength and weakness that 
challenge orthodoxies and norms. This constant reframing stages madness as ubiquitous 
and relative. Preconceived ideas about madness and Majnūn’s madness, in particular, are 
swept away with the repeated paradoxical refrain “He was not majnūn.” As the world of 
“Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu,” into which the text draws its audience, be-
comes consumed and subsumed by madness, it implicates that audience in the madness. 
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Chapter 3 
Problematizing Rationality in Iṣfahānī's  
Qays Lubnā Narrative 
INTRODUCTION 
 The stories of Qays Lubnā, i.e., Qays bin Dharīḥ, and Majnūn Laylā, i.e., Qays 
bin al-Malawwaḥ, each speak of overwhelming love. The famed intellectual al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 
868) speaks of the strong legendary association between these poets and their beloveds in 
the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir”:  
People have attributed all anonymous poetry about Laylā to the Majnūn. Just as 
they attributed all the poetry of this sort about Lubnā to Qays bin Dharīḥ.70 
(Iṣfahānī 1:10) 
Both Qays and Majnūn are struck by passionate love for particular women—Lubnā and 
Laylā, respectively—from whom they become separated, driving them to frequent faint-
ing spells and plaintive cries publicly in verse. While such could be said of the other sto-
ries from the ʿudhrī (tragic love) tradition, the stories of these particular ʿudhrī poets 
overlap in more than just their narrative motifs as told in the Kitāb al-Aghānī. In the 
                                                
70 Original text: 
لﻝﺎﻗوﻭ ﻆﺣﺎﺠﻟاﺍ: ﺎﻣ كﻙﺮﺗ سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ  ًاﺍﺮﻌﺷ لﻝﻮﮭﻬﺠﻣ ﻞﺋﺎﻘﻟاﺍ ﻞﯿﻴﻗ ﻲﻓ ﻰﻠﯿﻴﻟ ﻻإﺇ هﻩﻮﺒﺴﻧ ﻰﻟإﺇ ،٬نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ ﻻوﻭ  ًاﺍﺮﻌﺷ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﮫﻪﻠﯿﻴﺒﺳ ﻞﯿﻴﻗ ﻲﻓ 
ﻰﻨﺒﻟ ﻻإﺇ هﻩﻮﺒﺴﻧ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ ﺢﯾﻳرﺭذﺫ.  
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“Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” and the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī 
ʿĀmir,” their stories share plot details, poetic verse, the main character’s name (Qays), 
and distinctive phrasings in akhbār (lore). Only Qays and Majnūn among the poets under 
study here are said to have lost their minds in al-Iṣfahānī’s selection of akhbār, and in 
contrast to the chapters dedicated to the other poets, their love-sickness dominates in his 
retelling.  
 Despite all the concordance between the stories of Majnūn Laylā and Qays Lub-
nā, the experience of reading the “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” is 
starkly different from that of reading the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir.” Iṣfahānī’s narra-
tion of the Qays Lubnā story is not simply the story of Majnūn Laylā with some variation 
in its particular details and poetic verse. As I have argued in Chapters 1 and 2, Iṣfahānī 
foregrounds madness in the Majnūn Laylā chapter, which consists of a “muddled” ar-
rangement of often contradictory akhbār that draw the audience into Majnūn’s wonder-
ment and madness. The Aghānī relates the Qays Lubnā legend, in contrast, as a straight-
forward, seemingly coherent chronologically-arranged narrative. 
 Iṣfahānī tells us that he sought to arrange Qays’s akhbār in precisely this “settled” 
fashion when he lays out his approach to curating this story immediately after introducing 
Qays by name and familial relations: 
A group of our elders (shuyūkh) related the khabar of Qays and Lubnā, his wife, 
to me in connected and disconnected stories and prose (scattered) and verse (ar-
ranged) akhbār. I brought them together in order that his story (ḥadīthuhu) be set-
tled (yattasiq). However, for those akhbār that came isolated and yet were diffi-
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cult to exclude from the whole arrangement, I mention them separately.71 
(Iṣfahānī 9: 211) 
As he relates, Iṣfahānī composed Qays’s story from “connected and disconnected stories” 
and “prose and verse” to relate a continuous narrative (9: 211). After listing the names of 
the narrators from whose akhbār he drew, he notes that he narrates “each agreed upon 
khabar as an uninterrupted continuous narrative” and attributes “each whose knowledge 
conflicts” to its narrators (9: 211). Thus, rather than relatively short akhbār attributed to 
one or two original sources, we find narrations related as collected, aggregated stories, 
introduced by a chorus of narrators speaking in unison—“they said.” Indeed, immediately 
after this articulation of his approach, Iṣfahānī announces a story with the declaration 
“they all said” (qālū jamīʿan). The absence of detailed narrative chains (isnād), he tells 
us, indicates consensus.  
 While the story of Majnūn Laylā reads as a compound narrative, in that it is com-
posed of many discrete, conflicting, and non-chronological akhbār, Iṣfahānī presents the 
story of Qays Lubnā as a collective narrative,72 combining various narratives to create 
                                                
71 Original text: 
ﺎﻧﺮﺒﺧ ﺮﺒﺨﺑ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻰﻨﺒﻟوﻭ ﮫﻪﺗأﺃﺮﻣاﺍ  ٌﺔﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﻦﻣ ﺎﻨﺨﯾﻳﺎﺸﻣ ﻲﻓ ﺺﺼﻗ ﺔﻠﺼﺘﻣ ﺔﻄﻘﻨﻣوﻭ رﺭﺎﺒﺧأﺃوﻭ ةﺓرﺭﻮﺜﻨﻣ ،٬ٍﺔﻣﻮﻈﻨﻣوﻭ ﺖﻔﻟﺄﻓ ﻚﻟذﺫ 
ﻊﻤﺟأﺃ ﻖﺴﺘﯿﻴﻟ ﮫﻪﺜﯾﻳﺪﺣ ﻻإﺇ ﺎﻣ ءﺎﺟ  ًاﺍدﺩﺮﻔﻣ ﺮﺴﻋوﻭ ﮫﻪﺟاﺍﺮﺧإﺇ ﻦﻋ ﺔﻠﻤﺟ ﻢﻈﻨﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﺗﺮﻛﺬﻓ ﻰﻠﻋ ةﺓﺪﺣ.  
72 This is also the term Daniel Beaumont uses in his analysis of this chapter: “I should 
mention that most of the narrative about Qays in al-Aghānī is a collective narration. Abū 
‘l-Faraj tells us that he has combined various accounts” (57-8). 
  94 
longer ones and producing a coherent plot. Unlike his narration of the “Akhbār Majnūn 
Banī ʿĀmir,” Iṣfahānī downplays disagreements, emphasizes consensus, and imposes a 
linear structure upon the akhbār of the “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbāri-
hi.” Why does Iṣfahānī approach the narration of these stories in such starkly different 
manners? We might respond to this question immediately, recalling that the stylistic dif-
ferentiation between these stories is fitting with the approach to adab (inherited human-
istic knowledge) Iṣfahānī announces in the Aghānī’s introduction, as discussed in Chapter 
1. That is, the variation of style, particularly between stories with similar subject matter, 
would help to “deliver” us “from the familiar” and “refresh” us “through newness” 
(Iṣfahānī 1: 5). But why, then, does Iṣfahānī narrate the Qays Lubnā legend in this partic-
ular way? That is, why does he specifically stage coherence and causality in the “Dhikr of 
Qays bin Dharīḥ”? As I demonstrate, the imposed formal coherence of this chapter builds 
towards and allows for the expectation of resolution and thus the very form of the chapter 
enacts the expected resolution of the Qays Lubnā romance itself—Lubnā becomes Qays’s 
wife. Iṣfahānī makes certain that we know to expect this resolution when he sets out his 
approach to the chapter at the outset of the story by introducing Lubnā as Qays’s wife: “A 
group of our shaykhs related the khabar of Qays and Lubnā, his wife,…” (9: 211) Just as 
Qays’s pursuit will reach definitive resolution, so will ours.  
 The style of narrative Iṣfahānī employs, i.e., a collective narration, seems to pre-
sent linear narrative cohesion, and this earns the praise of those scholars that take a posi-
tivist approach to the Aghānī. In particular, they respond to the questions posed above  by 
once again pointing to issues of “factual” accuracy. Krystyna Skarzynska-Bochenska, for 
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example, argues in “Qays et Lubnā. Victoire de l’amour sur l’autorité du père et de la tri-
bu.” that the Qays Lubnā legend is more original and authentic than the other romances 
based largely on the story’s narrative cohesion in Iṣfahānī’s Aghānī. That is, she finds the 
chapter’s stylistic cohesion convincing in terms of the story’s historical accuracy. 
Iṣfahānī, however, thwarts the expectations for finality he sets up by presenting three di-
vergent “endings” to the story of Qays and Lubnā. Taking a similar positivist approach, 
Geert Jan Van Gelder is unsurprisingly dismissive of this divergence. Having found the 
first two endings “fitting,” van Gelder determines the third “alternative ending” to be 
“wholly inappropriate for the classical romantic tale,” suggesting it “may have been made 
up by someone who did not like unhappy endings, or more probably, someone who liked 
to mock the traditional tear-jerking model” (382). Iṣfahānī’s inclusion of this narrative 
twist, he seems to suggest, stems from his commitment to accuracy and exhaustiveness in 
reporting the lore around Qays Lubnā.  
 This chapter, in contrast responds to these questions by considering the performa-
tive impact of Iṣfahānī’s staging of coherence and causality in the Qays Lubnā story. I 
suggest that the mode of knowledge at work in the “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi 
wa Akhbārihi” is not the mad wonder of the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir;” instead, 
Iṣfahānī’s retelling of the Qays Lubnā legend pursues the knowledge of reason, operating 
through the related ideals of coherence, common sense, and certainty. I argue that by en-
gaging this mode of knowledge in “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi,” 
Iṣfahānī is able to reframe it with a pre-established yet subversive ending that points to 
the absurdity that adherence to reason inevitably produces.  
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COLLECTIVE NARRATION 
 It would be nearly impossible to summarize the 90-page story of Majnūn Laylā as 
it appears in the Aghānī without eliminating narrative conflict. Even if one were to at-
tempt to narrate the story in multiple, separate chronologies and variations, the task 
would quickly appear Sisyphean, as the possible permutations for renarrating Iṣfahānī’s 
presentation of the story into discrete chronological narratives seem endless. After enter-
ing into the madness of the text through the introductory section, we find no stable signi-
fieds behind signifiers, such as “majnūn,” through which we can anchor ourselves and the 
story. The language of time, like Majnūn himself, loses its reason and becomes con-
founded, and events do not proceed in a linear fashion. An attempt to bring the rationality 
of cause and effect recreates the madness of the text itself. 
 Iṣfahānī’s presentation of the Qays Lubnā legend, in stark contrast, easily lends 
itself to plot summary. He combines narratives to create a collective, cohesive narrative 
in which events are connected through a sense of logic and the audience’s attention is 
drawn toward the movement of the plot. The uniqueness of Iṣfahānī’s narrative treatment 
of the legend has been noted by many scholars of the Aghānī. Daniel Beaumont finds that 
“of the various accounts of lover/poets in al-Aghānī, that of Qays bin Dharīḥ has been 
singled out for most resembling a coherent fictional romance” (57). Hilary Kilpatrick, 
whose essay on the Qays Lubnā romance is titled “Akhbār Manẓūma (Arranged Akhbār), 
The Romance of Qays Lubnā in the Aġānī,” points out that the akhbār in this story are 
distinctively “arranged along chronological and thematic lines” (Modernity 251). 
Krystyna Skarzynska-Bochenska is also among those who argue that the story of Qays 
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Lubnā is distinguished in the Aghānī from other ʿudhrī love stories, pointing specifically 
to its coherence. She praises “la perfection de sa composition,” “son originalité,” and the 
“la force de caractère des deux amants” (133) and contrasts this perfection and originality 
with what is found in what she determines to be imitations—the stories of Majnūn Laylā 
and Jamīl Buthayna—that took on a tragic form in concordance “aux préceptes de la loi 
tribale” (143). 
 Whereas Iṣfahānī is conspicuously reliant on the use of isnād (chain of transmit-
ters) in the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir,” his emphasis on narrative coherence rather 
than isnād in the “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” is equally striking. 
In her study of the development of a tradition of literary criticism in medieval Arabic-
Islamic culture, Wen-chin Ouyang links al-Jāḥiẓ’s (d. 868) dispensing with isnād in his 
books discussing poetry, specifically Kitāb al-Ḥayawān (The Book of Animals) and Kitāb 
al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn (The Book of Eloquence and Demonstration), with his reliance 
“on reason” and his philosophical leaning as a Muʿtazilī (103). The Muʿtazila school of 
Islamic theology, which began to decline by the end of the tenth century, is associated 
with rationalism and its eventual incorporation of Greek and Hellenistic philosophy 
(Hodgson 66). Ouyang contrasts al-Jāḥiẓ’s “rational” approach in his works to his con-
temporary Ibn Sallām’s (d. 846) reliance on isnād in his documentation of the Arabic po-
etic tradition, which, she suggests, reflects his approach as a “religious scholar” (103). In 
other words, Ouyang suggests that the use of isnād can be understood not only as an ap-
peal to authority based on the authorizing practice established in Ḥadīth (sayings of or 
about the Prophet Muhammad) scholarship, but also as an appeal to its underlying ap-
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proach to knowledge, i.e., the verification of authority through transmission. The choice 
to relay knowledge without the use of isnād, on the other hand, she implies, points to an 
interest in approaching knowledge through the ideals of rationality.  
 As suggested by Ouyang’s reference to al-Jāḥiẓ, Iṣfahānī’s rhetorical strategy of 
essentially forgoing the use of isnād in the “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa 
Akhbārihi” was not necessarily unique during his time. Tarif Khalidi determines that 
while the use of isnād in Ḥadīth scholarship became increasingly “more rigorous with 
time,” its use among adab scholars waxed and waned (Masʿudi 24). Although initially 
these scholars made no use of the practice, they eventually matched the Ḥadīth scholars 
in their “rigorous application” of it until the late ninth century at which point the “trend 
towards continuous narrative” asserted itself (Khalidi, Masʿudi 24). Iṣfahānī composed 
the Aghānī, then, shortly after the practice of isnād had begun to go out of fashion for 
adab writers. This shift, as Khalidi points out, coincided with a preference for continuous 
narratives that seems to have reflected a growing admiration for “conciseness, simplicity, 
originality, and clarity” (Historical 100). 
 With both approaches to the presentation of akhbār in current practice at the time, 
Iṣfahānī is able to play with the philosophical associations with each. By engaging in the 
trend of the continuous narrative in the “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa 
Akhbārihi,” he alludes to the movement toward favoring “conciseness, simplicity, origi-
nality, and clarity” and the ideals of rational thought. Especially because Iṣfahānī engages 
in both narrative styles in the Aghānī, suggesting he is committed to neither as a superior 
approach, we might think of the “Dhikr of Qays bin Dharīḥ” as a parody of this growing 
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literary and philosophical trend. Philosophers of the tenth century, such as al-Farābī (d. 
950) and al-ʿAmiri (d. 992), contemporaries of Iṣfahānī, began to look toward synthesiz-
ing seemingly contradictory approaches to knowledge, such as those indicated by the two 
narrative styles represented in the “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” 
and the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir” (Ouyang 25). This impulse toward synthesis, 
Ouyang argues, came out of a strategy of legitimizing philosophers’ “disciplines of 
knowledge” at a time when its legitimacy was being called into question (25). In this at-
mosphere of debate over legitimacy between disciplines, Iṣfahānī seems to find an oppor-
tunity to participate as an outsider in both camps.  
 It is the chameleon-like ease of the Aghānī’s movement from one approach to an-
other that seems to point to its outsider status, and, as an outsider, its engagement in these 
trends carries a sense of infiltration. Kilpatrick proposes that Iṣfahānī’s “books betray lit-
tle interest in philosophical speculation, rationalist theology and the scientific legacy of 
Antiquity” (Great Book 16), but his distinctive narrative choices in the Aghānī suggest 
not a lack of interest but a performative disinterestedness, which itself seems to betray an 
ulterior agenda. That is, the “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” engages 
in the principles of “reason” from a critical distance in order to comment upon them and 
the ʿudhrī tradition. 
 Having mentioned the relative ease of summarizing the “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ 
wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi,” it seems useful to do so and consider the ways in which the 
plot develops and resolves. As with the majority of chapters that Iṣfahānī dedicates to 
personalities in the Aghānī, it begins with a short introductory section. In it, Iṣfahānī es-
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tablished Qays’s name, lineage, familial relations, and his milk-kinship with Prophet Mu-
hammad’s grandson al-Ḥusayn bin ʿAlī bin Abī Ṭālib. After briefly articulating his ap-
proach to the chapter, introducing Lubnā as Qays’s wife, and listing the narrators upon 
whom he relies, he begins the narration of the story, which might be summarized as fol-
lows: 
 Qays falls in love with Lubnā when they first meet outside her tent, where she 
brings him water. Some days later, Qays returns to relate to Lubnā his love for her, which 
she admits she also feels for him. When Qays tells his parents about the situation, howev-
er, they insist he must instead marry one of his cousins, so his great wealth would not be 
shared with a stranger. With the help of his prominent foster brother, Ḥusayn Ibn ‘Ali, 
however, Qays succeeds in marrying Lubnā. Qays’s mother is particularly displeased 
with the marriage, as her son focuses only on his wife and has no time for his mother. 
Soon after, Qays falls seriously ill. His mother plants worry in his father that their son 
might die without leaving offspring, as Lubnā had not given birth. They both pressure 
him to divorce her, and eventually he does. Soon after, his mind is swept away and 
“something like madness” overcomes him. Regretting his decision to obey his parents, 
Qays seeks out Lubnā whenever he can, while his parents work to distract him from his 
love sickness with the company of girls from their tribe. He falls gravely ill again, and 
neither girls nor doctors succeed in curing him. Eventually, Lubnā remarries, as does 
Qays, whose new wife’s name is also Lubnā.  
 At this point in the story, we encounter three different versions of how the 
story of Qays and Lubnā ends. In the first two versions, Qays and Lubnā die while 
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separated. In the third version, they remarry and die while together. This conspic-
uous divergence from the cohesive style of narration will be discussed in detail 
below. Up to this point, however, Iṣfahānī arranges the akhbār chronologically 
and draws the audience in through a plot that proceeds as a series of causes and 
effects. His arrangement delivers what seems to be rational, logical causality from 
one event to the next in which conflict arises and resolves around issues common 
to the human experience—love, filial loyalty, inheritance, jealousy, progeny, and 
illness. 
 Ṭaha Ḥusayn stresses the story’s proximity to familiar “real life” events in his 
discussion of the Aghānī’s narration. This familiarity, he suggests, makes the story ring 
true for its audience (204):  
As for this story [of Qays Lubnā],…its author succeeded in good composition and 
good taste and described masterfully in it things found in true daily life, such that 
from this story you find in yourself great resonance, and it convinces you to say: 
“This is right” and “this is good.”73 (204-5) 
                                                
73 Original text: 
ﺎﻣأﺃ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﺔﺼﻘﻟاﺍ ﻲﺘﻟاﺍ ﻦﺤﻧ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﺋاﺍزﺯﺈﺑ ﺪﻘﻓ ﻖﻓوﻭ ﺎﮭﻬﺒﺣﺎﺻ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﻦﺴﺣ ﻒﯿﻴﻟﺄﺘﻟاﺍ ﻦﺴﺣوﻭ ،٬قﻕوﻭﺬﻟاﺍ ﻒﺻوﻭوﻭ ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﻓ ءﺎﯿﻴﺷأﺃ ﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺪﺠﺗ ﻲﻓ 
ةﺓﺎﯿﻴﺤﻟاﺍ ﺔﯿﻴﻣﻮﯿﻴﻟاﺍ ،٬ﺔﻌﻗاﺍﻮﻟاﺍ ﻦﻘﺗأﺃوﻭ ﺎﮭﻬﻔﺻوﻭ. ﻰﺘﺣ نﻥإﺇ ﮫﻪﺘﺼﻗ ﺪﺠﺘﻟ ﻲﻓ ﻚﺴﻔﻧ ىﻯﺪﺻ ،٬ًّﺎﯾﻳﻮﻗ ﻚﻠﻤﺤﺗوﻭ ﻰﻠﻋ نﻥأﺃ لﻝﻮﻘﺗ: نﻥإﺇ اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ 
،٬ﻖﺤﻟ نﻥإﺇوﻭ اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﺪﯿﻴﺠﻟ.  
  102 
Ṭaha Ḥusayn emphasizes that the story’s mimetic realism and resonance with audiences’ 
life experiences establishes a kind of believability. It is believable because it is so reason-
able and “almost free of what reason (al-ʿaql) cannot accept” (216). Compared to the 
other stories of ʿudhrī love in the Aghānī, he argues, the story of Qays Lubnā is the “least 
absurd and least exaggerated” (207). Unlike his evaluation of the story of Majnūn, 
Ḥusayn finds Qays’s story specifically lacking in wonder: “all of this is something famil-
iar that people don’t deny or wonder (yuʿjabāuna) at” (Ḥusayn 206). 
 Indeed, as we have seen in previous chapters, the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir,” 
is filled with a sense of wonder, and it is specifically in confronting the unfamiliar that 
excites this wonder (ʿajab) in us. The pursuit of wonder demands a kind of madness, as 
madness gives rise to and allows for a continuous process of defamiliarization. To be 
mad is to become mixed up and muddled, and by compelling us to enter into this mad-
ness through constant mixing and muddling, the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir” invites us 
to perceive Majnūn as unfamiliar and abandon our preconceptions. Out of the chaos of 
the text emerges an ability to appreciate diverse knowledge and ambiguity. The “Dhikr 
Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi,” on the other hand, emphasizes the familiar-
ity of the story and the consensus of narrators around it. Rather than confronting the un-
familiar, we are persuaded by the text’s resonance with our prosaic human experience 
and preconceptions. The story is convincing precisely because it reaffirms our sense of 
the world.   
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COHESION AND RATIONALITY  
 The “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” has many of the trap-
pings of “reason” (ʿaql). Discussions of the term ʿaql among medieval linguists and phi-
losophers reflect conceptions of reason anchored in its root ʿ-q-l, meaning restraint, par-
ticularly that associated with the binding of a camel’s legs (Ibn Manẓūr 3047). The 
grammarian Ibn al-Anbārī (d. 939) suggests that a “reasonable” (ʿāqil) man is one “one 
who has gathered together (jāmiʿ) his affair (amrihi) and his thinking (raʾyihi),” (Ibn 
Manẓūr 3047) meaning he settled his affairs and opinions (Lane 455). This meaning, al-
Anbārī argues, is “taken from the expression ‘ʿaqaltu al-baʿīr’ (I “ʿaqled” the camel) 
[said] when I gather its feet together” in order to prevent it from wandering away (Ibn 
Manẓūr 3047). The active participle jāmiʿ, meaning one who has gathered together, 
brings to mind Iṣfahānī’s articulation of his approach to Qays’s akhbār, in which he em-
ploys the root j-m-ʿ twice, as shown in bold below:  
I brought [the connected (muttaṣilah) and disconnected (munqaṭiʿah) stories and 
prose (scattered) and verse (arranged) akhbār] all together (ajmaʿ) in order that 
his story be well-ordered (yattasiq). However, for those akhbār that came isolated 
(mufradan) and yet were difficult to exclude from the whole arrangement (jumlat 
al-naẓm), I mention them separately (ʿalā ḥidah)…I narrate each agreed upon 
(muttafaq fihi) khabar as an uninterrupted continuous narrative (muttaṣilan) and 
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attribute each whose knowledge conflicts (mukhtalaf) to its narrators. They all 
(jamīʿan) said…74 (Iṣfahānī 9: 211) 
Iṣfahānī’s approach brings the akhbār “all together,” allowing the narrators to speak in 
unison “all together.” This passage, in which Iṣfahānī stages his method as one of gather-
ing together of akhbār, not only emphasizes this “reasonable” technique, it also plays 
with the semantics of separation (munqaṭiʿah, manthūra, mufradan, ʿalā ḥidah, 
mukhtalaf) and joining (muttaṣilah, manẓūmah, ajmaʿ, jumlat al-naẓm, muttafaq fihi, 
muttaṣilan, jamīʿan) alternating between words associated with each. This semantic 
movement between separation and unity mimics the movement of the plot of the Qays 
Lubnā story, as Iṣfahānī arranges it, between marriage and divorce, physical union and 
separation, and conflict and resolution. 
 The story of Qays Lubnā is distinct from the other stories of the ʿudhrī tradition 
precisely because the two lovers unite (yajtamiʿāni). Qays and Lubnā join together both 
physically and legally in the Aghānī, and the idea of union, as represented by the root j-
m-ʿ, is a distinct motif in the poetry of Qays featured in the text. The following excerpted 
verses offer a sense of the various ways in which the idea of union is employed by Qays: 
                                                
74 Original text: 
ﺎﻧﺮﺒﺧأﺃ ﺮﺒﺨﺑ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻰﻨﺒﻟوﻭ ﮫﻪﺗأﺃﺮﻣاﺍ  ٌﺔﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﻦﻣ ﺎﻨﺨﯾﻳﺎﺸﻣ ﻲﻓ ﺺﺼﻗ ﺔﻠﺼﺘﻣ ﺔﻄﻘﻨﻣوﻭ رﺭﺎﺒﺧأﺃوﻭ ةﺓرﺭﻮﺜﻨﻣ ،٬ٍﺔﻣﻮﻈﻨﻣوﻭ ﺖﻔﻟﺄﻓ ﻚﻟذﺫ 
ﻊﻤﺟأﺃ ﻖﺴﺘﯿﻴﻟ ﮫﻪﺜﯾﻳﺪﺣ ﻻإﺇ ﺎﻣ ءﺎﺟ  ًاﺍدﺩﺮﻔﻣ ﺮﺴﻋوﻭ ﮫﻪﺟاﺍﺮﺧإﺇ ﻦﻋ ﺔﻠﻤﺟ ﻢﻈﻨﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﺗﺮﻛﺬﻓ ﻰﻠﻋ ةﺓﺪﺣ…ﺖﯿﻴﻜﺣوﻭ ﻞﻛ  ٍﻖﻔﺘﻣ ﻓﮫﻪﯿﻴ ،ً٬ﻼﺼﺘﻣ 
ﻞﻛوﻭ ﻒﻠﺘﺨﻣ ﻲﻓ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻧﺎﻌﻣ  ً ﺎﺑﻮﺴﻨﻣ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﮫﻪﯾﻳوﻭاﺍرﺭ. اﺍﻮﻟﺎﻗ  ً ﺎﻌﯿﻴﻤﺟ…:  
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I have resolved (ajmaʿtu) to suffer your absence, 
 knowing that what is between us endures.75 (Iṣfahānī 9: 231) 
The breeze brings us together (yajmaʿ) 
 and we see the beams of the disappearing sun 
Our souls meet at night in our village 
 and we know that we will sleep at daytime.  
The solid earth brings us together (tajmaʿunā), and above us 
 is a sky whose stars we see wandering around.76 (Iṣfahānī 9: 234) But, on 
my life, I cried intensely over you 
 even though all of my illness came altogether (ajmaʿ) from you.77 
(Iṣfahānī  9: 235) 
My day is spent talking and wishing 
                                                
75 Original text: 
 ًاﺍﺪـﻠـﺠﺗ ﻚﻨﻋ ﺖﻌﻤﺟأﺃ نﻥإﺇوﻭ ﻲﻧﺈﻓ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺪﮭﻬﻌﻟاﺍ ﺎﻤﯿﻴﻓ ﺎﻨﻨﯿﻴﺑ ﻢﯿﻴـﻘـﻤـﻟ 
76 Original text: 
نﻥﺈﻓ ﻢﯿﻴﺴﻧ ﻮﺠﻟاﺍ ﻊـﻤﺠﯾﻳ ﺎـﻨـﻨﯿﻴـﺑ   ﺮﺼﺒﻧوﻭ نﻥﺮﻗ ﺲﻤﺸﻟاﺍ ﻦﯿﻴﺣ لﻝوﻭﺰﺗ  
ﺎﻨﺣاﺍوﻭرﺭأﺃوﻭ ﻞﯿﻴﻟﺎﺑ ﻲﻓ ﻲﺤﻟاﺍ ﻲـﻘﺘﻠﺗ  ﻢﻠﻌﻧوﻭ ﺎﻧأﺃ ﻟﺎـﺑرﺭﺎـﮭﻬـﻨـ ﻞﯿﻴـﻘـﻧ  
ﺎﻨﻌﻤﺠﺗوﻭ ضﺽرﺭﻷاﺍ رﺭاﺍﺮﻘﻟاﺍ ﺎـﻨﻗﻮﻓوﻭ ءﺎﻤﺳ ىﻯﺮﻧ ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﻓ مﻡﻮﺠﻨﻟاﺍ لﻝﻮـﺠـﺗ  
77 Original text: 
 ًاﺍﺪـھﮪﮬﻫﺎـﺟ ﻚﺘﯿﻴﻜﺑ ﺪﻗ يﻱﺮﻤﻌﻟ ﻦﻜﻟوﻭ  نﻥإﺇوﻭ نﻥﺎﻛ ﻲﺋاﺍدﺩ ﮫﻪﻠﻛ ﻚﻨﻣ ﻊـﻤﺟأﺃ 
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 and it pulls me together (yajmaʿunī), but at night I am joined   
 (jāmiʿ) by worry.78 (Iṣfahānī 9: 250) 
For what God has sought to unite (jamaʿahu) there is  
 no separation, just as there is no union (jāmiʿ) for what God has   
 separated.79 (Iṣfahānī 9: 251) 
The notion of joining, as expressed by the root j-m-ʿ, takes on various particularities of 
meaning in these verses. The verbs ajmaʿtu in the first excerpt and yajmaʿunī in the 
fourth suggest mental resolve and reason. In the third excerpt, the adverb ajmaʿ evokes 
completeness. In the second and fifth, the root j-m-ʿ is employed to denote physical and 
spiritual union of love, and these images evoke the semantically related term jimāʿ, which 
alludes to sexual intercourse (Ibn Manẓūr 681).  
 The motif points to the interconnectedness of reason, completeness, union, and 
love, concepts that were being linked philosophically during the tenth century. The phi-
losopher Yahyā bin ʿAdī (965), who was well-versed in the concept of reason as devel-
oped in works of Greek philosophy and contributed to its development, offers a poetic 
argument for the notion that rationality unites all humanity through love in his Tahdhīb 
al-Akhlāq (The Refinement of Morals): 
                                                
78 Original text: 
ﻲﻀﻗ يﻱرﺭﺎﮭﻬﻧ ﺚﯾﻳﺪﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﻰـﻨـﻤـﻟﺎﺑوﻭ ﻲﻨﻌﻤﺠﯾﻳوﻭ ﻢﮭﻬﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻞﯿﻴـﻠـﻟﺎﺑ ﻊـﻣﺎـﺟ  
79 Original text: 
ﺲﯿﻴﻟوﻭ  ٍﺮﻣﻷ لﻝوﻭﺎﺣ ﮫﻪـﻠـﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪـﻌـﻤـﺟ  ٌﺖﺸﻣ ﻻوﻭ ﺎﻣ قﻕﺮﻓ ﮫﻪـﻠـﻟاﺍ ﻊـﻣﺎـﺟ  
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It is necessary for he who loves perfection to condition his soul to love all people 
(al-nās ajmaʿ) and to show affection and sympathy for them. People are one tribe, 
all related to one another. Humanity, the adornment of divine power that is in all 
of them (jamīʿihum) and in each one of them, joins them (tajmaʿuhum). That is 
the rational (ʿāqilah) soul. With this soul the human becomes human. It is the no-
blest of the two parts of the human, which are the soul and the body. The human 
is in reality the rational soul, which is one essence in all people (jamīʿ al-nass). 
And all people are in reality one thing in the form of many individuals. If their 
souls are all one, and love is in the soul, then they, all of them, must love one an-
other. This is natural in people, as long as the revengeful, passionate soul does not 
guide them. For this soul likes its owner to be master over other people, and it 
leads its owner to haughtiness and wonder (iʿjāb) and to take dominion over the 
oppressed, trivialize the poor, and envy the rich and powerful.80 (55)   
                                                
80 Original text: 
ﻲﻐﺒﻨﯾﻳ ﺐﺤﻤﻟ لﻝﺎﻤﻜﻟاﺍ ﺎﻀﯾﻳأﺃ نﻥأﺃ دﺩﻮﻌﯾﻳ ﮫﻪﺴﻔﻧ ﺔﺒﺤﻣ سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ ،٬ﻊﻤﺟأﺃ دﺩدﺩﻮﺘﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻢﮭﻬﯿﻴﻟإﺇ ﻦﻨﺤﺘﻟاﺍوﻭ ،٬ﻢﮭﻬﯿﻴﻠﻋ ﺔﻓأﺃﺮﻟاﺍوﻭ ﺔﻤﺣﺮﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻢﮭﻬﻟ.نﻥﺈﻓ 
سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ ﻞﯿﻴﺒﻗ ﺪﺣاﺍوﻭ ،٬نﻥﻮﺒﺳﺎﻨﺘﻣ ﻢﮭﻬﻌﻤﺠﺗ ،٬ﺔﯿﻴﻧﺎﺴﻧﻹاﺍ ﺔﯿﻴﻠﺣوﻭ ةﺓﻮﻘﻟاﺍ ﺔﯿﻴﮭﻬﻟﻹاﺍ ﻲﺘﻟاﺍ ﻲھﮪﮬﻫ ﻲﻓ ﻢﮭﻬﻌﯿﻴﻤﺟ ﻲﻓوﻭ ﻞﻛ ﺪﺣاﺍوﻭ ،٬ﻢﮭﻬﻨﻣ ﻲھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ 
ﺲﻔﻨﻟاﺍ ،٬ﺔﻠﻗﺎﻌﻟاﺍ هﻩﺬﮭﻬﺑوﻭ ﺲﻔﻨﻟاﺍ رﺭﺎﺻ نﻥﺎﺴﻧﻹاﺍ ،٬ﺎﻧﺎﺴﻧإﺇ ﻲھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ فﻑﺮﺷأﺃ ﻲﺋﺰﺟ نﻥﺎﺴﻧﻹاﺍ ﻦﯾﻳﺬﻠﻟاﺍ ﺎﻤھﮪﮬﻫ ﺲﻔﻨﻟاﺍ ﺪﺴﺠﻟاﺍوﻭ. نﻥﺎﺴﻧﻹﺎﻓ 
ﺔﻘﯿﻴﻘﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫ ﺲﻔﻨﻟاﺍ ،٬ﺔﻠﻗﺎﻌﻟاﺍ ﻲھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ ﺮھﮪﮬﻫﻮﺟ ﺪﺣاﺍوﻭ ﻲﻓ ﻊﯿﻴﻤﺟ ،٬سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻢﮭﻬﻠﻛ ﺔﻘﯿﻴﻘﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﺊﺷ ،٬ﺪﺣاﺍوﻭ صﺹﺎﺨﺷﻷﺎﺑوﻭ نﻥوﻭﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ 
اﺍذﺫإﺇوﻭ ﺖﻧﺎﻛ ﻢﮭﻬﺳﻮﻔﻧ ،٬ةﺓﺪﺣاﺍوﻭ ةﺓّدﺩﻮﻤﻟاﺍوﻭ إﺇﺎﻤﻧ نﻥﻮﻜﺗ ،٬ﺲﻔﻨﻟﺎﺑ ﺐﺟاﺍﻮﻓ نﻥأﺃ اﺍﻮﻧﻮﻜﯾﻳ ﻢﮭﻬﻠﻛ ﻦﯿﻴﺑﺎﺤﺘﻣ ،٬ﻦﯾﻳّدﺩاﺍﻮﺘﻣ ﻚﻟذﺫوﻭ ﻲﻓ سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ 
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Ibn ʿAdī argues that the rational soul defines and unites humanity, which necessitates mu-
tual love and leads naturally to it except for the interference of the “revengeful, passion-
ate soul” (al-nafs al-ghaḍabiyyah), which leads to, among other things, “wonder” (iʿjāb). 
Not only does Ibn ʿAdī link reason with unity and love, he sets it in opposition to wonder. 
While wonder and passion are interested in difference, reason emphasizes sameness. The 
collective style of narration in the “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi,” 
along with the theme of union, evoke reason and rationality. The knowledge to be gained 
in this chapter is not the diverse knowledge of the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir,” but ra-
ther the certainty and cohesion of reason.  
CORRECTNESS AND CERTAINTY 
 This straightforward style of the Qays Lubnā narrative is evident from the outset 
of the chapter, which begins with a short introductory section. As we saw in Chapter 1, 
the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir” opens with an immediate halt that distances Iṣfahānī 
from his narration: “He is—according to what those who scrutinized his lineage and his 
story—Qays” (2: 1). The narrator, or narrators, who scrutinized his lineage and story is 
nameless, and such scrutinization is shown to have led only to a tentative consensus that 
extends no further than his first name—Qays. The first sentence of the “Dhikr Qays bin 
Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” is also quickly interrupted:  
                                                                                                                                            
،٬ﺔﻌﯿﻴﺒطﻁ ﻮﻟ ﻢﻟ ﻢھﮪﮬﻫﺪﻘﺗ ﺲﻔﻨﻟاﺍ ،٬ﺔﯿﻴﺒﻀﻐﻟاﺍ نﻥﺈﻓ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﺲﻔﻨﻟاﺍ ﺐﺒﺤﺗ ﺎﮭﻬﺒﺣﺎﺼﻟ ،٬سﺱؤﺅﺮﺘﻟاﺍ دﺩﻮﻘﺘﻓ ﺎﮭﻬﺒﺣﺎﺻ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺮﺒﻜﻟاﺍ ،٬بﺏﺎﺠﻋﻹاﺍوﻭ 
ﻂﻠﺴﺘﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻰﻠﻋ ،٬ﻒﻌﻀﺘﺴﻤﻟاﺍ رﺭﺎﻐﺼﺘﺳاﺍوﻭ ،٬ﺮﯿﻴﻘﻔﻟاﺍ ﺪﺴﺣوﻭ ﻲﻨﻐﻟاﺍ يﻱذﺫوﻭ ﻞﻀﻔﻟاﺍ.  
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He is, according to al-Kalbī, al-Qaḥdhamī, and others, Qays bin Dharīḥ bin Sunna 
bin Ḥudhāqa bin Ṭarif bin ‘Utwāra bin ʿĀmir bin Layth bin Bakr bin ʿAbd 
Manāh; and he is ʿAlū bin Kināna bin Khuzayma bin Mudrika bin Ilyās bin 
Muḍar bin Nizār. Abū Shurāʿa al-Qaysī mentioned that he is Qays bin Dharīḥ bin 
al-Ḥubāb bin Sunna; the rest coincides (muttafaq) with the above.81 (Iṣfahānī 9: 
210) 
This interruption, however, specifies the names of two narrators while also indicating 
general agreement about the poet's name and lineage. The only conflict is regarding the 
inclusion of al-Ḥubāb in his lineage, a detail that suggests precision and consensus. While 
the opening of the introductory section mimics the opening of that of the “Akhbār 
Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir,” it emphasizes the extent of agreement around Qays’s identity. After 
solidly establishing Qays’s name and patrilineage, Iṣfahānī presents a khabar establishing 
his mother’s patrilineage: “al-Qaḥdhamī mentioned that his mother is the daughter of 
Sunna bin al-Dhāhil bin ʿĀmir al-Khuzāʿī, and this is the correct [lineage] (hādhā huwa 
al-ṣaḥīḥ)” (Iṣfahānī 9: 210). Correctness (al-ṣaḥīḥ) implies, as Lane puts it, freedom 
“from everything that would occasion doubt or suspicion” (1651). So, even though he 
                                                
81 Original text: 
،٬ﻮھﮪﮬﻫ ﺎﻤﯿﻴﻓ ﺮﻛذﺫ ﻲﺒﻠﻜﻟاﺍ ﻲﻣﺬﺤﻘﻟاﺍوﻭ ،٬ﺎﻤھﮪﮬﻫﺮﯿﻴﻏوﻭ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ ﺢﯾﻳرﺭذﺫ ﻦﺑ ﺔﻨﺳ ﻦﺑ ﺔﻓاﺍﺬﺣ ﻦﺑ ﻒﯾﻳﺮطﻁ ﻦﺑ ةﺓرﺭاﺍﻮﺘﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺮﻣﺎﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺚﯿﻴﻟ ﻦﺑ 
ﺮﻜﺑ ﻦﺑ ﺪﺒﻋ ةﺓﺎﻨﻣ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ ﻲﻠﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺔﻧﺎﻨﻛ ﻦﺑ ﺔﻤﯾﻳﺰﺧ ﻦﺑ ﺔﻛرﺭﺪﻣ ﻦﺑ سﺱﺎﯿﻴﻟإﺇ ﻦﺑ ﺮﻀﻣ ﻦﺑ رﺭاﺍﺰﻧ. ﺮﻛذﺫوﻭ ﻮﺑأﺃ ﺔﻋاﺍﺮﺷ ﻲﺴﯿﻴﻘﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ 
ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ ﺢﯾﻳرﺭذﺫ ﻦﺑ بﺏﺎﺒﺤﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ ؛ﺔﻨﺳ ﺮﺋﺎﺳوﻭ ﺐﺴﻨﻟاﺍ ﻖﻔﺘﻣ.  
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mentions no conflicting akhbār, Iṣfahānī emphasizes the lack of doubt around this line-
age, which leads into statements about his maternal uncle and milk-kinship through his 
aforementioned mother with the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson al-Ḥusayn bin ʿAlī bin 
Abī Ṭālib. Despite the absence of conflict or divergence, Iṣfahānī calls our attention to 
the correctness and certainty of this text. 
 At times, however, Iṣfahānī will include a note about a divergence in the akhbār 
with regard to the narration of a particular episode. In most of these instances, Iṣfahānī 
intervenes to give a final judgment on which version is “correct” (ṣaḥīḥ). One such in-
stance occurs around a discrepancy about length of time within the initial collective nar-
rative that begins “they all said” (qālū jamīʿan): 
[Qays’s father] said: “I will not be satisfied unless you divorce her.” With that, he 
swore that no roof of any house would shelter him ever until [Qays] divorced 
Lubnā. So, he would stand under the hot sun and Qays would come and stand be-
side him in order to shade him with his robe, himself burning under the blazing 
sun, until shadows became long. Only then would he leave him. He would go to 
Lubnā and embrace her and she would embrace him. He would weep, and she 
weeped with him, saying “Qays, don’t obey your father, for you will be destroyed 
and cause me to be destroyed.” He would say: “I would not obey anyone when it 
comes to you ever.” It was said: He remained that way for a year. Khālid bin 
  111 
Kulthūm said: Ibn ʿĀʾisha mentioned that he remained like that for forty days and 
then divorced her. This is not correct (hādhā laysa bi-ṣaḥīḥ).82 (Iṣfahānī 9: 214) 
It is notable that what, by default, Iṣfahānī seems to suggest is “correct” is the version for 
which he does not mention the names of the narrators, opting instead to use the passive 
construction “it is said” (yuqāl) to introduce the claim that Qays held out on divorcing 
Lubnā under these circumstances for a year. Instead, he mentions the chain of narration 
for the variation he claims is “not correct.” While this fits with Iṣfahānī’s promise to at-
tribute only specifically divergent akhbār to their specific narrators, especially if we are 
to interpret “conflicting in its knowledge” (mukhtalaf fī maʿānīhi) as “not correct,” the 
use of the passive voice calls into question the credibility of the claim that seems to be 
presented as correct. Although Kilpatrick makes the assumption that the passive voice 
refers to “the sources for the composite account of the romance of Qays and Lubnā” pre-
sented in the introduction, (Great Book 383) this would also be the assumption if Iṣfahānī 
used the collective active construction “they said” (qālū). Although divergence is regular-
                                                
82 Original text: 
لﻝﺎﻗ: ﻻ ﻰﺿرﺭأﺃ وﻭأﺃ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﻘﻠﻄﺗ ﻒﻠﺣوﻭ ﻻ ﮫﻪﻨﻜﯾﻳ ﻒﻘﺳ ﺖﯿﻴﺑ  ًاﺍﺪﺑأﺃ ﻰﺘﺣ ﻖﻠﻄﯾﻳ ﻰﻨﺒﻟ نﻥﺎﻜﻓ،٬ جﺝﺮﺨﯾﻳ ﻒﻘﯿﻴﻓ ﻲﻓ ﺮﺣ ،٬ﺲﻤﺸﻟاﺍ ءﻲﺠﯾﻳوﻭ 
 ٌﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻒﻘﯿﻴﻓ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﮫﻪﺒﻧﺎﺟ ﮫﻪﻠﻈﯿﻴﻓ ﮫﻪﺋاﺍدﺩﺮﺑ ﻰﻠﺼﯾﻳوﻭ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫ ﺮﺤﺑ ﺲﻤﺸﻟاﺍ ﻰﺘﺣ ءﻲﻔﯾﻳ ءﻲﻔﻟاﺍ فﻑﺮﺼﻨﯿﻴﻓ ،٬ﮫﻪﻨﻋ ﻞﺧﺪﯾﻳوﻭ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﻰﻨﺒﻟ ﺎﮭﻬﻘﻧﺎﻌﯿﻴﻓ 
ﮫﻪﻘﻧﺎﻌﺗوﻭ ﻲﻜﺒﯾﻳوﻭ ﻲﻜﺒﺗوﻭ ﮫﻪﻌﻣ لﻝﻮﻘﺗوﻭ ﮫﻪﻟ: ﺎﯾﻳ ،٬ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻻ ﻊﻄﺗ كﻙﺎﺑأﺃ ﻚﻠﮭﻬﺘﻓ ﻲﻨﻜﻠﮭﻬﺗوﻭ. لﻝﻮﻘﯿﻴﻓ: ﺎﻣ ﺖﻨﻛ ﻊﯿﻴطﻁﻷ  ًاﺍﺪﺣأﺃ ﻚﯿﻴﻓ  ًاﺍﺪﺑأﺃ. لﻝﺎﻘﯿﻴﻓ: 
ﮫﻪﻧإﺇ ﺚﻜﻣ ﻚﻟﺬﻛ  ًﺔﻨﺳ لﻝﺎﻗوﻭ. ﺪﻟﺎﺧ ﻦﺑ مﻡﻮﺜﻠﻛ: ﺮﻛذﺫ ﻦﺑاﺍ ﺔﺸﺋﺎﻋ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ مﻡﺎﻗأﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻚﻟذﺫ ﻦﯿﻴﻌﺑرﺭأﺃ  ً ﺎﻣﻮﯾﻳ ﻢﺛ ﺎﮭﻬﻘﻠطﻁ. اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ ﺲﯿﻴﻟ ﺢﯿﻴﺤﺼﺑ.  
  112 
ly resolved in finality in the “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi,” final 
resolution is quietly called into question.  
 Scholars of the Aghānī have pointed out the conspicuousness of the version 
Iṣfahānī chooses to affirm as the “correct” version here, assuming that the idea that Qays 
lasted one year standing in the hot sun every day does not make logical sense (Kilpatrick,  
Great Book; Ḥusayn, Ḥadīth al-Arbiʿāʾ). Kilpatrick suggests Iṣfahānī’s decision to affirm 
the longer time period points to his occasional interest in “artistic truth,” that is, that the 
exaggerated length of time dramatizes the difficulty of Qays’s decision to divorce Lubnā 
and thus his love for her (Great Book 118). Ḥusayn is also convinced that Iṣfahānī's 
choice is “strange” (201). In Ḥusayn’s estimation, Iṣfahānī chooses “to deny the closest 
version to the truth and the nearest to the familiar” when he intervenes to reject the cor-
rectness of the forty day period of “exertion and resistance” before “throwing down his 
weapon” (210). Ḥusayn throws up his hands in the face of his puzzlement over Iṣfahānī’s 
decision as compiler and arranger of akhbār. Kilpatrick, however, reasons that Iṣfahānī 
felt the need to enhance the story with artistic truth, as if forty days standing in the blaz-
ing sun would fail to communicate the drama of Qays’s position (Great Book 118). One 
could equally argue the artistic effect of a forty day duration, based on the manifold sig-
nificance of the period in the Arabo-Islamic tradition, such as the length of time Musa 
spent on Mount Sinai when he received the ten commandments: “And We made an ap-
pointment with Moses for thirty nights and perfected them by the addition of ten; so the 
term of his Lord was completed as forty nights” (The Qurʾan, Al-Aʿrāf 7.142). Indeed, 
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forty days is a common time period suggesting great trial and difficulty in Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam.  
 Iṣfahānī’s artfulness, I suggest, is not in dramatizing Qays’s stubbornness and the 
extent of his resistance nor in adding the symbolic weight of the number forty to his 
demonstration of will. Both versions would individually convey the nobleness of Qays’s 
conflicted loyalty toward his father and wife. Instead, by mentioning both time periods, 
Iṣfahānī conveys the realistic value and symbolic weight expressed by “forty days” as 
well as the physical feat implied by “a year.” More importantly, by mentioning both time 
periods and affirming the less realistic, at least by Kilpatrick and Ḥusayn’s estimations, 
Iṣfahānī disrupts the cohesion of the text and calls attention to the incompatibility of “cor-
rectness” and consensus (one year) with common sense (40 days). This subtle disruption 
foreshadows the much more profound disruption at the end of the chapter.  
 Just as reason’s promise of cohesion and coherence begins to unravel, so does the 
expectation of plot resolution, as the audience has been tipped off that the story should 
end in marriage. The reveal of the discrepancy between the proposed periods of time for 
which Qays was able to resist coincides with the reveal of the dissolution of Qays and 
Lubnā’s marriage, that is, the dissolution of the expected conclusion. The story continues 
for thirty-five pages, chronicling episodes of Qays’s love sickness caused by his separa-
tion from his beloved. The presentation of Lubnā as Qays’s wife in the introduction is 
recast as a starting point, and the story proceeds as a tale of tragic love. 
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THREE ENDINGS 
 The “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” is “well-ordered” and 
the story it narrates, as Ṭaha Ḥusayn observes, contains “no strangeness (gharābah) or 
absurdity (iḥālah)” but rather is “familiar” (maʾlūf) and “not difficult to understand or 
make sense of” (205). When Iṣfahānī’s narration finally reaches its resolution, however, 
it comes in the form of those akhbār that Iṣfahānī tells us “came isolated and yet were 
difficult to exclude from the whole arrangement,” and thus mentioned “separately” 
(Iṣfahānī 9: 211). After thirty-five pages of near-consensus around cohesive and familiar 
“every day” stories, the final two pages confront us with three different endings, the last 
and longest of which has the least consensus and presents a deus ex machina-like, disso-
nant denouement. It is also this final ending that gives us the pre-established, yet thwarted 
expectation of resolution in marriage. The style of narrative Iṣfahānī employs, i.e., a col-
lective narration, sets up the expectation that things will be tied up, reasonable, maʿqūl, 
but the three conflicting “endings” subvert these expectations.  
 To better appreciate the way in which the multiple endings impact the narration, it 
is necessary to consider how the Aghānī presents them. Iṣfahānī begins by announcing 
that the end branches off, and then he presents each branch:  
They differed with regard to the end of Qays and Lubnā's story. Most narrators 
mentioned that they died in separation from one another. Among them are those 
who say: He died before her and that news reached her, so she died out of sorrow. 
Among them are those who say: Rather she died before him and he died out of 
sorrow for her. Among those that say that was al-Yūsufī based on what he heard 
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from ʿAlī bin Ṣāliḥ al-Muṣallīl He said that Abū ʿAmrū al-Madanī told me: Lubnā 
died, so Qays went out with a group from his people and stopped at her grave and 
said: 
Lubnā died, and her death is my death 
 Is my grief of any use at all? 
I will weep the weeping of one who is broken-hearted 
 whose life ends due to love for one who is dead83 
Then he bent over her grave, weeping until he fainted. His relatives carried him 
home while he was unconscious, and he remained sick, unconscious, and not re-
sponding to anyone speaking to him for three [days] until he died and his body 
was buried beside hers. 
Al-Qaḥdhamī, Ibn ʿĀʾisha, and Khālid bin Jamāl mentioned that Ibn Abī ʿAtīq 
went to al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, the sons of ʿAlī bin Abī Ṭālib, and ʿAbd Allah 
bin Jaʿfar, may God be pleased with them, and a group of people from the 
                                                
83 Original text: 
ﺪﻗوﻭ ﻒﻠﺘﺧاﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺮﺧآﺁ ﺮﻣأﺃ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ؛ﻰﻨﺒﻟوﻭ ﺮﻛﺬﻓ ﺮﺜﻛأﺃ ةﺓاﺍوﻭﺮﻟاﺍ ﺎﻤﮭﻬﻧأﺃ ﺎﺗﺎﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ ،٬ﺎﻤﮭﻬﻗاﺍﺮﺘﻓاﺍ ﻢﮭﻬﻨﻤﻓ ﻦﻣ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﮫﻪﻧإﺇ تﺕﺎﻣ ﺎﮭﻬﻠﺒﻗ ﺎﮭﻬﻐﻠﺑوﻭ 
ﻚﻟذﺫ ﺖﺗﺎﻤﻓ  ً ﺎﻔﺳأﺃ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻠﻋ. ﻢﮭﻬﻨﻣوﻭ ﻦﻣ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﻞﺑ ﺖﺗﺎﻣ ﮫﻪﻠﺒﻗ تﺕﺎﻣوﻭ  ً ﺎﻔﺳأﺃ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﻠﻋ ﻦﻤﻣوﻭ ﺮﻛذﺫ ﻚﻟذﺫ ﻲﻔﺳﻮﯿﻴﻟاﺍ ﻦﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺢﻟﺎﺻ 
؛ﻰﻠﺼﻤﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ لﻝﺎﻗ ﻲﻟ ﻮﺑأﺃ وﻭﺮﻤﻋ ﻲﻧﺪﻤﻟاﺍ: ﺖﺗﺎﻣ ،٬ﻰﻨﺒﻟ جﺝﺮﺨﻓ  ٌﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﮫﻪﻌﻣوﻭ  ٌﺔﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﻦﻣ ﮫﻪﻠھﮪﮬﻫأﺃ ﻒﻗﻮﻓ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺮﺒﻗ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ:  
ﺖﺗﺎﻣ ﻰﻨﯿﻴﺒﻟ ﺎـﮭﻬﺗﻮﻤﻓ ﻲـﺗﻮـﻣ  ﻞھﮪﮬﻫ ﻦﻌﻔﻨﺗ ﻲﺗﺮﺴﺣ ﻰﻠﻋ تﺕﻮﻔﻟاﺍ  
فﻑﻮﺳوﻭ ﻲﻜﺑأﺃ ءﺎﻜﺑ  ٍﺐﺌـﺘـﻜـﻣ ﻰﻀﻗ  ًةﺓﺎﯿﻴﺣ  ًاﺍﺪﺟوﻭ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺖﯿﻴـﻣ  
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Quraysh tribe. He said to them: “I need something from a man I am afraid will re-
fuse me, and I seek the help of your rank and wealth in this matter.” They said: 
“You have that at your disposal from us.” They met on the appointed day and he 
went with them to Lubnā’s husband. When he saw them, he was stupefied when 
they came to him. They said: “We have come to you, all of us together, because 
Ibn Abī ʿAtīq wants something.” He said: “It is done, whatever it is.” Ibn Abī 
ʿAtīq said: “You will do it, whatever it is, in matters of possessions, money, or 
family?” He said: “Yes.” He said: “Then would you give Lubnā, your wife, to 
them and to me and divorce her.” He said: “I testify to you that she is divorced by 
three!” The others became embarrassed, apologized and said: “By God, we did 
not know what he wanted, but if we had known that this was it, we would not 
have asked it of you.” Ibn ʿĀʾisha said: Al-Ḥasan compensated him for that with a 
hundred thousand dirhams. Ibn Abī ʿAtīq brought her to al-Ḥasan. She stayed 
with him until her waiting period had passed. Then they asked her father to marry 
her to Qays. She remained with him until they died. They said: Qays said in praise 
of Ibn Abī ʿAtīq:84 
                                                
84 Original text: 
ﻢﺛ ﺐﻛأﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮﺒﻘﻟاﺍ ﻲﻜﺒﯾﻳ ﻰﺘﺣ ﻲﻤﻏأﺃ ؛ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻠﻋ ﮫﻪﻌﻓﺮﻓ ﮫﻪﻠھﮪﮬﻫأﺃ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﮫﻪﻟﺰﻨﻣ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ ﻻ ،٬ﻞﻘﻌﯾﻳ ﻢﻠﻓ لﻝﺰﯾﻳ  ًﻼﯿﻴﻠﻋ ﻻ ﻖﯿﻴﻔﯾﻳ ﻻوﻭ ﺐﯿﻴﺠﯾﻳ  ً ﺎﻤﻠﻜﻣ 
 ً ﺎﺛﻼﺛ ﻰﺘﺣ تﺕﺎﻣ ﻦﻓﺪﻓ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺎﮭﻬﺒﻨﺟ. ذﺫوﻭﺮﻛ ﻲﻣﺬﺤﻘﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑاﺍوﻭ ﺔﺸﺋﺎﻋ ﺪﻟﺎﺧوﻭ ﻦﺑ ﻞﻤﺟ نﻥأﺃ ﻦﺑاﺍ ﻲﺑأﺃ ﻖﯿﻴﺘﻋ رﺭﺎﺻ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﻦﺴﺤﻟاﺍ 
ﻦﯿﻴﺴﺤﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻲﻨﺑاﺍ ﻲﻠﻋ ﻦﺑ ﻲﺑأﺃ ﺐﻟﺎطﻁ ﺪﺒﻋوﻭ ﷲ ﻦﺑ ﺮﻔﻌﺟ ﻲﺿرﺭ ﷲ ﻢﮭﻬﻨﻋ  ٍﺔﻋﺎﻤﺟوﻭ ﻦﻣ ،٬ﺶﯾﻳﺮﻗ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﻢﮭﻬﻟ: نﻥإﺇ ﻲﻟ  ًﺔﺟﺎﺣ ﻰﻟإﺇ 
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 وﻭﻋﺪھﮪﮬﻫﻢ ﻟﯿﻴﻮمﻡ ٍ ﻓﺎﺟﺘﻤﻌﻮاﺍ .ﻣﻨﺎ ﻣﺒﺘﺬلﻝ ٌ ﻟﻚ ذﺫﻟﻚ :ﻗﺎﻟﻮاﺍ .ﻋﻠﯿﻴﮫﻪ ﻓﯿﻴﮭﻬﺎ وﻭأﺃﻣﻮاﺍﻟﻜﻢ ﺑﺠﺎھﮪﮬﻫﻜﻢ أﺃﺳﺘﻌﯿﻴﻦ وﻭإﺇﻧﻲ ﻓﯿﻴﮭﻬﺎ،٬ ﯾﻳﺮدﺩﻧﻲ أﺃنﻥ أﺃﺧﺸﻰ رﺭﺟﻞ
 أﺃﺑﻲ ﻻﺑﻦ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﺄﺟﻤﻌﻨﺎ ﺟﺌﻨﺎكﻙ ﻟﻘﺪ :ﻓﻘﺎﻟﻮاﺍ .وﻭأﺃﻛﺒﺮهﻩ إﺇﻟﯿﻴﮫﻪ ﻣﺼﯿﻴﺮھﮪﮬﻫﻢ أﺃﻋﻈﻢ رﺭآﺁھﮪﮬﻫﻢ ﻓﻠﻤﺎ .ﻟﺒﻨﻰ زﺯوﻭجﺝ إﺇﻟﻰ ﺑﮭﻬﻢ ﻓﻤﻀﻰ ﻓﯿﻴﮫﻪ،٬
 .ﻧﻌﻢ ﻗﺎلﻝ أﺃھﮪﮬﻫﻞ؟ أﺃوﻭ ﻣﺎلﻝ أﺃوﻭ ﻣﻠﻚ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﺎ ﻛﺎﺋﻨﺔً  ﻗﻀﯿﻴﺘﮭﻬﺎ ﻗﺪ :ﻋﺘﯿﻴﻖ أﺃﺑﻲ اﺍﺑﻦ ﻗﺎلﻝ .ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﺎ ﻛﺎﺋﻨﺔً  ﻣﻘﻀﯿﻴﺔ ھﮪﮬﻫﻲ :ﻗﺎلﻝ .ﻋﺘﯿﻴﻖ
 ﻣﺎ وﻭﷲ :وﻭﻗﺎﻟﻮاﺍ وﻭاﺍﻋﺘﺬرﺭوﻭاﺍ اﺍﻟﻘﻮمﻡ ﻓﺎﺳﺘﺤﯿﻴﺎ .ﺛﻼﺛﺎ ً  طﻁﺎﻟﻖ ٌ أﺃﻧﮭﻬﺎ أﺃﺷﮭﻬﺪﻛﻢ ﻓﺈﻧﻲ :ﻗﺎلﻝ .وﻭﺗﻄﻠﻘﮭﻬﺎ زﺯوﻭﺟﺘﻚ ﻟﺒﻨﻰ وﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﮭﻬﻢ ﺗﮭﻬﺐ :ﻗﺎلﻝ
 وﻭﺣﻤﻠﮭﻬﺎ دﺩرﺭھﮪﮬﻫﻢ أﺃﻟﻒ ﻣﺎﺋﺔ ذﺫﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ اﺍﻟﺤﺴﻦ ﻓﻌﻮﺿﮫﻪ :ﻋﺎﺋﺸﺔ اﺍﺑﻦ وﻭﻗﺎلﻝ .إﺇﯾﻳﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺎ ﺳﺄﻟﻨﺎكﻙ ﻣﺎ ھﮪﮬﻫﺬهﻩ أﺃﻧﮭﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﻨﺎ وﻭﻟﻮ ﺣﺎﺟﺘﮫﻪ،٬ ﻋﺮﻓﻨﺎ
 :ﻗﺎﻟﻮاﺍ .ﻣﺎﺗﺎ ﺣﺘﻰ ﻣﻌﮫﻪ ﺗﺰلﻝ ﻓﻠﻢ ﻗﯿﻴﺴﺎ،ً٬ ﻓﺰوﻭﺟﮭﻬﺎ أﺃﺑﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺎ اﺍﻟﻘﻮمﻡ ﻓﺴﺄلﻝ .ﻋﺪﺗﮭﻬﺎ اﺍﻧﻘﻀﺖ ﺣﺘﻰ ﻋﻨﺪهﻩ ﺗﺰلﻝ ﻓﻠﻢ .إﺇﻟﯿﻴﮫﻪ ﻋﺘﯿﻴﻖ أﺃﺑﻲ اﺍﺑﻦ
  :ﻋﺘﯿﻴﻖ أﺃﺑﻲ اﺍﺑﻦ ﯾﻳﻤﺪحﺡ ﻗﯿﻴﺲ ﻓﻘﺎلﻝ
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  ﺻﺪﯾﻳﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺧﯿﻴﺮاﺍً  اﺍﻹﺣﺴﺎنﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﯾﻳﺠﺎزﺯيﻱ ﻣﺎ أﺃﻓﻀﻞ اﺍﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ ﺟﺰىﻯ
  ﻋـﺘـﯿﻴﻖ أﺃﺑﻲ ﻛﺎﺑﻦ أﺃﻟﻔﯿﻴﺖ ﻓﻤﺎ  ﺟـﻤـﯿﻴﻌـﺎ ً  إﺇﺧﻮاﺍﻧﻲ ﺟﺮﺑﺖ ﻓﻘﺪ
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Iṣfahānī’s introduces the first two stories by suggesting a degree of consensus around 
their deaths in separation. These two “endings” deliver the tragic finale common in the 
ʿudhrī tradition and maintains the solemn and earnest tone that characterizes the rest of 
the story. Qays and Lubnā are brought together in death in these endings, and the story 
seems to reach its end with the image of their bodies buried beside one another. This nar-
ration of Qays’s death brings a satisfying resolution to the story, and as van Gelder points 
out in a note to his translation of the Aghānī chapter, it “would have been a fitting end to 
the story” (382). Van Gelder goes further, admitting that he finds it “something of a dis-
appointment to see that according to modern scholars Qays lived to the age of sixty or 
even seventy-five, far too old for the traditional hopeless lover” (382). His strong prefer-
ence for the tragic ending suggests, as Ṭaha Ḥusayn implies, an insistence that previous 
“experience” should be a definitive guide:  
There are those who want the ending of Qays bin Dharīḥ to be that of Jamīl and 
Majnūn, and you will recall that Majnūn was found dead in some valley and that 
Jamīl died a stranger in Egypt. Love killed both of them, so it must be that love 
kills Qays bin Dharīḥ just as it killed his two friends and just as it killed ʿArwa 
bin Ḥizām before him.86 (215)  
                                                                                                                                            
ﻰﻌﺳ ﻲﻓ ﻊﻤﺟ ﻲﻠﻤﺷ ﺪﻌﺑ  ٍعﻉﺪﺻ  ٍيﻱأﺃرﺭوﻭ تﺕﺪﺣ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻓ ﻦﻋ ﻖﯾﻳﺮـﻄﻟاﺍ  
أﺃوﻭﺄﻔطﻁ  ًﺔﻋﻮﻟ ﺖﻧﺎﻛ ﻲـﺒـﻠـﻘـﺑ  ﻲﻨﺘﺼﻏأﺃ ﺎـﮭﻬﺗرﺭاﺍﺮﺣ ﻲـﻘﯾﻳﺮـﺑ  
لﻝﺎﻗ: لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﮫﻪﻟ ﻦﺑاﺍ ﻲﺑأﺃ ﻖﯿﻴﺘﻋ: ﺎﯾﻳ ﻲﺒﯿﻴﺒﺣ ﻚﺴﻣأﺃ ﻦﻋ اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ؛ﺢﯾﻳﺪﻤﻟاﺍ ﺎﻤﻓ ﮫﻪﻌﻤﺴﯾﻳ ﺪﺣأﺃ ﻻإﺇ ﻲﻨﻨظﻅ  ًاﺍدﺩاﺍﻮﻗ. ﻰﻀﻣ ﺚﯾﻳﺪﺤﻟاﺍ.  
86 Original text: 
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Because love killed Jamīl, Majnūn, and ʿArwa, Qays must also die out of love. The first 
two endings, in which Qays follows suit with his friends, represent the logic of the same 
and the rejection of randomness in human experience.  
 As mentioned earlier, van Gelder finds this “alternative ending” to be “wholly 
inappropriate for the classical romantic tale,” suggesting it “may have been made up by 
someone who did not like unhappy endings, or more probably, someone who liked to 
mock the traditional tear-jerking model” (382). The ending, indeed, reads less like a hap-
py ending than it does a mockery. It not only pokes fun at the “tear-jerking model,” but 
more importantly, it toys with the audience who has likely been moved by the serious-
ness, familiarity, and tragic tone of Qays’s story and poetry. Significantly longer than the 
first two endings, the third alternative is isolated from the narration of the rest of the sto-
ry, set apart by an introductory sanad and offers a drastically different conclusion to the 
love affair. The separated lovers reunite in marriage. Rather than solemn and tragic, this 
end is playful and light-hearted and not simply because it provides the reunion of Qays 
and Lubnā. It ends with a wink— Ibn Abī ʿAtīq responds to Qays’s poetic praise by beg-
ging him to put an end to it: “My friend, stop this praise, for whoever hears it will think 
me a pimp” (Iṣfahānī 9: 253). This final line, delivered not by Qays or Lubnā but instead 
by Ibn Abī ʿAtīq, trivializes the love story and reads like a punchline. After their remar-
                                                                                                                                            
ﻚﻟذﺫ نﻥأﺃ ﻦﻣ سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ ﻦﻣ دﺩاﺍرﺭأﺃ نﻥأﺃ نﻥﻮﻜﺗ ةﺓﺮﺧآﺁ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ ﺢﯾﻳرﺭذﺫ ةﺓﺮﺧﺂﻛ ﻞﯿﻴﻤﺟ ،٬نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍوﻭ ﺖﻧأﺃوﻭ ﺮﻛﺬﺗ نﻥأﺃ نﻥﻮﻨﺠﻤﻟاﺍ ﺪﺟوﻭ ًﺎﺘﯿﻴﻣ ﻲﻓ 
ﺾﻌﺑ ،٬ﺔﯾﻳدﺩوﻭﻷاﺍ نﻥأﺃوﻭ ﻼﯿﻴﻤﺟ تﺕﺎﻣ ًﺎﺒﯾﻳﺮﻏ ﻲﻓ ،٬ﺮﺼﻣ ﺎﻤھﮪﮬﻫﻼﻛ ﮫﻪﻠﺘﻗ ،٬ﺐﺤﻟاﺍ ﺐﺠﯿﻴﻓ نﻥأﺃ ﻞﺘﻘﯾﻳ ﺐﺤﻟاﺍ ﺲﯿﻴﻗ ﻦﺑ ،٬ﺢﯾﻳرﺭذﺫ ﺎﻤﻛ ﻞﺘﻗ 
،٬ﮫﻪﯿﻴﺒﺣﺎﺻ ﺎﻤﻛوﻭ ﻞﺘﻗ ةﺓوﻭﺮﻋ ﻦﺑ مﻡاﺍﺰﺣ ﻦﻣ ﮫﻪﻠﺒﻗ.  
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riage, Qays replaces Lubnā with Ibn Abī ʿAtīq as the object of his poetry, joyfully sing-
ing his praises in verse. Like a shy lover, Ibn Abī ʿAtīq asks that Qays cease exposing 
him in poetry, and the story itself ceases there, i.e., with Ibn Abī ʿAtīq’s demand for an 
abrupt end. Not only does it analogize the sentiments of ʿudhrī love with that of ineffec-
tive praise poetry, as Qays’s verse proves only to embarrass its object of praise, it also 
scoffs at the audience’s emotional investment in Qays’s pain and commitment to ʿudhrī 
love, which is brought to an abrupt end in marriage.  
 The final alternative ending also breaks with the familiarity that characterized the 
story up to this point. It entails the involvement of two of the most powerful political fig-
ures of the time in their reunion, i.e., al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, the sons of the fourth 
“rightly guided” caliph ʿAlī. Although Qays’s foster brother intervened successfully be-
fore, he participated knowingly in that intervention. In this episode, he appears again, this 
time with his brother al-Ḥasan and with the weight of their position and money arranged 
a divorce and a marriage that seemed impossible. In this scenario, however, Ibn Abī ʿAtīq 
deceives and embarrasses the two respected men of power, mirroring the audience’s own 
sense of deception and embarrassment. Whereas, as Ṭaha Ḥusayn has pointed out, the 
events of the rest of the narrative are “familiar” to the audience, which can identify with 
Qays and his struggle, this ending is not taken from the pages of “every day life” (204). 
Having been an insider, able to understand and identify with the not unusual issues of en-
suring progeny, inheritance anxiety, needy mothers, and stubborn fathers, the audience 
becomes an outsider that is not privy to such resources of power and deception that could 
magically bring about the seemingly most unobtainable goal.  
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 The audience’s expectation of cohesion is betrayed in this alternative ending, both 
in terms of form and tone. Although we are tipped off at the top of the story that Lubnā is 
Qays’s wife, we no longer know whether or not to expect their remarriage after the di-
vorce. Despite the twists and turns in the plot, however, the cohesiveness of the plot and 
its narration set up expectations for a cohesive conclusion. If the goal of a collective nar-
rative is “conciseness, simplicity, originality, and clarity,” (Khalidi Historical 100) 
Iṣfahānī’s narrative has fallen short. The neatness of the first two endings, which seem to 
flow naturally from the story and bring the action to a definitive end, makes the inclusion 
of the third ending seem particularly bewildering. The third ending challenges the notion 
that one can know anything definitively, as this reasonable, persuasive story can so easily 
be trivialized and its premise of the seriousness of passionate love is so quickly called 
into question.  
CONCLUSION 
 Iṣfahānī draws the audience into Qay’s struggle through a plot that proceeds line-
arly and narrative tension that arises from familiar human experiences only to poke fun at 
their earnest investment in the story. His narration of the Qays Lubnā legend ends up 
drawing our attention to our vulnerability as an audience in the face of the persuasiveness 
of “reason” as represented by the collective narrative, which necessarily rejects other nar-
rative possibilities and the complexity of the human experience. The problematic conclu-
sion of the narrative dramatizes how the conceit of cohesion attempts to erase the realities 
of the process that creates cohesion. Considering the political and social context of tenth-
century Kufa and Baghdad, in which the Aghānī was composed, concerns about the vio-
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lent nature of unification are not surprising. As Joel Kraemer points out in his study of 
the “cultural revival” during the Buyid Age (945-1055), the “unification of a tremendous 
territory under the single banner of Islam” (30) meant inter-confessional conflict and 
fragile loyalties (23). “The cohesion of Muslims did not suffice to outweigh subgroup 
antagonism,” he adds, noting the particularly intense “social, religious, and ideological 
antagonisms” of the period (Kraemer 23).  
 The “Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” raises the question of 
what gets marginalized or silenced in the process of unification. In the case of Qays, it is 
the “happy” ending that is left on the margin. Ibn ʿAdī’s argument that reason unites 
mankind in love is thwarted in this chapter, as it is the break with cohesion that brings 
about union in love. Furthermore, the ideal of human unity achieved through rationality 
that he articulates is exposed as requiring the reduction of multiplicity and silencing un-
conventional possibilities. Whereas the “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir” encourages its au-
dience to doubt its certitude by inviting it into the madness of passion and wonder, the 
“Dhikr Qays bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” does so by exposing the seductive 
realism of familiarity.  
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Chapter 4 
Uprooting the “Authenticity”  
of Dhū ‘l-Rumma 
 in the Aghānī 
INTRODUCTION 
We learn from the Arabic linguist Abū ʿAmr bin al-ʿAlāʾ (d. 776) that “poetry 
was sealed (khutima) with Dhū ‘l-Rumma”87 rather early on in the lore that Iṣfahānī cu-
rates in the chapter he devotes to the ʿudhrī poet Dhū ‘l-Rumma (d. 735), the lover of 
Mayy, which is titled “Narrations and Lore of Dhu l’Rumma” (“Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa 
Khabaruhu”) (Iṣfahānī 18: 14). We might take this as a declaration that Dhū ‘l-Rumma 
was the last  poet of the “Jāhilī (i.e., pre-Islamic) manner,” whose death “marked the end 
of an era,” as Geert Jan van Gelder suggests, or perhaps that he was simply “the last po-
et,” as Arie Schippers takes it (van Gelder 111; Schippers 191, 193). Abū ʿAmr’s remark 
suggests the greatness and inimitability of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetic contribution. Poetry, it 
seems, reached its pinnacle with Dhū ‘l-Rumma. Or, perhaps, it was specifically Jāhilī 
poetry, as Van Gelder implies. 
                                                
87 Original text: 
ﻢﺘﺧ ﺮﻌﺸﻟاﺍ يﻱﺬﺑ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ  
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 Iṣfahānī, however, soon confronts us with another remark from Abū ʿAmr. Name-
ly, that “Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry is a bride’s beauty marks (nuqaṭ ʿarūs) that fade after a 
short time (ʿan qalīl) and animal droppings (abʿār) that give a delightful odor (lahā mas-
hamm) at first and then return to the smell of dung (arwāḥ al-baʿr)” (18: 14, 15).88 These 
analogies comparing Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry to beauty marks and animal dung suggest 
that his poetry invites both delight and disappointment. While his poetry appears admira-
ble at first, Abū ʿAmr seems to suggest, with time, it soon reveals a less attractive side. 
Iṣfahānī confronts us with both seemingly glowing praise for Dhū ‘l-Rumma's poetry 
from Abū ʿAmr, i.e., “poetry was sealed with Dhū ‘l-Rumma,” as well as a rather biting 
critique from him, i.e., that Dhū ‘l-Rumma's poetry is comparable to animal dung. 
 Iṣfahānī continues to dramatize such divergence of opinion among Dhū ‘l-
Rumma’s contemporaries and close successors over his contribution to and impact on 
Arabic poetry throughout this chapter of the Aghānī. In dramatizing this divergence, 
Iṣfahānī offers no resolution. The following excerpts from “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa 
Khabaruhu” convey a sense of this unresolved ambivalence and divergence in the recep-
tion of his poetry:  
[1] Al-Kumayt said when he heard a verse of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry: “By God, 
this is inspired! How great is Bedouin knowledge of the intricacies of reason and 
                                                
88 Original text: 
ﺎﻤﻧإﺇ ﺮﻌﺷ يﻱذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﻂﻘﻧ سﺱوﻭﺮﻋ ﻞﺤﻤﻀﯾﻳ ﻦﻋ ﻞﯿﻴﻠﻗ رﺭﺎﻌﺑأﺃوﻭ ﮭﻬﻟﺎ ﻢﺸﻣ ﻲﻓ لﻝوﻭأﺃ ﺔﻤﺷ ﻢﺛ دﺩﻮﻌﺗ ﻰﻟإﺇ حﺡاﺍوﻭرﺭأﺃ ﺮﻌﺒﻟاﺍ.  
  126 
the treasures attributed to the mind of those of sound judgment. Better and bet-
ter”89 (18: 11-12) 
[2] Ḥamād al-Rāwiya said: Dhū ‘l-Rumma came to us in Kufa. I had never seen 
[anyone] more eloquent, or knowledgeable of obscure terms than him.”90 (18: 13) 
[3] Ḥamād al-Rāwiya said: “The best of the Jāhiliyya at simile (tashbīh) is Imrūʾ 
 al-Qays, and Dhū 'l-Rumma is the best of people of Islam at tashbīh”91 (18: 14). 
[4] Abū ʿUbayda told me that he heard from Abū ʿAmr: Poetry (al-shiʿr) was 
sealed with Dhū ‘l-Rumma and impromptu poetry (al-rajaz) was sealed with 
Ruʾba.92 (18: 14) 
                                                
89 Original text: 
لﻝﺎﻗ ﺖﯿﻴﻤﻜﻟاﺍ ﻦﯿﻴﺣ ﻊﻤﺳ لﻝﻮﻗ يﻱذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ…اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﷲوﻭ ﻢﮭﻬﻠﻣ ﺎﻣوﻭ ﻢﻠﻋ يﻱوﻭﺪﺑ ﻖﺋﺎﻗﺪﺑ ﺔﻨﻄﻔﻟاﺍ ﺮﺋﺎﺧذﺫوﻭ ﺰﻨﻛ ﻞﻘﻌﻟاﺍ ﺪﻌﻤﻟاﺍ يﻱوﻭﺬﻟ 
بﺏﺎﺒﻟﻷاﺍ! ﻦﺴﺣأﺃ ﻢﺛ ﻦﺴﺣأﺃ.  
90 Original text: 
لﻝﺎﻗ دﺩﺎﻤﺣ ﺔﯾﻳوﻭاﺍﺮﻟاﺍ: مﻡﺪﻗ ﺎﻨﯿﻴﻠﻋ وﻭذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﺔﻓﻮﻜﻟاﺍ ﻢﻠﻓ رﺭأﺃ ﺢﺼﻓأﺃ ﻻوﻭ ﻢﻠﻋأﺃ ﺐﯾﻳﺮﻐﺑ ﮫﻪﻨﻣ.  
91 Original text: 
دﺩﺎﻤﺣ ﺔﯾﻳوﻭاﺍﺮﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﻦﺴﺣأﺃ ﺔﯿﻴﻠھﮪﮬﻫﺎﺠﻟاﺍ  ً ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﺒﺸﺗ ؤﺅﺮﻣاﺍ ﺲﯿﻴﻘﻟاﺍ وﻭذﺫوﻭ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﻦﺴﺣأﺃ ﻞھﮪﮬﻫأﺃ مﻡﻼﺳﻹاﺍ  ً ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﺒﺸﺗ.  
92 Original text: 
ﻲﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﻮﺑأﺃ ةﺓﺪﯿﻴﺒﻋ ﻦﻋ ﻲﺑأﺃ وﻭﺮﻤﻋ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﻢﺘﺧ ﺮﻌﺸﻟاﺍ يﻱﺬﺑ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﻢﺘﺧوﻭ ﺰﺟﺮﻟاﺍ ﺔﺑؤﺅﺮﺑ.  
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[5] Abū ʿAmr bin al-ʿAlāʾ would say: “Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry is a bride’s beauty 
marks that fade after a short time and animal droppings that give a delightful odor 
at first and then return to the smell of dung”93 (18: 19) 
[6] Al-Farazdaq came upon Dhū ‘l-Rumma while he was reciting his poem in 
which he says: 
“When the whip’s lashes scattered and the bodies of the mounts bent  
 like crescents, Saydaḥ94 made them suffer” 
Dhū ‘l-Rumma said: “What do you think [of my verse] Abū Firās95.” He said: “I 
think well of it.” He said: “So, why do you not consider me among the great stud 
poets (fuḥūl al-shuʿarāʾ)?” He said: “What deprives you of that distinction and 
separates you is your mention of animal dung and your weeping over abodes.”96 
(18: 20) 
                                                
93 Original text: 
نﻥﺎﻛ ﻮﺑأﺃ وﻭﺮﻤﻋ ﻦﺑ ءﻼﻌﻟاﺍ لﻝﻮﻘﯾﻳ: ﺎﻤﻧإﺇ ﺮﻌﺷ يﻱذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﻂﻘﻧ سﺱوﻭﺮﻋ ﻞﺤﻤﻀﯾﻳ ﻦﻋ ﻞﯿﻴﻠﻗ رﺭﺎﻌﺑأﺃوﻭ ﺎﮭﻬﻟ ﻢﺸﻣ ﻲﻓ لﻝوﻭأﺃ ﺔﻤﺷ ﻢﺛ 
دﺩﻮﻌﺗ ﻰﻟإﺇ حﺡاﺍوﻭرﺭأﺃ ﺮﻌﺒﻟاﺍ.  
94 Saydah, which denotes a donkey’s holler, is the name of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s camel. 
95 Abū Firās is the nickname for the poet al-Farazdaq (d. 732).  
96 Original text: 
لﻝﺎﻗ ﻮﺑأﺃ ﺪﯾﻳزﺯ ﻦﺑ ﺔﺒﺷ: لﻝﺎﻗ ﻮﺑأﺃ ةﺓﺪﯿﻴﺒﻋ:  
اﺍذﺫإﺇ ﺾﻓرﺭاﺍ فﻑاﺍﺮطﻁأﺃ طﻁﺎﯿﻴﺴﻟاﺍ ﺖﻠﻠھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ مﻡوﻭﺮﺟ ﺎﯾﻳﺎﻄﻤﻟاﺍ ﻦﮭﻬﺘﺑﺬﻋ حﺡﺪﯿﻴﺻ  
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[7] It was recorded about Dhū ‘l-Rumma that he did not excel at satire or praise 
poetry.97 (18: 35) 
The critical reactions presented above respond to Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s use of esoteric vocab-
ulary, demonstrations of Bedouin knowledge, talent for tashbīh, and deployment of ar-
chaic references to animal droppings and abandoned abodes, all features associated with 
Jāhilī poetry.98 Writing in such a archaicizing Jāhilī manner earns Dhū ‘l-Rumma both 
praise and criticism from his contemporaries and successors in the Aghānī. These voices 
do not diverge based on whether or not Dhū ‘l-Rumma performed this sort of poetry well, 
but on whether his mastery of them deserves praise. Al-Farazdaq (d. 732), for example, 
criticizes Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry for his use of images common to Arabic poetry, name-
ly animal droppings and weeping at abandoned campsites, which are motifs that are par-
ticularly indicative of the nasīb, the elegiac opening to the qaṣīda in which the poet re-
flects on the passage of time and the cruelty of fate (dahr). While weeping over abodes 
and mentioning “animal dung” is reason for lauding Imrūʾ al-Qays (d. 526),99 the finest 
                                                                                                                                            
لﻝﺎﻘﻓ وﻭذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ: ﻒﯿﻴﻛ ﻊﻤﺴﺗ ﺎﯾﻳ ﺎﺑأﺃ سﺱاﺍﺮﻓ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﻊﻤﺳأﺃ  ً ﺎﻨﺴﺣ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺎﻤﻓ ﻲﻟ ﻻ ﺪﻋأﺃ ﻲﻓ لﻝﻮﺤﻔﻟاﺍ ﻦﻣ ءاﺍﺮﻌﺸﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﻚﻌﻨﻤﯾﻳ ﻦﻣ 
ﻚﻟذﺫ كﻙﺪﻋﺎﺒﯾﻳوﻭ كﻙﺮﻛذﺫ رﺭﺎﻌﺑﻷاﺍ كﻙؤﺅﺎﻜﺑوﻭ رﺭﺎﯾﻳﺪﻟاﺍ.  
97 Original text: 
ﻧإﺇﺎﻤ ﻊﺿوﻭ ﻦﻣ يﻱذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ نﻥﺎﻛ ﻻ ﻦﺴﺤﯾﻳ نﻥأﺃ ﻮﺠﮭﻬﯾﻳ ﻻوﻭ حﺡﺪﻤﯾﻳ.  
98 I discuss these features of Jāhilī poetry in more detail later.  
99 The first three lines of Imruʾ al-Qays’s “Muʿallaqa, ” which, as Stetkevych points out, 
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poet in simile-crafting of the Jāhiliyya, it is also reason for dismissing Dhū ‘l-Rumma, 
the finest poet in simile-crafting of the people of Islam, from the highest ranks of poets. 
Notably, Iṣfahānī’s chapter devoted to the akhbār of Imrū’ al-Qays neither mentions nor 
raises the question of his status as one of the greats, while Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s status is a 
central theme of his akhbār. Why does Iṣfahānī stage Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetic merit as 
still so unsettled two centuries after the poet's death? 
 Contemporary receptions of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry continue to enact the unset-
tledness of his poetic merit and the divergent reception of his poetry that Iṣfahānī drama-
                                                                                                                                            
is “widely considered to be the finest in the Arabic language, composed by that tradi-
tion’s most renowned poet” (Mute Immortals 241) famously speak of weeping over 
abodes and the dung of wild animals: 
Stop! Let us weep over the memory of a beloved and her abode 
 Here in the desert between al-Dakhūl and Ḥawmal 
And Tuwḍiḥ and al-Miqrāh, its traces have not yet been erased 
 In spite of the winds weaving across it from the south and north  
You see the dung of white antelopes in its desolate spaces 
 And in its sunken places like peppercorns. 
 Original text: 
َﺎِﻔﻗ  ِﻚَْﺒﻧ  ْﻦِﻣ ىﻯَﺮْﻛِذﺫ  ٍﺐِﯿﻴﺒَﺣ  ِلﻝِﺰْﻨَﻣوﻭ   ِﻂْﻘِِﺴﺑ ىﻯَﻮﱢﻠﻟاﺍ  َﻦَْﯿﻴﺑ  ِلﻝﻮُﺧﱠﺪﻟاﺍ  ِﻞَﻣْﻮََﺤﻓ  
 َﺢِﺿُْﻮَﺘﻓ  ِةﺓاﺍﺮْﻘِﻤﻟَﺎﻓ  َْﻢﻟ  ُﻒَْﻌﯾﻳ ﺎﮭﻬُﻤْﺳَرﺭ  ﺎَِﻤﻟ َﺎﮭﻬْﺘَﺠََﺴﻧ  ْﻦِﻣ  ٍبﺏُﻮﻨَﺟ  ِلﻝﺄْﻤَﺷوﻭ  
ىﻯََﺮﺗ  َﺮََﻌﺑ  ِمﻡآﺁْرﺭﻷاﺍ ِﻲﻓ ﺎَـِﮭﻬﺗﺎَﺻَﺮَﻋ  َﺎِﮭﻬﻧﺎـَﻌِْﯿﻴﻗَوﻭ  ُﮫﻪﱠﻧﺄَﻛ  ﱡﺐَﺣ  ِﻞـُـﻔُْﻠﻓ  
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tizes in “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu.” For example, the poet’s diction has led a 
number of contemporary scholars, including Jaroslav Stetkevych, Arie Schippers, and 
Geert Jan van Gelder, to deem it—or his poetry in general—archaic or archaizing (Stet-
kevych, Zephyrs of Nejd 63; Schippers 191,193; van Gelder 110). While van Gelder finds 
that the difficulty of the language in Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s work detracts from its value, de-
claring the poet’s “archaic diction and abstruse vocabulary” “hurdles” that the listener or 
reader must overcome in order to “appreciate his virtues” (110),100 Stetkevych and 
Schippers find it invigorating. Specifically, Stetkevych views Dhū ‘l-Rumma as a “pur-
posefully archaic poet,” (63) whose “precision of...language...adds a special liveliness 
and earthbound reality to the poet’s vision of the firmament” (153). Schippers suggests 
that the poet’s penchant for quadriliteral nouns and adjectives lends an archaic quality to 
his language, (193) and declares what he finds to be a particularly difficult qaṣīda (“Mā 
Bālu ‘Aynuka”) no less than a “masterpiece” (203).”  
 Modern scholars’ reception of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry indicated in the brief re-
view above continues and reenacts the divergence of opinion we find in “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-
Rumma wa Khabaruhu,” a text these scholars have closely examined. Despite this per-
formative effect “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” has seemed to have had on cur-
                                                
100 It is also worth nothing that this response, although more muted, is in keeping with the 
received orientalist view toward Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry. Reynold Nicholson, for exam-
ple, saw his work as imitations of “the odes of the desert Arabs with tiresome and ridicu-
lous fidelity” (264). 
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rent scholars of classical Arabic literature, scholars of the Aghānī have given little atten-
tion to the divergence and ambivalence we find in this chapter. Instead, the usual relega-
tion of the Aghānī to the reference shelf has foreclosed such questions as “why all this 
divergence and ambivalence?” for most scholars. Instead, scholars refer to “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-
Rumma wa Khabaruhu” as a source of his poetry and its socio-historical context. Such an 
approach offers little in the way of opening up this divergence and performative friction 
as a kind of verbal art for analysis. In redressing this, I engage Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari’s notion of the rhizome and the ways in which it interacts with the audience and 
the world through processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization in order to di-
rect a reading of “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” in relation to the anxieties of 8th 
and 10th century Arabo-Islamic society.  
 Because the book, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, might be understood as an 
“assemblage” connected to other “assemblages,” the question of what a book means is 
irrelevant. The right questions, including those about literature, explore how matter, or 
literature, functions and with what it functions (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 4). Con-
ceived as a machine, one doesn’t ask what a book means, they assert, but rather what it 
can do and how it relates to other machines: 
Contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. It forms 
a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of the book and the 
world; the book assures the deterritorialization of the world, but the world effects 
a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 11) 
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Rather than approaching the Aghānī, then, as an image of Umayyad or Abbasid society, 
we might consider instead how the manipulation of Dhū ‘l-Rumma lore in the Aghānī, as 
a rhizomatic book, plugs into Umayyad culture and the lore to form a rhizome with them 
and deterritorialize them. This manipulation also sets itself up to be plugged into the Ab-
basid social practices of Iṣfahānī’s time, which are deterritorialized by the same process 
and reterritorialized with the meaning reflected back onto it through the audience’s par-
ticipation. 
 In responding to the guiding question of why Iṣfahānī stages Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s po-
etic merit as so unsettled, I consider Iṣfahānī’s selection and arrangement of akhbār, in 
which he weaves akhbār about the value of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry into unresolving 
akhbār about his Bedouinness. In this chapter, Iṣfahānī presents us with akhbār that rein-
force Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s Bedouin “authenticity,” complicate it, and challenge it. By fore-
grounding Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s multi-faceted liminality throughout the chapter on Dhū ‘l-
Rumma, Iṣfahānī breaks down the Bedouin-Urbanite, Jāhilī-Islamic dichotomies. As I 
argue in this chapter, rather than constructing a fixed identity for Dhū ‘l-Rumma, “Dhikr 
Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” presents a poet who moves between identities. With his 
arcane language and esoteric knowledge, Dhū ‘l-Rumma seems like a time-traveller sent 
from the Jāhiliyya to embody and uphold a culture, through its language and poetry. Fur-
thermore, it is from this culture that this new Islamic society draws its cultural weight, 
thus creating interest in keeping Dhū ‘l-Rumma rooted and fixed, i.e., “authentic” (aṣīl). I 
argue that in his performance of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s lore in “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Kha-
baruhu,” which points to this concern about the poet’s “rootedness” in Bedouin culture, 
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i.e., “authenticity” (aṣāla), Iṣfahānī invites his audience to consider the irrelevance and 
absurdity of looking for “authenticity” in poetry and lore and points to the misguidedness 
of the interest in fixing them. 
A PRE-ISLAMIC POET IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY 
 Dhū ‘l-Rumma composed his poetry at a time of Islamic expansion that involved 
the establishment of garrison towns, such as Basra and Kufa, where a center “for the ex-
pression of old Bedouin ideals” thrived (Hodgson 229). As Marshall Hodgson explains, 
Arabic poetry was “vigorously transplanted to the new setting” and continued to find its 
expression in the “standard Bedouin tongue” (229-330). Amidst this movement toward 
urbanization and toward the idealization of Bedouin, i.e., Arabic, culture, Dhū ‘l-Rumma 
celebrated desert life in his poetry through extended animal descriptions and distinctive 
vocabulary. The bulk of his poetry is dedicated to “desert themes and motifs” into which 
he weaves his amatory verse for his beloved Mayya (and sometimes Kharqāʾ). (Sells 67-
76). His seemingly encyclopedic knowledge of the desert landscape and fauna makes for 
varied and novel similes and metaphors.101 His skill in creating similes became his 
trademark, earning him praise in the Aghānī as “the best of the people of Islam at tashbīh 
(simile)” from the scholar of Arabic poetry Ḥammād al-Rāwiya (d. 771) among others 
(Iṣfahānī 18: 14). Dhū ‘l-Rumma himself is presented in the Aghānī as identifying this 
                                                
101 See Schippers for an insightful analysis of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s metaphorical use of desert 
animals in his poetry.  
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strength as a defining trait: “If I say ‘as if it were’ and then can’t find a way out, then may 
God gag me”102 (Iṣfahānī 18: 14).  
 Further situating his poetry in an imagined lost Bedouin past, a deftly employed 
arcane Arabic lexicon—characteristic of the Jāhiliyya period or not—distinguishes his 
poetry. Much is made of his distinctive word choice in the Aghānī, and Iṣfahānī makes it 
clear that it did not go unnoticed by his contemporaries. Ḥammād al-Rāwiya, for exam-
ple, recalls the impression Dhū ‘l-Rumma made on the people of Kufa during one of his 
visits: “we had never seen anyone better at, more eloquent in, or knowledgeable of ob-
scure terms (bi-gharībin) than him” (Iṣfahānī 18: 38). Ibn Ḥabīb suggests that the poet 
earned his laqab “Dhū ‘l-Rumma.” i.e., “the one with the rumma (frayed rope),” for his 
use of the word “rumma” in a particular verse (Iṣfahānī 18: 5),103 which suggests the dis-
tinctiveness of the word at the time. In addition to the people of Kufa, others express sim-
ilar admiration for Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s performed knowledge. For example, upon hearing 
some of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry, the poet al-Kumayt (d. 743) exclaims: “By God, this is 
inspired. How great is Bedouin knowledge in the intricacies of reason and the treasures 
stored in the mind of those of sound judgment. Better and better” (Iṣfahānī 18: 12). Al-
                                                
102 Original text:  
ﺖﻌﻤﺳ اﺍذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ لﻝﻮﻘﯾﻳ: اﺍذﺫإﺇ ﺖﻠﻗ: ﮫﻪﻧﺄﻛ ﻢﺛ ﻢﻟ ﺪﺟأﺃ  ً ﺎﺟﺮﺨﻣ ﻊﻄﻘﻓ ﷲ ﻲﻧﺎﺴﻟ.  
103 Original text: 
لﻝﺎﻗوﻭ ﻦﺑاﺍ ﺐﯿﻴﺒﺣ: ﺐﻘﻟ اﺍذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﻟﻮﻘﻟ: ﺚﻌﺷأﺃ ﻲﻗﺎﺑ ﺔﻣرﺭ ﺪﯿﻴﻠﻘﺘﻟاﺍ  
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Kumayt’s praise for Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry links his poetry to an esoteric Bedouin 
knowledge that was the under threat of becoming archaic. 
 Dhū ‘l-Rumma composed his verses after Islamic culture had begun to form and 
spread, which led authors of classical Arabic texts on poets and poetry, such as Ibn Sal-
lām al-Jumaḥī (d. 846) in his Ṭabaqāt Fuḥūl al-Shuʿarāʾ (Classes of Champion Poets) to 
categorize Dhū ‘l-Rumma as an Islamic poet. Despite this and although narrators stage 
him as a pious Muslim,104 Iṣfahānī’s presentation of the akhbār dramatizes how cultural 
imagination links his poetry’s rich Arabic vocabulary and vivid desert scenes to esoteric 
Bedouin knowledge and to the Jāhiliyya.105 But such a poetic identity could only be actu-
                                                
104 A few akhbar in “Dhikr and Khabar of Dhū ‘l-Rumma” stage the poet as pious. 
Among them is a khabar from Isā ibn ʾUmar in which Dhū ‘l-Rumma says, after finishing 
the recitation of some poetry: “By God I strike you from behind with something you 
won’t see coming: Praise to God and thanks be to God and there is no god but God. God 
is great” (Iṣfahānī 18: 52). The khabar that follows, from Abū Maʿāwiya al-Ghulabi, spe-
cifically remarks on Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s piousness:  
Dhū ‘l-Rumma was good at prayer, good at humility. It was said to him: “How 
great is your praying!” So he said: “The servant, when he stands between the 
hands of God, he must be humble.” (Iṣfahānī 18: 52) 
105 While other medieval books of poets and poetry tend to organize chapters according to 
the poet’s period and rank, Iṣfahāni does not fix poets and the poetry into definitive cate-
gories for interpretation in the Aghānī. As its name suggests the Kitāb al-Aghānī (The 
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alized in relation to variations that proved fitting for the new urban and Islamic setting. 
The sense that there is a Jāhilī manner of composing verse emerges indirectly in the pro-
cess of those contemporary scholars and fellow poets discussing and musing about Dhū 
‘l-Rumma’s poetry in the Aghānī. The criticism they level at him inverts the aesthetic 
model they use for judging those poets who fall into the Jāhiliyya, which highlights the 
anxiety over the future of poetry. Iṣfahānī dramatizes the anxiety that shifting and absent 
categories inspired and manifests this anxiety as collective ambivalence toward his poetry 
and through polyvalent judgments that many of his contemporaries express.  
                                                                                                                                            
Book of Songs) is, on an overt level, a collection of songs. Rather than organizing chap-
ters of his akhbār text according to the period or rank of the singers and poets (Iṣfahānī 1: 
3-5), Iṣfahānī arranges the material in his Aghānī according to three lists of songs he in-
herited or compiled himself. First, Iṣfahānī presents the one hundred songs selected by 
musicians of the court of Hārūn al-Rashīd at the end of the 8th century. The second group 
of songs consists of those composed by the Umayyad and Abbasid families. In the third 
and final section, he presents songs of his own choosing. Iṣfahānī then follows each song 
with akhbār relating to the poet, singer, or event with whom or which the song is associ-
ated, and these groups of akhbār, which I refer to as chapters, vary in length in current 
printed editions from anywhere between four and over a hundred pages. Because lists of 
songs dictate the overall organization of the text, chapters with similar themes, charac-
ters, historical context are scattered throughout the massive book.   
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 The praise of his simile-crafting mentioned above, taken in its larger context, is in 
keeping with the practice at the time of grouping poets by period: “the best of the 
Jāhiliyya at tashbīh is Imrūʾ al-Qays, and Dhū ‘l-Rumma is the best of people of Islam at 
tashbīh” (Iṣfahānī 18: 9). While narrators suggest a superficial distinction between Islam-
ic poets and Jāhilī poets, nothing in the discussion of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry in the 
Aghānī points to a preformed notion of a distinction in style. Rather, a sense of a stylistic 
distinction emerges from Iṣfahānī's performance of the discussions and evaluations of the 
quality and function of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry contribution. His performance calls atten-
tion to the need for multiple aesthetic models for Arabic poetry. Emerging notions of a 
Jāhilī manner and an Islamic or Classical style of poetic composition can be gleaned in 
part from the consensus around Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry that builds in his akhbār of the 
Aghānī. The first time Dhū ‘l-Rumma is praised in the Aghānī as “the best of people of 
Islam at tashbīh,” Iṣfahānī presents it as the words of Ḥammād al-Rāwiya (Iṣfahānī 18: 
14). When Iṣfahānī repeats this khabar, the narrator attributes it to an anonymous group, 
namely “our scholars” (Iṣfahānī 18: 15) Similarly, in Ḥammād al-Rāwiya’s first account 
of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s visit to al-Kūfa,  he speaks in the first person singular, saying “I had 
never seen anyone better…” (Iṣfahānī 18: 14). When Iṣfahānī repeats this praise many 
pages later, however, Iṣfahānī presents Ḥammād al-Rāwiya speaking from the first per-
son plural: “we had never seen anyone better…” (Iṣfahānī 18: 38). These movements 
from the individual voice to the collective do not point to a growing consensus around the 
aesthetic or social value of his poetry as a whole, but rather around those aspects of his 
poetry that make such a consensus difficult to reach, i.e., his use of obscure language and 
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skill with simile and metaphor. That is, it is specifically because Dhū ‘l-Rumma so mas-
terfully captures desert life to meditate on human experiences through tashbīh and deftly 
employs arcane Arabic lexicon that his verse problematizes Arabic poetry during the 
transitional period of the mid-eighth century.  
 Skills in invective and panegyric, however, trumped Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s skill set due 
to the new demands of reconfigured social, political, and economic structures. The grow-
ing bureaucracy and emergence of local rulers during the Umayyad period provided 
“plentiful sources of patronage...to reward poets who would compose occasional poems” 
(Allen 68). Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s achievements in tashbīh and agility with the language of 
poetry contrasted with and emphasized his lack of demonstrated skills in praising and sat-
irizing, social and political weapons that were key in competing for financial support 
through the expanding patronage system. His lack in this arena, within which most poets 
made their living, is not merely alluded to in the Aghānī by the emphasis on his talent for 
tashbīh. Iṣfahānī includes a number of akhbār illustrating his failures in attempting these 
genres, and the scholar al-Aṣmaʿī relates a khabar that declares outright that Dhū ‘l-
Rumma “did not excel at satire (yahjū) or praise poetry (yamdaḥ)” (Iṣfahānī 18: 35).  
 In his selection and arrangement of akhbār, Iṣfahānī stages a consensus around 
Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s failing in praise poetry (madḥ), which forms not on the basis of the 
quality of his panegyric verse itself, which many suggest deserves admiration not deri-
sion, but rather on the basis of the verse's failure to achieve its aim (gharaḍ)—madḥ. 
Iṣfahānī presents akhbār that narrate anecdotes in which the objects of his attempts at 
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panegyric often received them in unintended ways. In praising the governor of Basra, 
Bilāl bin Abī Burda,  for example, Dhū ‘l-Rumma said:  
I saw people seeking pasture where rain has fallen 
 So I said to Ṣaydaḥ: Seek out Bilāl106 (Iṣfahānī 18: 35) 
In this verse, Dhū ‘l-Rumma plays with the polyvalence of the word Bilāl, which refers to 
the proper name of the object of praise while also bringing to mind its common interpre-
tation—a place where rain has fallen. It is upon this wordplay that Dhū ‘l-Rumma sets up 
an analogy between the governor and a place of abundance and generosity, as he directs 
his camel, Ṣaydaḥ, toward him. Although Dhū ‘l-Rumma relies on his skills in tashbīh in 
composing his verse, he falls short of flattering Bilāl, who embarrasses the poet by point-
ing out the meagerness of his praise: “Is it only Ṣaydaḥ that seeks me out?!” (Iṣfahānī 18: 
35).107 The negative judgments regarding his panegyric focus not on its aesthetic function 
but its social and political function. It is Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s praise poetry that he and others 
consider his most inspired work. In considering the way in which he composed certain 
verses, Dhū ‘l-Rumma reports that it is a verse intended as madḥ that caused him great 
madness: 
                                                
106 Original text: 
ﺖﯾﻳأﺃرﺭ سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ نﻥﻮﻌﺠﺘﻨﯾﻳ  ً ﺎﺜﯿﻴﻏ  ﺖﻠﻘﻓ حﺡﺪﯿﻴﺼﻟ: ﻲﻌﺠﺘﻧاﺍ ﻻﻼﺑ  
107 Original text: 
لﻝﺎﻗ ﮫﻪﻟ : وﻭأﺃ ﻢﻟ ﻲﻨﻌﺠﺘﻨﯾﻳ ﺮﯿﻴﻏ حﺡﺪﯿﻴﺻ ؟ ﺎﯾﻳ مﻡﻼﻏ , ﮫﻪﻄﻋأﺃ ﻞﺒﺣ  ﱠﺖﻗ حﺡﺪﯿﻴﺼﻟ ﮫﻪﻠﺠﺧﺄﻓ  
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In my poetry is that which comes easy to me and helps me along in the process. 
There is also that for which I must strain myself. There is as well that for which I 
become completely possessed with madness. As for that which comes easy to me:  
 My two friends, take a detour from leading your riding camels to water 
And as for that which I must strain myself: 
 Is it that I searched for dignity in Kharqāʾ? 
And as for that which possesses me with madness:  
 What is wrong with your eye from which tears are falling?108 (Iṣfahānī 18: 
26-27) 
The first two verses Dhū ‘l-Rumma cites correspond to descriptive desert scenes and am-
atory verse, respectively. While descriptive verses come most easily to him, love poetry 
requires great effort. It is praise poetry, however, that possesses him with madness, sug-
                                                
108 Original text: 
ﻦﻣ يﻱﺮﻌﺷ ﺎﻣ ﻲﻨﻋوﻭﺎطﻁ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻓ لﻝﻮﻘﻟاﺍ ﻲﻧﺪﻋﺎﺳوﻭ ﮫﻪﻨﻣوﻭ ﺎﻣ تﺕﺪﮭﻬﺟأﺃ ﻲﺴﻔﻧ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻓ ﮫﻪﻨﻣوﻭ ﺎﻣ ﺖﻨﻨﺟ ﮫﻪﺑ  ً ﺎﻧﻮﻨﺟ ﻓﺎﻣﺄ ﺎﻣ ﻲﻨﻋوﻭﺎطﻁ لﻝﻮﻘﻟاﺍ 
ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻓ ﻲﻟﻮﻘﻓ:  
 ﻲﻠﯿﻴﻠﺧ  ً ﺎﺟﻮﻋ ﻦﻣ رﺭوﻭﺪﺻ ﻞﺣاﺍوﻭﺮﻟاﺍ  
ﺎﻣأﺃوﻭ ﺎﻣ تﺕﺪﮭﻬﺟأﺃ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻓ ﻲﺴﻔﻧ ﻲﻟﻮﻘﻓ:  
  نﻥأﺃأﺃ ﺖﻤﺳﻮﺗ ﻦﻣ ءﺎﻗﺮﺧ ﺔﻟﺰﻨﻣ  
ﺎﻣأﺃ ﺎﻣ ﺖﻨﻨﺟ ﮫﻪﺑ  ً ﺎﻧﻮﻨﺟ ﻲﻟﻮﻘﻓ:  
 ﺎﻣ لﻝﺎﺑ ﻚﻨﯿﻴﻋ ﺎﮭﻬﻨﻣ ﻊﻣﺪﻟاﺍ ﺐﻜﺴﻨﯾﻳ  
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gesting mad inspiration. Indeed, this khabar is followed by one in which we learn that the 
verse that caused him madness is also the line which the poet Jarīr (d. 728) wished to be 
attributed to him because it is the one in which “his muse (shaytān) was his aid in it” 
(Iṣfahānī 18: 27).109    
  If the poet who excelled above all others at his time in innovating upon the tradi-
tion of Arabic poetry while demonstrating mastery of the Bedouin tongue and culture 
from within which it emerged, and upon which Islam and the Umayyad empire drew a 
cultural identity, could not successfully compete with his fellow poets during his lifetime, 
how could poetry itself succeed? In “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu,” Iṣfahānī calls 
attention to how Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry problematizes poetry itself and raises questions 
about the future of poetry in the nascent Islamic society. Such anxieties about the future 
of Arabic poetry would have been particularly resonant in the tenth century when the 
Aghānī’s contemporary audience was facing the consequences of the decentralization of 
the Abbasid caliphal courts, including an uncertain future for court musicians and the liv-
ing tradition they embodied. In calling attention to Dhu ‘l-Rumma’s in-between status as 
a Jāhilī-style poet living in the Islamic period, the “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” 
suggests that the ways in which poetry is assessed and understood requires drastic reas-
                                                
109 Original text: 
نﻥﺎﻛ ﺮﯾﻳﺮﺟ لﻝﻮﻘﯾﻳ: ﺎﻣ ﺖﺒﺒﺣأﺃ نﻥأﺃ ﺐﺴﻨﯾﻳ ﻲﻟإﺇ ﻦﻣ ﺮﻌﺷ يﻱذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﻻإﺇ ﮫﻪﻟﻮﻗ: ﺎﻣ لﻝﺎﺑ ﻚﻨﯿﻴﻋ ﺎﮭﻬﻨﻣ ءﺎﻤﻟاﺍ ﺐﻜﺴﻨﯾﻳ نﻥﺈﻓ ﮫﻪﻧﺎﻄﯿﻴﺷ نﻥﺎﻛ 
ﮫﻪﻟ ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﻓ  ً ﺎﺤﺻﺎﻧ.  
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sessment at times of drastic social change. Kumayt credits Dhū ‘l-Rumma with relating 
the greatness of “Bedouin knowledge” and “the intricacies of reason and the treasures 
stored in the mind of those of sound judgment” in his poetry (Iṣfahānī 18: 12), and the 
cosmopolitan people of Kufa exclaim that they had never seen anyone “better at, more 
eloquent in, or knowledgeable of obscure terms (bi-gharībin) than him” (Iṣfahānī 18: 38). 
His poetry, it seems, would help spread Bedouin knowledge in Islamic society and serve 
as a source for this crucial cultural and linguistic knowledge. However, “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-
Rumma wa Khabaruhu,” as is discussed in the next section, suggests an uneasiness with 
accepting such a function for Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry and plays with the paradox of “au-
thenticity.” 
THE “AUTHENTICITY” OF DHŪ ‘L-RUMMA 
 Although the words “badw” or “ahl al-bādiya,” used in “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa 
Khabaruhu” to refer to the notion of “Bedouin” derive from b-d-w, a root implying open-
ness and “going forth into the open country” (Lane 170), a Bedouin’s legitimacy as a 
source of knowledge was premised upon his purity and fixedness, i.e., his aṣāla,  at least 
by the tenth century. The word aṣāla,  which I intend by the term “authenticity,” derives 
from ʾ-ṣ-l, denoting “root” (Lane 34) or “the lowest part of everything (asfalu kulli 
shayʾin)”110 (Ibn Manẓūr 89). However, as Jonathan Shannon points out, “the use of 
aṣāla to mean authenticity reflects a decidedly modern sensibility” (57). The medieval 
                                                
110 Original text: 
ﻞﻔﺳأﺃ ﻞﻛ ءﻲﺷ  
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usage of the word, rather, implies “notions of rootedness, fixedness, permanence, and lin-
eage” (Shannon 57). The question of “authenticity,” then, becomes one of “fixedness.” 
This association between the Bedouin identity and “authenticity” is particularly evident 
in medieval discourses on language. If a Bedouin “had mixed (khālaṭ) with settled people 
(ahl al-ḥaḍar),” ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Maṭar explains based on an anecdote that Ibn Jinnī (d. 
1002) recorded in his Kitāb al-Khaṣāʾiṣ fī ʿIlm Uṣūl ʿArabiyya (Book of Special Features 
of Arabic Grammar), “then taking linguistic knowledge from him is prohibited because 
his skin would have become soft (lāna)” (Maṭar 45).111 In other words, mixing with the 
people of the city would put into question the Bedouin’s “authenticity” as a source of 
“pure,” “unmediated” knowledge.  
 The importance of Bedouin “purity” reached a new pinnacle in the tenth century, 
when the use of living Bedouin informants by linguistic experts as arbiters in questions of 
Arabic language disappeared (Versteegh 64). As Kees Versteegh points out, from the 
tenth century on, references to the “language of the Bedouin still abounded in the books 
of the grammarians, but these were no longer connected with any living speech” (64). 
Grammarians, instead, relied on Bedouins of the past, and as Dhū ‘l-Rumma “sealed” po-
etry, he had been a common source of linguistic knowledge.112 Scholars also drew upon 
                                                
111 Original text: 
اﺍذﺫﺈﻓ ﻂﻟﺎﺧ يﻱوﻭﺪﺒﻟاﺍ ﻞھﮪﮬﻫأﺃ ﺮﻀﺤﻟاﺍ اﺍﻮﻌﻨﺘﻣاﺍ ﻦﻋ ﺬﺧﻷاﺍ ،٬ﮫﻪﻨﻋ ﮫﻪﻧﻷ « َنﻥﻻ هﻩُﺪﻠﺟ.»  
112 He is mentioned over 150 times in al-Farāhīdī’s (d. 786) Kitāb al-ʿAyn (Book of ʿAyn), 
over 40 times in Sībawayh’s (d. 796) al-Kitāb (The Book), over 300 times in al-
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Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry for other sources of knowledge, such as botanical113 and zoolog-
ical114. Nicholson argues that the philologists in the period after Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s death 
“delighted in his antique and difficult style, and praised him far above his merits” pre-
cisely because he was seen as “the last important representative of the pure Bedouin 
school” (246). However, as what were accepted as reliable living sources of the “pure 
Bedouin tradition” were dwindling in the tenth century, “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khaba-
ruhu” points to renewed anxiety in the tenth century about the reliability of past sources, 
namely Dhū ‘l-Rumma and his poetic legacy.  
 “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” reads like a compilation of literary criti-
cism on Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetic contribution, and thus, the plentiful comments about his 
physical appearance, character, and social interactions that Iṣfahānī includes ask to be 
read as part and parcel of this inquiry into his oeuvre, even when doing so is called into 
question. As mentioned above, Arabic poetry was directly linked to a notion of Arabic 
culture that was based on Bedouin life in the desert. His esoteric Bedouin knowledge, as 
seen in both his arcane language and desert descriptions, reinforces and is reinforced by 
                                                                                                                                            
Zamasharī’s (d. 1143) Asās al-Balāgha (Foundations of Rhetoric), and over 1000 times 
in Ibn Manẓūr’s (d. 1311) Lisān al-ʿArab (The Language of the Arabs).  
113 He is mentioned about 40 times in Abū Ḥanīfa al-Dīnawarī’s (d. 896) Kitāb al-Nabāt 
(Book of Plants).  
114 He is mentioned about 50 times in al-Jāḥiẓ’s (d. 869) Kitāb al-Hayawān (Book of An-
imals) 
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his perceived identity as a Bedouin. The attention paid in the akhbār to Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s 
physical appearance, personality, and social traits probe the question of his Bedouin-ness. 
While the chapters in the Aghānī that Iṣfahānī dedicates to Majnūn Laylā and Qays Lub-
nā, who were famed primarily as love poets, focus on their love stories, “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-
Rumma wa Khabaruhu,” dedicated to the personality known as the last great Bedouin 
poet, explores the question of his status as a “true” Bedouin.  
 In exploring this question, however, “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” com-
plicates the question of his rootedness in Bedouin culture. In other words, we discover 
that that which seems to complicate his “authenticity” can also be understood as contrib-
uting to it. Even the notion of Bedouin rootedness, then, lacks rootedness and reminds us 
of the wandering, not fixedness, associated with the Bedouin. In particular, the “Dhikr 
Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” examines three aspects of his Bedouin “authenticity”: his 
rootedness in the desert, his illiteracy, and his direct knowledge of what he describes in 
his poetry.  
PARTY-CRASHING IN BASRA AND KUFA 
 Early on in the chapter, Iṣfahānī relates akhbār that stage in which his mixing 
with the people of the city. In particular, he relates that Dhū ‘l-Rumma was a party-
crasher (ṭufaylī), who would “often come to the city region (al-ḥaḍar) and stay in Kufa 
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and Basra” (Iṣfahānī 18: 9).115 He also reports a khabar from Ibn Saʿīd al-Kindī who re-
lates having heard Ibn ʿAyyāsh saying: “Someone told me he saw Dhū ‘l-Rumma party-
crashing, taking food at banquets” (Iṣfahānī 18: 9).116 As noted above, to mix with the 
people of the city would supposedly problematize the “authenticity” of a Bedouin. Such 
mixing need not be one of blood for this invalidation. Even eating the food of the settled 
folk could supposedly delegitimize a Bedouin’s knowledge, as we learn in an account al-
Zubaydī (d. 989) includes in his Ṭabaqāt al-Naḥwiyyīn wa al-Lughawiyyīn (Classes of 
Grammarians and Lexicographers) in which al-Aṣmaʿī (d. 828) refuses to accept the cor-
rectness of the word “zawjah” (172). When al-Sadrī protests by citing a line of poetry 
said by Dhū ‘l-Rumma, al-Aṣmaʿī maintains his rejection because, as he says, “Dhū ‘l-
Rumma ate salty foods and legumes in taverns (ḥawānīt al-baqqālīn)” (al-Zubaydī 
172).117 In other words, Dhū ‘l-Rumma participated in the culture of non-Bedouins by 
eating their food at their establishments and thus cannot be relied on as a trustworthy 
source of Bedouin culture.  
                                                
115 Original text: 
نﻥﺎﻛوﻭ وﻭذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ  ًاﺍﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﺎﻣ ﻲﺗﺄﯾﻳ ﺮﻀﺤﻟاﺍ ﻢﯿﻴﻘﯿﻴﻓ ﺔﻓﻮﻜﻟﺎﺑ ةﺓﺮﺼﺒﻟاﺍوﻭ وﻭنﻥﺎﻛ  ً ﺎﯿﻴﻠﯿﻴﻔطﻁ.  
116 Original text: 
ﻲﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﻦﺑاﺍ ﺪﯿﻴﻌﺳ يﻱﺪﻨﻜﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺖﻌﻤﺳ ﻦﺑاﺍ شﺵﺎﯿﻴﻋ لﻝﻮﻘﯾﻳ: ﻲﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﻦﻣ ىﻯأﺃرﺭ اﺍذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ  ً ﺎﯿﻴﻠﯿﻴﻔطﻁ ﻲﺗﺄﯾﻳ تﺕﺎﺳﺮﻌﻟاﺍ.  
117 Original text: 
وﻭذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﻞﻛأﺃ ﺢﻟﺎﻤﻟاﺍ ﻞﻘﺒﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻲﻓ ﺖﯿﻴﻧاﺍﻮﺣ ﻦﯿﻴﻟﺎﻘﺒﻟاﺍ.  
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 In the stories included in “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu,” however, Dhū ‘l-
Rumma’s time in the city is mentioned in relation to his party-crashing habits, which, alt-
hough indicative of mixing, might also be perceived as reinforcing his Bedouin identity. 
In a chapter of al-Baghdādī’s Taṭfīl (Party-Crashing) called “Bāb Fīman Ḥamida al-Taṭfīl 
wa Iḥtajja l-Ahlihi wa Dhakarahum bi-l-Jamīl” (“Those Who Praise, Excuse, and Speak 
Well of Party-Crashing”), al-Aṣmaʿī suggests how Bedouin culture might perceive the 
practice of party-crashing: 
Al-Aṣmaʿī said: A Bedouin (aʿrābī) heard some people talking [about party-
crashers] and said: “Who are these party-crashing people?” It was said: “People 
who come to eat food without having been invited. So, he said: “These are truly a 
friendly (kirām) people”118 (79) 
The Bedouin in this anecdote exhibits naiveté with respect to the conventions of parties 
and social etiquette and views the party-crasher positively for joining a banquet even 
without an invitation.  
 The “motif of the bedouin” in the “Arabic tradition,” as Lawrence Conrad argues, 
involves “a simple rather uncouth individual portrayed as a guileless rustic, who is be-
fuddled by a simple problem, fails to see a basic point, or naively behaves in a totally un-
                                                
118 Original text: 
 َلﻝَﺎﻗ ﻲﻌﻤﺻﻷاﺍ: ﻊﻤﺳ ﻲﺑاﺍﺮﻋأﺃ ﺎﻣﻮﻗ نﻥوﻭﺮﻛﺬﯾﻳ ،٬  َلﻝَﺎَﻘﻓ : ﻦﻣ ﻮﻨﺑ ﻞﯿﻴﻔطﻁ  ِءﻻَُﺆھﮪﮬﻫ ؟ ﻞﯿﻴﻘﻓ : مﻡﻮﻗ نﻥﻮﺗﺄﯾﻳ مﻡﺎﻌﻄﻟاﺍ ﻦﻣ ﺮْﯿﻴَﻏ َنﻥأﺃ اﺍﻮﻋﺪﯾﻳ 
 ِﮫﻪَْﯿﻴِﻟإﺇ ،٬  َلﻝَﺎَﻘﻓ :  ِءﻻَُﺆھﮪﮬﻫ ﷲوﻭ مﻡﻮﻗ مﻡاﺍﺮﻛ.  
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acceptable way, for example, urinating in the mosque” (407). Conrad presents the Bedou-
in as an outsider among “settled” people and suggests that he is perceived as so deeply 
“rooted” in his ways that he unselfconsciously behaves inappropriately, guilelessly per-
forming his identity as such. Like the Bedouin in al-Aṣmaʿī’s story, then, Dhū ‘l-
Rumma’s habit of party-crashing, while suggestive of mixing might also be understood 
as demonstrating his Bedouin guilelessness; he is so naive and rustic that he shares food 
uninvited based on his Bedouin notions of hospitality and community.  
LITERACY 
 Iṣfahānī also complicates the question of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s literacy in “Dhikr Dhī 
‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu.” Because the ability to read and write is related to mixing with 
the learned people of the city and suggests an ability to gain knowledge through books 
rather than personal firsthand experience, what is at stake in the question of a Bedouin 
poet’s literacy, as Michael Cook points out, is his “authenticity” (496). This sentiment is 
echoed by the twelfth century literary theorist al-Kalāʿī (d. 1148) in his Ihkām Ṣanʿat al-
Kalām (Perfecting the Art of Speech), in which he argues that scholars considered the use 
of writing among Bedouin shameful at that time because of the artificiality (takalluf) of 
writing, which would inevitably lead the poet to compose “unnatural” and “affected” 
work (Cook 496).  
 Iṣfahānī present two akhbār that explicitly comment on Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s ability 
to read and write. In the first, Muḥārib bin Dithār (d. 734), a Kufan judge, is quoted as 
saying:  
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Dhū ‘l-Rumma would read and write but would hide that fact. It was said to him: 
“How do you say it: Uzayr ibn Allah or Uzayr bin Allah?” He said: “The one that 
has more letters.”119 (Iṣfahānī 18: 34) 
In revealing Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s secret ability to read and write, Muḥārib offers as evidence 
what appears to have been an unintentional slip on the part of the supposedly illiterate 
poet. In fulfilling his role as the eloquent Bedouin who naturally, i.e., without learning, 
possesses the answers to questions of grammar and pronunciation, Dhū ‘l-Rumma seems 
to be tricked into revealing his ability to read and write, as his response refers to spelling 
rather than pronunciation. While Muḥārib seems either to take for granted that the reason 
for hiding this ability is known to his audience or to be puzzled himself by the poet’s 
ruse, in the khabar that follows Dhū ‘l-Rumma suggests why it is that he is keen to keep 
his literacy concealed:  
ʿĪsā bin ʿUmar said: Dhū ‘l-Rumma said to me: “Place a nominative vowel mark-
er on this letter.” So I said to him: “You know how to write?” He said, putting his 
hand on his mouth: “Keep this hidden for me because we consider it a fault 
(ʿīb).”120 (Iṣfahānī 18: 34) 
                                                
119 Original text: 
 نﻥﺎﻛ وﻭذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ أﺃﺮﻘﯾﻳ ﺐﺘﻜﯾﻳوﻭ ﻢﺘﻜﯾﻳوﻭ ﻚﻟذﺫ ﻞﯿﻴﻘﻓ ﮫﻪﻟ: ﻒﯿﻴﻛ لﻝﻮﻘﺗ: ﺮﯾﻳﺰﻋ ﻦﺑاﺍ ﷲ وﻭأﺃ ﺮﯾﻳﺰﻋ ﻦﺑ ﷲ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ: ﺎﻤھﮪﮬﻫﺮﺜﻛأﺃ  ً ﺎﻓوﻭﺮﺣ.  
120 Original text: 
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The Basran grammarian ʿĪsā bin ʿUmar al-Thaqafī (d. 766) stumbles upon Dhū ‘l-
Rumma’s ability by chance and the poet asks him to keep this quiet. Here it is clear that 
ʿĪsā bin ʿUmar had been initially under the impression that Dhū ‘l-Rumma was illiterate 
and that he had sought to give such an impression. The reason for this deception, he ad-
mits, is that his people consider such a skill to be shameful. Presumably the “we” to 
which Dhū ‘l-Rumma refers is the Bedouin community, or specifically the Bedouin of al-
Yamāma,  his birthplace in the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula. While admitting 
his ability to read and write, he asserts his affiliation with and intimate knowledge of 
Bedouin customs. While his knowledge of the alphabet suggests mixing with people of 
the city, and thus the impurity of his poetic language, his interest in hiding that 
knowledge could be understood as a conscious, self-aware attempt to deceive and bolster 
his Bedouin identity and as evidence of his rootedness in Bedouin ethics.  
 The cultural significance of illiteracy can be further appreciated by considering 
the controversy around the Prophet Muḥammad’s supposed inability to read and write,121 
                                                                                                                                            
لﻝﺎﻗ ﻰﺴﯿﻴﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺮﻤﻋ: لﻝﺎﻗ ﻲﻟ وﻭذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ: ﻊﻓرﺭاﺍ اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ فﻑﺮﺤﻟاﺍ ﺖﻠﻘﻓ ﮫﻪﻟ: ﺐﺘﻜﺗأﺃ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ هﻩﺪﯿﻴﺑ ﻰﻠﻋ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻓ: ﻢﺘﻛاﺍ ﻲﻠﻋ ﮫﻪﻧﺈﻓ ﺎﻧﺪﻨﻋ 
ﺐﯿﻴﻋ.  
121 The Qurʿān has been resorted to in order to both establish and discredit the claim of 
Muḥammad’s illiteracy. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, for example, includes a verse that begins: “Those 
who follow the Messenger, the unlettered (al-ummī) prophet,…” (Sahīh International 
7:157). This verse seems to celebrate Muḥammad’s illiteracy, but detractors, both medie-
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which is, as Günther argues, “a crucial feature of faith and spirituality in Islam” (16) be-
cause it is often taken as proof of his prophecy (Fitzpatrick 286). The twelfth century the-
ologian and philosopher Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) expresses the importance of 
Muḥammad’s illiteracy in relation to the miracle of the Qurʾān in his al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr 
(Grand Commentary):  
If [Muḥammad] had been proficient in writing (al-khaṭṭ) and reading (al-qirāʾa) , 
he would have been accused perhaps of having studied (ṭālaʿa) the books of the 
ancestors and having acquired this knowledge (hādhihi al-ʿulūm) through study-
ing (muṭālaʿa) . So when he brought forth this great Qurʾān, which is filled with 
copious knowledge, without any learning or studying, it was among the miracles 
(muʿjizāt).122 (87)  
                                                                                                                                            
val and modern, point out other possible meanings of ummī, such as “Arabian,” “Mec-
can,” “layman,” and “heathen” (Günther 1), suggesting that Muḥammad was not “unlet-
tered.” The opening of Surat al-ʿAlaq is further used as contradictory evidence that 
Muḥammad was clearly literate: “Read (iqraʾ) in the name of your Lord…” (Sahīh Inter-
national 96:1). This verse, while seeming to presume the Prophet’s ability to read, has 
also been understood as evidence that he learned to read and write over the course of the 
revelation. 
122 Original text: 
ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ ﻮﻟ نﻥﺎﻛ ﻦﺴﺤﯾﻳ ﻂﺨﻟاﺍ ةﺓءاﺍﺮﻘﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻟرﺭﺎﺼ ﺎﻤﮭﻬﺘﻣ ﻲﻓ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ ﺎﻤﺑرﺭ ﻊﻟﺎطﻁ ﺐﺘﻛ ﻦﯿﻴﻟوﻭﻷاﺍ ﻞﺼﺤﻓ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ مﻡﻮﻠﻌﻟاﺍ ﻦﻣ ﻚﻠﺗ ،٬ﺔﻌﻟﺎﻄﻤﻟاﺍ ﺎﻤﻠﻓ 
ﻰﺗأﺃ اﺍﺬﮭﻬﺑ نﻥآﺁﺮﻘﻟاﺍ ﻢﯿﻴﻈﻌﻟاﺍ ﻞﻤﺘﺸﻤﻟاﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ مﻡﻮﻠﻌﻟاﺍ ةﺓﺮﯿﻴﺜﻜﻟاﺍ ﻦﻣ ﺮﯿﻴﻏ ﻢﻠﻌﺗ ﻻوﻭ ﺔﻌﻟﺎﻄﻣ نﻥﺎﻛ ﻚﻟذﺫ ﻦﻣ ،٬تﺕاﺍﺰﺠﻌﻤﻟاﺍ  
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As al-Rāzī eloquently explains, the notion that Muḥammad could not read or write upon 
receiving the Qurʾān enhances the miracle of the revelation. It contributes to the sense 
that the knowledge presented in the Qurʿān is inspired and not a product of learning. Sim-
ilarly, the perception that Dhū ‘l-Rumma was an illiterate Bedouin enhances the sense of 
his poetry’s inspired purity, and, as mentioned above, it was precisely his poetry that he 
and others, such as Jarīr, considered inspired that earned the greatest admiration.  
 What is at stake in doubting Muḥammad’s illiteracy before the revelations is be-
lief in the “authenticity” of his prophecy; questioning that of Dhū ‘l-Rumma has implica-
tions for the “authenticity” of his status as the last representative of the Bedouin tradition, 
unadulterated by learning and city culture. Nadia Abbott points out that “the dogma of 
Muḥammad’s illiteracy” was particularly evident in the tenth-century controversy around 
a hadīth from Ibn Ḥanbal, Bukhārī, and Dārimī that reports that Muḥammad “‘wrote with 
his own hand’ some of the alterations in the preamble of the Treaty of Ḥudaibīyah” (3). 
At the time Iṣfahānī curated the Aghānī, then, raising questions about Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s 
literacy would likely have cued comparisons to this debate. By raising questions about 
Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s illiteracy, “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” links Dhū ‘l-Rumma 
to Muḥammad, whose own Bedouin identity in many ways gave that culture its weight in 
Islamic society.  
INSPIRED KNOWLEDGE 
 Iṣfahānī once again complicates the question of “authentic” Bedouinness in 
“Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” in the akhbār he curates that point to concerns that 
his knowledge had been gained from direct observation, such that the source of his 
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knowledge was his own experience. The knowledge presumably required to both believ-
ably describe desert life and deftly employ an arcane Arabic lexicon in verse is indicative 
of the Bedouin character that defines Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s celebrity. However, his “authen-
ticity” as a Bedouin poet is not premised only upon his possession of this performed spe-
cial knowledge, but on his provincial, i.e., “natural,” acquisition of it, as suggested by al-
Kalāʿī’s comments about literacy.  Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s Bedouin persona, and the admiration 
associated with it, requires that both his linguistic and desert life knowledge be unadul-
terated by study and other sources.  
 This interest in Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s direct knowledge of that to which he bears wit-
ness in his poetry is well-illustrated in an anecdote that al-Faḍl bin Isḥāq al-Hāshimī pre-
sents in the chapter: 
Al-Faḍl bin Isḥāq al-Hāshimi told us a story related by one of his grandfather’s 
companions, who said: I saw Dhū ‘l-Rumma in the Basran market Mirbad. A man 
challenged him, ridiculing him, and said: “O Bedouin (yā aʿrābī), have you borne 
witness to that which you have not seen?” He said: “Yes.” He said: “To what?” 
He said: “I bear witness that your father fucked (nāka) your mother.”123 (Iṣfahānī 
18: 13) 
                                                
123 Original text: 
ﺎﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﻞﻀﻔﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ قﻕﺎﺤﺳإﺇ ﻲﻤﺷﺎﮭﻬﻟاﺍ ﻦﻋ ﻰﻟﻮﻣ هﻩﺪﺠﻟ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺖﯾﻳأﺃرﺭ اﺍذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ قﻕﻮﺴﺑ اﺍﺪﺑﺮﻤﻟ ﺪﻗوﻭ ﮫﻪﺿرﺭﺎﻋ  ٌﻞﺟرﺭ أﺃﺰﮭﻬﯾﻳ ﮫﻪﺑ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﮫﻪﻟ: 
ﺎﯾﻳ ﻲﺑاﺍﺮﻋأﺃ ﺪﮭﻬﺸﺗأﺃ ﺎﻤﺑ ﻢﻟ ﺮﺗ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﻢﻌﻧ لﻝﺎﻗ: اﺍذﺫﺎﻤﺑ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺪﮭﻬﺷأﺃ نﻥأﺃ كﻙﺎﺑأﺃ كﻙﺎﻧ ﻚﻣأﺃ.  
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Al-Faḍl bin Isḥāq al-Hāshimī reports that this exchange took place in Mirbad, a camel 
market that had become a well-known stage for poetic performance and exchange. In par-
ticular, people would gather in Mirbad “to observe the game of flyting (naqāʾiḍ)” (Dayf 
186).  Not only is this khabar set in this market, which was being established as a stage 
for poetic rivalry and lampoon (Jorgensen 62-89), the narrator tells us that the unnamed 
man’s question was intended to ridicule and challenge Dhū ‘l-Rumma. The man’s use of 
the epithet “Bedouin” establishes both that the poet was perceived as a Bedouin outsider 
and that his question intends to challenge that perception. He poses this question as a 
challenge for Dhū ‘l-Rumma to defend his public persona as a Bedouin, drawing a direct 
link between the title of “Bedouin” and the importance of direct observation. Dhū ‘l-
Rumma’s response acts in one sense as both a confirmation of his Bedouinness and his 
status as a learned urbanite. He succeeds in embarrassing a man whose aim was to embar-
rass him, and in doing so with a vulgar response, he enacts the “uncouth” behavior of the 
Bedouin persona. The verb nāka is an impolite term for sexual intercourse,124 and its 
                                                
124 Although the verb nāka and its root n-y-k are likely considered more vulgar today 
(modern dictionaries tend not to list the root at all) than they were in the seventh or tenth 
centuries, (respectively, Dhū 'l-Rumma’s and Iṣfahānī's eras) the impoliteness of this verb 
in the earlier centuries of Arabo-Islamic society is suggested by the absence of a defini-
tion in the entries for nāka in Al-Ṣāḥib bin ʿAbbād’s Muḥīṭ fī al-Lugha (10th century), 
Al-Jawharī’s al-Siḥāḥ (10th century), Al-Azharī’s Tahdhīb al-Lugha (10th century), and 
Ibn Manẓūr’s Lisān al-ʿArab (1290), which opt instead to list its meaning as “known” 
 
  155 
crudeness is enhanced here by its use in reference to the interlocutor’s mother and father. 
This response also “naively” neglects to address the intended question, namely, whether 
Dhū 'l-Rumma bears witness in his poetry, presumably, to that which he has not seen 
with his own eyes. That is, he seems to “fail to see the basic point,” a common character-
istic of the Bedouin motif as argued by Conrad. At the same time, however, DR admits 
that he has indeed borne witness to that which he has not seen with his own eyes, sug-
gesting that his Bedouin knowledge is perhaps less than “pure.” 
THE PARADOX OF “AUTHENTICITY” 
 The complications that the Aghānī presents regarding Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s Bedouin-
ness—in particular, complications with regard to his rootedness in the desert, his illitera-
cy, and his desert experience—also paradoxically seem to reinforce his Bedouinness. If to 
be Bedouin is to be “authentic,” i.e., “rooted” (aṣīl), as the requirements of rootedness in 
the desert, illiteracy, and direct knowledge suggest, why is the notion of Bedouinness so 
difficult to fix in place? Does his habit of party-crashing demonstrate his mixing or his 
outsider status? Does he hide his possible literacy out of a conscious awareness of his 
self-presentation or out of a true affiliation and familiarity with the taboos of Bedouin 
culture? Does his response to the anonymous man in the crowd at Mirbad cunningly 
                                                                                                                                            
(maʿrūf) and/or delineate its word forms (2543). In another chapter in the Aghānī, a 
woman is described as covering her face when a man uses the word when speaking with 
her (Iṣfahānī 289; vol. XI) (“Akhbār Abī Naḍīr wa Nasabuhu”). It is also notable that the 
poem for which al-Mutannabī was reportedly killed includes the verb three times.  
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evade the question and knowingly reinforce his Bedouinness or instead does it naively 
miss the point and demonstrate his guileless inappropriateness and uncouthness? Whether 
or not Dhū ‘l-Rumma embodies a true Bedouin becomes an unproductive question in 
“Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu.” Iṣfahānī’s curation of akhbār does not simply 
leave these questions and Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s Bedouinness open but challenges their rele-
vance and usefulness.  
 The stories examined above reinvigorate the sense of the Bedouin as a rootless 
wanderer whose “authenticity” defies final determination, as this determination implies 
seeking rootedness in rootlessness. We find an inherent contradiction in seeking “authen-
tic” knowledge, as finding it involves its corruption. Rather than reveal Dhū ‘l-Rumma to 
be either an “authentic” or “inauthentic” embodiment of the Bedouin, “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-
Rumma wa Khabaruhu” moves away from the question of “authenticity” and instead 
calls attention to the complexity of the notion of identity. Iṣfahānī further explores this 
complexity for the poet’s identity in the stories of plagiarism and false attributions he re-
lates in “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu”.  
WANDERING VERSE 
 In “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu,” Iṣfahānī calls attention to the practices 
of plagiarism and false attributions among poets, and in doing so, points to another level 
of absurdity inherent in any attempt to determine a poet’s “authenticity,” especially when 
such an attempt is made in order to base judgments of poetry upon this determination. 
The chapter of the Aghānī that Iṣfahānī to Dhū ‘l-Rumma relates stories that dramatize 
both plagiarism and false attribution, and we encounter four specific variations of these 
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practices: Dhū ‘l-Rumma adopting verses composed by his three less famous brothers, al-
Farazdaq adopting (“intaḥala”) verses composed by Dhū ‘l-Rumma, other poets accusing 
Dhū ‘l-Rumma of stealing verses, and others falsely attributing verses to him. I explore 
two of these variations below in order to understand how Iṣfahānī presents these practices 
and the implications of his presentation for the role of the author in the poetic tradition.  
 The two akhbār that detail Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s interaction with al-Farazdaq about 
his adopting certain verses foreground Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s acquiescence when confronted 
with al-Farazdaq making claim to these verses. In the first, Abū Yaḥyā al-Ḍabī reports 
that Dhū ‘l-Rumma once recited four lines of his that had “breadth, purpose, and depth of 
meaning” (Iṣfahānī 18: 21) to al-Farazdaq. Upon hearing them, al-Farazdaq exclaims: 
“You surely should recite them again as they are more fitting of me than you!” (Iṣfahānī 
18: 21). Al-Farazdaq makes his claim to these verses by declaring their fittingness to his 
own style of composition. These four lines of poetry, which speak of the poet’s pride, 
heroism, and loyalty to the Banū Tamīm, could easily be assumed to belong to al-
Farazdaq, who was from the Banū Dārim, a branch of Tamīm, and famed for his poetry 
of self-glorification (fakhr). Dhū ‘l-Rumma, on the other hand, was no more skilled at 
fakhr than he was at madḥ, and was from the Banū ʿAdī, not Tamīm. This narration con-
tinues, reporting Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s response to al-Farazdaq’s claim: “I swear,” he re-
sponds, “I don’t; rather, I only recite them as yours” (Iṣfahānī 18: 21). The narration 
ends, and the narrator deems the four lines in question to belong to “one of al-Farazdaq’s 
poems” (Iṣfahānī 18: 22). This first story of how al-Farazdaq adopts these lines points to 
the primacy of poetic style over poetic “authenticity.” Dhū ‘l-Rumma agrees that he has 
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no right to these lines despite having composed them because they do not fit with his 
public persona and the rest of his poetic output.  
 In The Author and His Double, Abdelfattah Kilito relates a similar incidence of 
al-Farazdaq’s adoption of poetry composed by another. Kilito’s example involves a line 
of poetry composed by the ʿudhrī poet Jamīl that bestows great praise on the poet’s tribe. 
As Jamīl was famed for his erotic verses and al-Farazdaq, as we know, was famed for his 
fakhr, Jamīl, Kilito tells us “should not have spoken the line” (21). He continues: 
Al-Farazdaq, on the other hand could have spoken the line, because he represents 
a tribe with a real claim to glory. The line befits him, which suffices to make him 
its author…We do not expect [Jamīl] to compose a verse of vaunting poetry: it is 
not his “way” (ṭarīqa), nor does it fit the image that has been constructed for him. 
The line cited here sullies the purity of that image; it dangles like a useless and 
awkward appendage from the corpus of his poetry; it lurks like a poor, eccentric 
relative, unneeded because unconnected to the rest of Jamīl’s oeuvre, a mis-
matched pearl in the necklace. Claimed by al-Farazdaq, however, the line finds it-
self on familiar territory, among relatives and friends. Al-Farazdaq may therefore 
claim it without scruple or hesitation…Had Jamīl misattributed [the line] to al-
Farazdaq, no one would have taken offense. Had al-Farazdaq credited it to Jamīl, 
no one would have believed him. Indeed, had the line simply wandered, lost and 
anonymous, it would doubtless have been attributed to al-Farazdaq. (Kilito 21-22) 
In this passage, Kilito delivers the particular sense of authorship that dictated conventions 
of poetic attribution among the poets of the Umayyad period. The poet who composes a 
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certain set of verses does not necessarily have legitimate claim over it. If a set of verses is 
more befitting of another poet’s style, that poet may make a legitimate claim to them. 
Otherwise, those lines may and likely will be attributed to him by others anyway. With-
out such attribution, the meaning and value of the poetry would be lost. This is precisely 
the sense of authorship suggested by this first story in which al-Farazdaq takes verses 
composed by Dhū ‘l-Rumma. In the face of al-Farazdaq’s claim, Dhū ‘l-Rumma quickly 
surrenders any claim to the four lines without protest. He already attributes them to al-
Farazdaq, he says, aware of the correct attribution even before encountering al-
Farazdaq’s request.   
 The next khabar offers an alternative series of events which results in al-Farazdaq 
taking these same lines from Dhū ‘l-Rumma. In this telling, the narrator complicates and 
foregrounds the question of poetic ownership throughout the khabar: 
Al-Ḍaḥḥāk al-Fiqīmi said: When I was in Kāẓima,  Dhū ‘l-Rumma was reciting 
his poem in which he says:  
Two masked riders had arrived from a house there and they stopped. When Dhū 
‘l-Rumma finished reciting, al-Farazdaq uncovered his face and said to his narra-
tor: “O son of the desert (ʿUbayd), you can have these lines.” Dhū ‘l-Rumma said 
to him: “I beseech of you by God O Abū Firās125!” He replied: “I have more right 
to them than you” and adopted these four lines.126 (Iṣfahānī 18: 22)  
                                                
125 Abū Firās is another name for Farazdaq.  
126 Original text: 
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First, the narrator refers to these lines as belonging to “his poem” (qaṣīdatahu), referring 
to Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poem, and thus attributes them to Dhū ‘l-Rumma. The, he refers to 
Dhū ‘l-Rumma as “his narrator” (rāwiyatihi), that is, the narrator of al-Farazdaq’s poetry. 
As the term Rāwiya implies one that recites or transmits someone else’s poetry, the use of 
this epithet for Dhū ‘l-Rumma implies that the poetry belongs to al-Farazdaq. By ending 
the narrative with the words “he adopted (intaḥala) these four lines,” however, the narra-
tor now suggests that the lines only came to belong to al-Farazdaq after this exchange 
with Dhū ‘l-Rumma.  
 Ownership of poetic verse is not fixed here, and instead, depends on perception. 
Al-Farazdaq, upon hearing the four lines, disingenuously offers them to Dhū ‘l-Rumma, 
as if they already belonged to him: “you can have these lines,” he tells Dhū ‘l-Rumma, 
treating him, as the narrator points out, as a transmitter of his verse. As in the first version 
of this story, Dhū ‘l-Rumma does not put up any real protest in this narration to al-
Farazdaq’s annexing of these lines. His acquiescence, however, is more reluctant here: “I 
beseech of you by God” (nashadtuka allāhī) , he responds, which seems to imply that al-
Farazdaq find the answer to this indirect request to adopt these lines with God. In other 
words, Dhū ‘l-Rumma responds as if to say “take them, if you must,” and in doing so, 
                                                                                                                                            
كﻙﺎﺤﻀﻟاﺍ ﻲﻤﯿﻴﻘﻔﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺎﻨﯿﻴﺑ ﺎﻧأﺃ ﺔﻤظﻅﺎﻜﺑ وﻭذﺫوﻭ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﺪﺸﻨﯾﻳ ﮫﻪﺗﺪﯿﻴﺼﻗ ﻲﺘﻟاﺍ لﻝﻮﻘﯾﻳ ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﻓ: اﺍذﺫإﺇ نﻥﺎﺒﻛاﺍرﺭ ﺪﻗ ﺎﯿﻴﻟﺪﺗ ﻦﻣ ﺐﻘﻧ ﺔﻤظﻅﺎﻛ 
نﻥﺎﻌﻨﻘﻣ ﺎﻔﻗﻮﻓ ﺎﻤﻠﻓ غﻍﺮﻓ وﻭذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﺮﺴﺣ قﻕدﺩزﺯﺮﻔﻟاﺍ ﻦﻋ ﮫﻪﮭﻬﺟوﻭ لﻝﺎﻗوﻭ ﮫﻪﺘﯾﻳوﻭاﺍﺮﻟ: ﺎﯾﻳ ﺪﯿﻴﺒﻋ ﻢﻤﺿاﺍ ﻚﯿﻴﻟإﺇ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ تﺕﺎﯿﻴﺑﻷاﺍ. لﻝﺎﻗ ﮫﻪﻟ وﻭذﺫ 
ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ: ﻚﺗﺪﺸﻧ ﷲ ﺎﯾﻳ ﺎﺑأﺃ سﺱاﺍﺮﻓ! لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﮫﻪﻟ: ﺎﻧأﺃ ﻖﺣأﺃ ﺎﮭﻬﺑ ﻚﻨﻣ ﻞﺤﺘﻧاﺍوﻭ ﺎﮭﻬﻨﻣ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﺔﻌﺑرﺭﻷاﺍ تﺕﺎﯿﻴﺑﻷاﺍ.  
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acknowledges that he has no agency in the matter. The choice is not his to make. In stak-
ing his claim to these four lines in front of an audience—his unnamed riding companion, 
our narrator al-Ḍaḥḥāk al-Fiqīmi, and presumably others—al-Farazdaq gives the impres-
sion that these lines were already his, and Dhū ‘l-Rumma is impotent to change this per-
ception. Whereas the first story emphasizes the fittingness of these verses with al-
Farazdaq’s style (ṭarīqa) , and thus the dominance of style over actual composition in de-
termining ownership, this story emphasizes the role of perception in such a determina-
tion. Recalling the questions about Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s Bedouinness, then, this story sug-
gests that the perception that the legendary Dhū ‘l-Rumma was illiterate, for example, is 
more important than whether or not the poet actually knew how to read and write. 
 Iṣfahānī presents us with a story in “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” in 
which the poet Ruʾba accuses Dhū ‘l-Rumma of stealing his poetry, and the way in which 
Ruʾbah’s complaint is received suggests another key element in determining poetic own-
ership: 
Muḥammad bin Abī Bakr al-Makhzūmī said: Ruʾba said: “Every time I said poet-
ry (shiʿr), Dhū ‘l-Rumma would steal it (saraqahu).” It was said to him: “How’s 
that (mā dhāk)?” He said: I said:  
* The death rattle (al-shahīq) lives and the breaths (al-anfās) die. * 
And he said: 
They miscarry in the desert without knowing 
 Every wet-skinned aborted fetus  
* The death rattle (al-shahīq) lives and the links (al-awṣāl) die. * 
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So I said to him: “Well, his, by God, is of better quality than yours, if he did steal 
it from you.” So he said: “What grief you have caused me (dhālika aghammu 
liyya).”127 (Iṣfahānī 18: 34-35) 
Ruʾba complains that Dhū ‘l-Rumma steals poetry from him, giving as an example a line 
he says Dhū ‘l-Rumma took and modified. Rather than sympathizing with Ruʾba,  how-
ever, the narrator declares that Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s modification is an improvement upon his 
original verse, trivializing Ruʾbah’s accusation of thievery (sariqa) . This story implies 
that improving upon a previously said verse grants a poet the right to claim ownership to 
the verse he improved. Not only do style and perception dictate ownership, then, but the 
demonstration of superior poetic skill can obviate the sin of thievery.  
 Plagiarism is inevitable in literature, and this phenomenon was particularly com-
mon among early Islamic poets and medieval Arabic scholars. The literary critic Ibn 
Rashīq al-Qayrwānī (d. 1064), for example, declared that although “the poet’s reliance on 
                                                
127 Original text: 
ﺪﻤﺤﻣ ﻦﺑ ﻲﺑأﺃ ﺮﻜﺑ ﻲﻣوﻭﺰﺨﻤﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ: لﻝﺎﻗ ﺔﺑؤﺅرﺭ: ﺎﻤﻛ ﺖﻠﻗ  ًاﺍﺮﻌﺷ ﮫﻪﻗﺮﺳ وﻭذﺫ ﺔﻣﺮﻟاﺍ ﻓﻞﯿﻴﻘ ﮫﻪﻟ: ﺎﻣوﻭ كﻙاﺍذﺫ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺖﻠﻗ:  
* ﻲﺣ ﻖﯿﻴﮭﻬﺸﻟاﺍ ﺖﯿﻴﻣ سﺱﺎﻔﻧﻷاﺍ *  
لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫ:  
ﻦﺣﺮﻄﯾﻳ قﻕرﺭﺎﮭﻬﻤﻟﺎﺑ لﻝﺎﻔﻏﻻاﺍ ﻞﻛ ﺾﯿﻴﮭﻬﺟ ﻖﺜﻟ لﻝﺎﺑﺮﺴﻟاﺍ  
* ﻲﺣ ﻖﯿﻴﮭﻬﺸﻟاﺍ ﺖﯿﻴﻣ لﻝﺎﺻوﻭﻷاﺍ *  
ﺖﻠﻘﻓ ﮫﻪﻟ: ﮫﻪﻟﻮﻘﻓ ﷲوﻭ دﺩﻮﺟأﺃ ﻦﻣ ﻚﻟﻮﻗ نﻥإﺇوﻭ نﻥﺎﻛ ﮫﻪﻗﺮﺳ ﻚﻨﻣ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ: ﻚﻟذﺫ ﻢﻏأﺃ ﻲﻟ.  
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plagiarism is stupidity and weakness…to abandon all previous poetic ideas is ignorance” 
(395).128 Instead, he suggests, a bit of both invention and borrowing is preferable (Ibn 
Rashīq 395). Furthermore, as the akhbār dramatizing these practices suggest, because 
poetry is shared, borrowed, modified and taken, the “authenticity” (aṣāla)  of the author 
and his story become irrelevant. That is, if the question of “authenticity” is one of “fixed-
ness,” these akhbār of “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” suggest that the author of a 
verse is anything but “authentic.”  
 None of this is to say that the idea of the author and his story become irrelevant in 
the face of these practices. On the contrary, the Aghānī presents poetry as part and parcel 
with the lore that surrounds it and the poet to whom the poetry has been attributed. Ra-
ther, it is the notion of “fixedness” itself that becomes irrelevant. As these stories of 
“false” attribution and plagiarism demonstrate, poetic style and skill, a poet’s public per-
sona, and the perception of the audience, all of which are subject to change and alteration, 
dictate how poetry should be received and understood. While the author-function is one 
that categorizes poetry by theme, style, period, and poetic persona and enhances the 
meaning of poetry, it is by no means a tool of “authentication.”  
CONCLUSIONS 
                                                
128 Original text: 
لﻝﺎﻜﺗاﺍوﻭ ﺮﻋﺎﺸﻟاﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻗﺮﺴﻟاﺍ ةﺓدﺩﻼﺑ ،٬ﺰﺠﻋوﻭ ﺮﺗوﻭﮫﻪﻛ ﻞﻛ ﻰﻨﻌﻣ ﻖﺒﺳ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻟإﺇ ﻞﮭﻬﺟ.  
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 Why raise doubts about Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s authenticity if “authenticity,” i.e., “root-
edness,” is irrelevant? First, his rootedness in Bedouin tradition is a central concern for 
the reception of his poetry, which embodies a Jāhilī mode during the Islamic era and per-
forms esoteric Bedouin knowledge for an increasingly cosmopolitan society. Arabic poet-
ry of the Umayyad and Abbasid periods was consciously linked to a romanticized Bedou-
in Jāhilī past, a past that was alien “to the family heritage of the Muslims,…the daily lan-
guage, [and] the deeply urban patterns of the bureaucracy and of the other elements in the 
population which now turned to honouring it” (Hodgson 296-7). From the period be-
tween the mid-seventh century and the twelfth century, literary scholars began to collect 
and edit old poetry, “dedicated as much to its philological niceties as to its aesthetic de-
lights” (Hodgson 297). This process sought to root old Arabic poetry in a fixed past that 
could be mined for important cultural knowledge. Philological niceties and aesthetic de-
lights abound in Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry; but because he and his poetry are situated be-
tween the pre-Islamic and Islamic and between the desert and city, his rootedness in this 
cultural tradition become of particular concern. 
 Second, it is in voicing these doubts that Iṣfahānī illustrates the absurdity of look-
ing for fixedness in Arabic poetry. The challenges to Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s “authenticity” as a 
Bedouin end up both reinforcing and complicating his rootedness, dramatizing the para-
dox of Bedouin “authenticity.” Finally, in raising these doubts, Iṣfahānī finds room for 
them in the legend of Dhū ‘l-Rumma. He literally creates space for their expression in 
“Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” where Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s Bedouin identity is not 
diminished by these doubts, but instead is complicated by them, opening up his poetry to 
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a wider range of interpretation and inquiry. By releasing Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s poetry from 
the binds of “authenticity” and drawing attention to the way in which it problematizes 
poetry at a time of critical social change, “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabaruhu” attempts 
not to resolve the divergence surrounding the reception of his poetry but to appreciate its 
openness. 
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Chapter 5 
“Sincerity” in the Story of  
Kuthayyir ʿAzza 
INTRODUCTION 
 Kuthayyir ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (d. 723), known for his unrequited love for ʿAzza bint 
Ḥumayl, is a character who inspired much controversy during his time. In the Aghānī 
chapter dedicated to Kuthayyir ʿAzza, “The Narrative of Kuthayyir’s Lore and Lineage” 
(“Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi”), we find various akhbār framing Kuthayyir as 
disingenuous and transgressive of social norms: a haughty religious extremist who once 
claimed to be the reincarnation of Jonah (Yūnus); a target of regular mockery for his fool-
ishness, ugliness, short stature, and stupidity; a man who satirized others and physically 
attacked a man after inviting satirize; and a poet who boldly recited unwelcome poetry 
for a woman whom he claimed to love and whose love for her was doubted. The text is 
filled with unflattering framings of his character and appearance (e.g. “I never saw any-
one more stupid than Kuthayyir” (mā raʾaytu qaṭ aḥmaqa min kuthayyir) (Iṣfahānī 9: 27); 
“He was short and ugly” (kān qaṣīran damīman) (Iṣfahānī 9: 15)). Iṣfahānī confronts us 
with page after page of such mockery and expressions of derision toward Kuthayyir in 
“Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi.” 
 After learning of this seemingly incessant mobbing of Kuthayyir, however, we 
learn from the akhbār Iṣfahānī presents at the end of the chapter that nearly the entire city 
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attended his funeral despite it coinciding with the funeral of the famous early Quranic and 
fiqh scholar ʿIkrima. The people of the city flocked to mourn his death and celebrate his 
poetic legacy. In the final pages of the chapter, Iṣfahānī transforms him into a Christ-like 
figure and stages him as a celebrated poet of amorous verse and panegyrics. Indeed, his 
legend and verse were not only well-remembered during Iṣfahānī’s time, but continue to 
be remembered and reimagined today.129  
 The positivist trend in scholarship on the Aghānī, as I have laid out in earlier 
chapters, approaches the text as an image of Umayyad and Abbasid society, wherein 
scholars foreclose analysis of such performative friction by taking them to be dismissible 
“inconsistencies,” focusing instead on coherence and finality. Rather than dismissing the 
akhbār Iṣfahānī presents as “mere” contextualization, as Kilpatrick presumes (Kilpatrick, 
Great Book 89; “Modernity” 252), I deploy a hybrid of post-structuralist approaches, 
such as Bakhtin’s theory of “dialogism” in order to open up analysis of the inclusion, ar-
rangement, and curation of akhbār. I also draw again upon Deleuze and Guattari’s “rhi-
zomatic” theory to consider how Iṣfahānī’s performance of lore in the Aghānī, in this 
case the lore of Kuthayyir, plugs into Umayyad culture and the Kuthayyir ʿAzza lore to 
form a rhizome with them and deterritorialize them. This performance also sets itself up 
to be plugged into the Abbasid social practices of Iṣfahānī’s time, which are deterritorial-
                                                
129 For examples, see al-Ṭayyib Ṣālih’s ʿUrs al-Zayn and Carolyn Baugh’s The View from 
Garden City.  
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ized by the same process and reterritorialized with the meaning reflected back onto it 
through the audience’s participation. 
 This chapter explores how Iṣfahānī curates and presents overwhelmingly censori-
ous akhbār about the stigmatized Kuthayyir in “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi,” 
which culminates in the seemingly incongruous celebration of Kuthayyir at his funeral, in 
such a way that inspires sympathy in us as an audience, such that our reception of the 
chapter incorporates this incongruity. As I will show, Iṣfahānī’s staging of a tragic mob-
bing and scapegoating of Kuthayyir invites us to confront our own horrific impulses to 
rush to judgment. Iṣfahānī’s performance of the lore, in which Kuthayyir redeems himself 
by himself, urges us to asses our own inner demons.  
RECEPTION AS KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE AGHĀNĪ 
Reconsidering Akhbār Texts 
 Much of the scholarship that engages the Kitāb al-Aghānī tends to employ the text 
as a resource for fleshing out the historical or literary stories surrounding the people and 
events it stages.130 While Hilary Kilpatrick’s Making the Great Book of Songs seeks to 
treat the Aghānī as a work of literature in its own right and highlights Iṣfahānī’s artful-
ness in compiling, arranging, and commenting on the akhbār, Kilpatrick argues that the 
historical reports contained in the Aghānī “merely serve to sketch the background and 
context in which the poems and settings were composed and performed” (Great Book 
89). However, evidence both internal and external to the text suggest otherwise. Why, for 
                                                
130 See Khan and Khairallah 
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example, if the historical narratives “merely serve to sketch the background and context,” 
as Kilpatrick argues, did Iṣfahānī make “conscious choices” (“Modernity” 252) in arrang-
ing the material? 
 The term “akhbār texts,” refers to one of the earliest Arabic forms of narrative. 
Such texts, which include both prose and poetry, curate akhbār, i.e., lore or anecdotes. 
and belong to the larger category of adab. Adab, a key term in classical Arabic literature, 
includes, as Samer Ali argues, not only “a corpus of varied literary knowledge…that a 
littérateur must know” and “the constellation of courtly manners and tastes to be condi-
tioned and exhibited,” but also often-overlooked social dimensions of acquiring, produc-
ing, and performing that corpus of knowledge, manners, and tastes (Salons 33). A more 
profane narrative form, akhbār texts emerged as a common narrative strategy in the 9th 
and 10th centuries alongside the development of the religiously-oriented narrative form of 
ḥadīth. Whereas ḥadīth texts collect the words and sayings of or about the Prophet 
Muḥammad and his companions, akhbār texts include the words and sayings of and 
about poets, politicians, rulers, linguists, historians, religious figures and scholars, scien-
tists, mathematicians, anonymous men and women, etc. Scholars and littérateurs em-
ployed the akhbār form to treat and present equally-varied types of adab knowledge, 
penning books of lore on animals, poets, humor, social gatherings, political histories, 
etc.131 
                                                
131 Examples include al-Jaḥiẓ’s (d. 868) Book of Animals (Kitāb al-Hayawān), Ibn 
Qutayba’s (d. 889) Book of Poetry and Poets (Kitāb al-Shiʿr wa al-Shuʿarāʾ), al-Jawzī’s 
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 Designating such particular categories for akhbār texts, however, often requires 
that we ignore the extent to which such types of adab knowledge overlap, despite a trend 
of specialization (Ouyang 11), as well as the diversity of approaches adab scholars and 
littérateurs took in organizing their books.132 As such, attempts to arrange them into the-
                                                                                                                                            
(d. 1201) Book of Fools and Simpletons (Kitāb al-Ḥamqa wa-l-Mughaffalīn), al-
Tawḥīdī’s (d. 1023) Book of Entertainment and Conviviality (Kitāb al-Imtaʿ wa-l-
Muʾanasa), and al-Ṭabarī’s (d. 923) History of Prophets and Kings (Tarīkh al-Rusūl wa-
l-Mulūk).  
132 Considering those akhbār texts that relate the lore of poets serves to illustrate this di-
versity. In Classes of the Master Poets (Ṭabaqāt Fuḥūl al-Shuʿarāʾ), the critic and phi-
lologist Ibn Sallām al-Jumaḥī’s (d. 845) dedicates each chapter to a particular “class” of 
poets, rather than individual poets, according to a particular method of classification in-
spired by Ibn Saʿd al-Baghdādi’s (d. 845) Book of the Major Classes (Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt 
al-Kubrā) (“Criteria of Classification” 142), a collection of anecdotes about famous Is-
lamic personalities. Ibn Qutayba’s (d. 889) Poetry and Poets (al-Shiʿr wa al-Shuʿarāʾ) 
adopts a less complex criteria for organizing poets. Rather than organizing poets into 
classes, Ibn Qutayba dedicates each chapter of his anthology to one of approximately 100 
poets, presenting them in chronological order. While Ibn Qutayba and Ibn Sallām al-
Jumaḥī include poets that ranged from the pre-Islamic period (Jāhiliyya) to near contem-
poraries, the littérateur Abū Bakr al-Ṣūlī’s (d. 946) “Akhbār of the Poets” (“Akhbār al-
Shuʿarāʾ”) in his Book of Folios (Kitāb al-Awrāq) focuses on Abbasid poets, dedicating 
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matic categories for comparison tends to reduce the extent of the dialogism between such 
texts. With the penning of each akhbār text between the 9th and 11th centuries, authors of 
akhbār texts (akhbāriyyīn) offered innovations on and new possibilities for the concep-
tion, organization, and use of these texts. Among akhbār texts that relate poetic lore, we 
find a great diversity in text length, method of organization, definition of subject matter, 
and intertextual links with other types of akhbār and adab texts. While some of these 
akhbār texts take poetic personas as their organizing principle, others are organized 
around theme. While some are interested in classifications, others reveal a preoccupation 
with chronology or particular periods. Each akhbārī takes a novel approach to the collec-
tion and potential functions of akhbār from that of his peers and contemporaries, such 
that it is impossible to speak of a conventionalized akhbār tradition. Instead, the akhbār 
form was especially open to innovation and the practice of adab, and scholars employed 
the defining characteristic of the form, i.e., anecdotal reports (akhbār), for diverse effects. 
                                                                                                                                            
one or more sections to each of a total of twelve poets. The historian and philologist al-
Raqīq al-Qayrawānī (d. 1026) also takes a particular focus in his book The Axis of Pleas-
ure in Descriptions of Wine (Quṭb al-Surūr fī Awsāf al-Khumūr). However, he includes 
poets and poetry from the Jāhiliyya to the 11th century. In this anthology, al-Qayrawānī 
collects akhbār relating to wine and organizes chapters according to theme, such as 
“Rowdy Drunkenness” (“al-ʿArbada”), “Morning Drinking” (“al-Sabūḥ”), and “Drinking 
Alone” (“al-Waḥda”), as well as a chapter on wine poets in general. 
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The Rhizomatic Aghānī 
 Iṣfahānī’s Aghānī can be taken as a particularly apt example of Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s notion of the “rhizomatic” book. Such a book is made of “plateaus,” a concept they 
borrow from Gregory Bateson’s use of the word in his essay on Balinese culture and use 
to refer to “a continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities whose development avoids 
any orientation toward a culmination point or external end” (Deleuze and Guattari, Plat-
eaus 24). As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the chapters of the Aghānī under 
study here, particularly as demonstrated for “The Lore of Majnun of the Banu Amir” 
(“Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir”) and “The Narration of Qays bin Dharih” (“Dhikr Qays 
bin Dharīḥ”) achieve “some sort of continuing plateau of intensity” without “[sexual] 
climax” or “a culmination point” (Plateaus 24). That is, the chapters of the Aghānī each 
build to a pitch of intensity yet thwart resolution.  
 Moreover, each plateau of a rhizomatic book “can be read starting anywhere and 
can be related to any other plateau” (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 24). The non-
linearity of Iṣfahānī’s arrangement of akhbār within its chapters and his non-
chronological nonhierarchical arrangement of these chapters allow a reception of the text 
without a necessary starting point or termination point. This is the kind of reception of the 
Aghānī that the Syrian poet Shafīq Jabrī (d. 1980) conveys in the introduction of his study 
of Iṣfahānī’s text: 
I mention that I acquired this book thirty years ago and over the course of these 
thirty years, I would glance at some of its pages and perhaps read a page many 
times, then I would close the section and then come back to it after a week or a 
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month, returning to the same page or to a different page. I would stop at verses of 
poetry or one of the akhbār. Then I would close the section and come back to it 
after a week, a month, or a year, and devote (aḥbis) my mind entirely to a poem or 
a khabar. This is the way I passed thirty years, having not read the Kitāb al-
Aghānī from its beginning to its end, having not read most of it or least of it, but 
having read pages from it. This form of reading did not pave a path for me to un-
derstand this book fully, but I knew nonetheless that it contained something of 
poetry and something of akhbār and nothing else, and that it was a book of great 
excellence (kitāb jalīl al-qadar).133 (9) 
 Jabrī’s articulation of his initial reading of the Aghānī over a period of thirty years re-
veals that he approached the book, finding multiple entryways and exits. Indeed, “multi-
ple entryways” is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “perhaps one of the most important 
                                                
133 Original text: 
ﺮﻛذﺫأﺃ ﻲﻧأﺃ ﺖﯿﻴﻨﺘﻗاﺍ اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ بﺏﺎﺘﻜﻟاﺍ ﻦﻣ ﻦﯿﻴﺛﻼﺛ ،٬ﺔﻨﺳ ﺖﻨﻛوﻭ ﻲﻓ لﻝﻼﺧ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﻦﯿﻴﺛﻼﺜﻟاﺍ ﺔﻨﺴﻟاﺍ ﺮﻈﻧأﺃ ﻲﻓ ﺾﻌﺑ ﮫﻪﻗرﺭوﻭ ،٬اﺍﺮﻈﻧ ﺎﻤﺑرﺭوﻭ 
تﺕأﺃﺮﻗ ﺔﻗرﺭﻮﻟاﺍ ةﺓﺪﺣاﺍﻮﻟاﺍ تﺕاﺍﺮﻣ ،٬ةﺓﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﻢﺛ يﻱﻮطﻁأﺃ ءﺰﺠﻟاﺍ ﻢﺛ دﺩﻮﻋأﺃ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻟإﺇ ﺪﻌﺑ عﻉﻮﺒﺳأﺃ وﻭأﺃ ﺪﻌﺑ ﺮﮭﻬﺷ ﻊﺟرﺭﺄﻓ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺔﻗرﺭﻮﻟاﺍ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﺴﻔﻧ وﻭأﺃ 
ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺔﻗرﺭوﻭ ،٬ﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺮﯿﻴﻏ ﻒﻗﺄﻓ ﻰﻠﻋ تﺕﺎﯿﻴﺑأﺃ ﻦﻣ ﺮﻌﺸﻟاﺍ وﻭأﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮﺒﺧ ﻦﻣ ،٬رﺭﺎﺒﺧﻷاﺍ ﻢﺛ يﻱﻮطﻁأﺃ ءﺰﺠﻟاﺍ ﻢﺛ ﺪﻋوﻭأﺃ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻟإﺇ ﺪﻌﺑ عﻉﻮﺒﺳأﺃ وﻭأﺃ 
ﺪﻌﺑ ﺮﮭﻬﺷ وﻭأﺃ ﺪﻌﺑ ﺔﻨﺳ ﺲﺟﺄﻓ ﻲﻨھﮪﮬﻫذﺫ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮﻌﺷ وﻭأﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮﺒﺧ. اﺍﺬﻜھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ تﺕﺮﻣ ﻲﻠﻋ نﻥﻮﺛﻼﺛ ﺔﻨﺳ ﺎﻧأﺃوﻭ ﻢﻟ أﺃﺮﻗأﺃ بﺏﺎﺘﻛ ﻲﻧﺎﻏﻷاﺍ ﻦﻣ 
ﮫﻪﻟوﻭأﺃ ﻰﻟإﺇ ،٬هﻩﺮﺧآﺁ ﻻوﻭ تﺕأﺃﺮﻗ ،٬هﻩﺮﺜﻛأﺃ ﻻوﻭ تﺕأﺃﺮﻗ ،٬ﮫﻪﻠﻗأﺃ ﺎﻤﻧإﺇوﻭ تﺕأﺃﺮﻗ ﺎﻗاﺍرﺭوﻭأﺃ ،٬ﮫﻪﻨﻣ ﻢﻠﻓ ﺪﮭﻬﻤﺗ ﻲﻟ ةﺓءاﺍﺮﻗ ﻦﻣ اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﻞﻜﺸﻟاﺍ ﻼﯿﻴﺒﺳ ﻰﻟإﺇ 
ﺔطﻁﺎﺣﻹاﺍ بﺏﺎﺘﻜﺑ ،٬ﻲﻧﺎﻏﻷاﺍ ﺮﯿﻴﻏ ﻲﻧأﺃ ﺖﻨﻛ ﻢﻠﻋأﺃ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ ﻞﻤﺘﺸﯾﻳ ﻰﻠﻋ ءﻲﺷ ﻦﻣ ﺮﻌﺸﻟاﺍ وﻭأﺃ ﻦﻣ رﺭﺎﺒﺧﻷاﺍ ﺲﯿﻴﻟ ،٬ﻻإﺇ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃوﻭ بﺏﺎﺘﻛ ﻞﯿﻴﻠﺟ 
رﺭﺪﻘﻟاﺍ.  
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characteristics of the rhizome” (Plateaus 2). “The burrow,” they propose, “is an animal 
rhizome, and sometimes maintains a distinction between the line of flight as passageway 
and storage and living strata” (Plateaus 2). Jabrī approaches the Aghānī as such a burrow, 
entering and exiting at different places, moving through the text “as a passageway” at 
times, and “living” in certain lines of poetry and akhbār (aqif ʿalā abyāt min al-shiʿr aw 
ʿalā khabar min al-akhbār) at others, and “storing” his mind in the poetry and akhbār 
(aḥbis dhihnī ʿalā shiʿr aw khabar) at still others.  
 Each chapter, i.e., “plateau,” of the Kitāb al-Aghānī also lends itself to being ap-
proached “starting anywhere” and being “related to any other plateau” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, Plateaus 24) because the stories and poetry contained in the book straddle mul-
tiple plateaus and are cross-referential, communicating “with one another across micro-
fissures” (Plateaus 12). That is, the characters and events in the Aghānī appear and reap-
pear across chapters. Stories of Kuthayyir, for example, (re)appear in “The Origin and 
Lore of Jamīl” (“Nasab Jamīl wa Akhbāruhu”) (Iṣfahānī vol. 8) in which new stories 
emerge and communicate with those in “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” (Iṣfahānī 
vol. 9). We have also seen in Chapter 3 how the Aghānī chapters dedicated to Majnūn 
Banī ʿĀmir (Iṣfahānī vol. 2) and Qays bin Dharīḥ (Iṣfahānī vol. 9) communicate with one 
another through shared character and plot features. 
 Finally, the rhizome is conceived as a map (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 13) 
and thus “has to do with performance” (14). As in performance, the Aghānī is not inter-
ested in discrete objects and subjects, but in processes, relations, and happenings. For ex-
ample, in the case of “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir,” we encounter madness as a process, 
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a transition rather than a particular state of mind. Similarly, as we shall see, the Aghānī’s 
interest in Kuthayyir is focused not on the character of an individual but on the processes 
through which his character is understood, his relations to others, and the events from 
which he emerges as a character. As a rhizomatic text, the Aghānī performs knowledge 
and poetry and invites the audience to be affected by that performance.   
Openness in “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” 
 A comparison of the treatment of our lover-poet Kuthayyir in the Aghānī to that in 
the Ibn Qutayba’s (d. 889) Kitāb al-Shiʿr wa al-Shuʿarāʾ, which was composed almost a 
century prior, reveals the Aghānī’s distinctive use of akhbār can be received as destabiliz-
ing the notion of authoritative knowledge, decentering the author, and producing 
knowledge socially. Indeed, the rhizomatic book resists the urge to put down roots and 
instead requires the audience to do so. It is the audience’s role, Daniel Smith notes in his 
essay on Deleuzian analytics, “to trace out trajectories whose directions are not given in 
advance of one’s reading” (124). While we find knowledge presented as authoritative and 
resolved, i.e., rooted, in Ibn Qutayba’s chapter on Kuthayyir, knowledge of Kuthayyir in 
the Aghānī “must be produced, constructed” (Plateaus 21).  
 Ibn Qutayba’s text introduces Kuthayyir in the following way: 
He is Kuthayyir bin ʿAbd al-Raḥmān bin Abī Jumʿa from Khuzāʿa. He was a re-
bel (kān rāfiḍiyyan134) and he said when death came to him: 
                                                
134 The term rāfiḍ is also a pejorative term for a supported or the Alids or another anti-
state cause. 
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I invoke by God to be free from both the son of Arwā135  
 and from the power of the Kharijites 
And from ʿUmar I am free and from ʿAtīq136 
 once called the Prince of the Faithful137 (313) 
Not only does the entry about Kuthayyir in the Kitāb al-Shiʿr wa al-Shuʿarāʾ begin with-
out a chain of transmission (isnād), it makes unqualified, univocal, authoritative claims 
about Kuthayyir’s name, place of origin, and character. 
 In contrast, Kuthayyir’s introduction in the Aghānī is immediately interrupted by 
isnād and includes an extensive staging of his lineage: 
He is, according to what Muḥammad bin al-ʿAbbās al-Yazīdī told us was trans-
mitted to him from Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb from Ibn al-ʿArābī, Abū Ṣakhr 
Kuthayyir bin ʿAbd al-Raḥmān bin al-Aswad bin ʿĀmir bin ʿUwaymir bin Ma-
khlad bin Saʿīd bin Subayʿ bin Ja‘thima bin Saʿd bin Mulayḥ bin ʿAmrū, and he is 
Khuzāʿa bin Rabīʿa, and he is Yaḥyā bin Hāritha bin ʿAmrū, and he is Mazīqiyā 
bin ʿĀmir, and he is Māʾ al-Samāʾ bin Hāritha al-Ghatrīf bin Imriʾ al-Qays al-
                                                
135 ʿUthmān 
136 Abū Bakr 
137 Original text: 
ﻮھﮪﮬﻫ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﻦﺑ ﺪﺒﻋ ﻦﻤﺣﺮﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ ﻲﺑأﺃ ،٬ﺔﻌﻤﺟ ﻦﻣ ،٬ﺔﻋاﺍﺰﺧ نﻥﺎﻛوﻭ ،٬ﺎﯿﻴﻀﻓاﺍرﺭ لﻝﺎﻗوﻭ ﺎﻤﻟ ﮫﻪﺗﺮﻀﺣ ةﺓﺎﻓﻮﻟاﺍ:  
 ُﺖْﺋَِﺮﺑِ ﻰﻟإﺇ  ِﮫﻪﻟﻹاﺍ ﻦِﻣ  ِﻦﺑاﺍ ىﻯوﻭَْرﺭأﺃ  ﻦِﻣَوﻭ  ِﻦﯾﻳدﺩ  ِجﺝِرﺭاﺍﻮﺨﻟاﺍ ﺎﻨﯿﻴَﻌَﻤَْﺟأﺃ  
ﻦِﻣَوﻭ  ٍﺮَﻤُﻋ  ُِﺖﺋَْﺮﺑ ﻦِﻣَوﻭ  ٍﻖﯿﻴﺘَﻋ   َةﺓاﺍﺪَﻏ  ُدﺩ َﻲِﻋ  َﺮﯿﻴَﻣأﺃ ﺎﻨﯿﻴﻨِﻣﺆُﻤﻟاﺍ  
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 saw eh dna ,ʾraD si eh dna ,dazA-la nib nizāM nib lūlhaB-la abalʿahT nib qīrṭaB
 nib nālhaK nib dyaZ nib kilāM nib tnib nib htwahG-la nib adūdmaM ʾāraD dellac
  .nāthaQ nib barʿ aY nib bajhsaY nib ʾabaS
-la taht su dlot īmraH-la qāḥsI nib dammaḥuM nib damḥA nāmḥaR-la dbAʿ ūbA
 taht su dlot iʿazahK-la ʾarʿaZ-la ībA nib rhkaS ūbA taht su dlot rakaB nib ryabuZ
-la nib nāmḥaR-la dbAʿ nib riyyahtuK si eH :dias riyyahtuK tnib ālyaL rehtom sih
 nib ūrmAʿ nib ḥyaluM nib dʿaS nib ʿyabuS nib dalhkaM nib rimĀʿ nbi dawsA
 )5 :9 īnāhafṣI( 831.rimĀʿ nib ūrmAʿ nib ahtirāH nib aʿībaR
 hcihw fo htob ,riyyahtuK rof snoitalleppa yhtgnel ylgnimlehwrevo owt sedivorp īnāhafṣI
 gnimlehwrevo rieht ot noitidda nI .sedivorp abyatuQ nbI hcihw taht deecxe yltaerg
                                                
 :txet lanigirO 831
 ﺑﻦ اﺍﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ ﻋﺒﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻛﺜﯿﻴﺮ ﺻﺨﺮ أﺃﺑﻮ اﺍﻷﻋﺮاﺍﺑﻲ،٬ اﺍﺑﻦ ﻋﻦ ﺣﺒﯿﻴﺐ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻋﻦ اﺍﻟﯿﻴﺰﯾﻳﺪيﻱ اﺍﻟﻌﺒﺎسﺱ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ أﺃﺧﺒﺮﻧﺎ ﻓﯿﻴﻤﺎ ھﮪﮬﻫﻮ
 رﺭﺑﯿﻴﻌﺔ ﺑﻦ ﺧﺰاﺍﻋﺔ وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻮ ﻋﻤﺮوﻭ ﺑﻦ ﻣﻠﯿﻴﺢ ﺑﻦ ﺳﻌﺪ ﺑﻦ ﺟﻌﺜﻤﺔ ﺑﻦ ﺳﺒﯿﻴﻊ ﺑﻦ ﺳﻌﯿﻴﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺨﻠﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻋﻮﯾﻳﻤﺮ ﺑﻦ ﻋﺎﻣﺮ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻷﺳﻮدﺩ
 اﺍﻟﺒﻄﺮﯾﻳﻖ اﺍﻟﻘﯿﻴﺲ اﺍﻣﺮئﺉ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻟﻐﻄﺮﯾﻳﻒ ﺣﺎرﺭﺛﺔ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻟﺴﻤﺎء ﻣﺎء وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻮ ﻋﺎﻣﺮ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺰﯾﻳﻘﯿﻴﺎ وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻮ ﻋﻤﺮوﻭ ﺑﻦ رﺭﺛﺔﺣﺎ ﺑﻦ ﯾﻳﺤﯿﻴﻰ وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻮ
 ﺳﺒﺄ ﺑﻦ ﻛﮭﻬﻼنﻥ ﺑﻦ زﺯﯾﻳﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺎﻟﻚ ﺑﻦ ﻧﺒﺖ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻟﻐﻮثﺙ ﺑﻦ ﻣﻤﺪوﻭدﺩاﺍ دﺩرﺭاﺍء وﻭﻗﯿﻴﻞ دﺩرﺭء وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻮ اﺍﻷزﺯدﺩ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺎزﺯنﻥ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻟﺒﮭﻬﻠﻮلﻝ ﺛﻌﻠﺒﺔ ﺑﻦ
  .ﻗﺤﻄﺎنﻥ ﺑﻦ ﯾﻳﻌﺮبﺏ ﺑﻦ ﯾﻳﺸﺠﺐ ﺑﻦ
 أﺃﺑﻲ ﺑﻦ ﺻﺨﺮ أﺃﺑﻮ ﺣﺪﺛﻨﺎ ﻗﺎلﻝ ﺑﻜﺎرﺭ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻟﺰﺑﯿﻴﺮ ﺣﺪﺛﻨﺎ ﻗﺎلﻝ اﺍﻟﺤﺮﻣﻲ إﺇﺳﺤﺎقﻕ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺑﻦ أﺃﺣﻤﺪ اﺍﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ ﻋﺒﺪ أﺃﺑﻮ وﻭأﺃﺧﺒﺮﻧﺎ
 ﺑﻦ ﺳﺒﯿﻴﻊ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺨﻠﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻋﺎﻣﺮ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻷﺳﻮدﺩ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ ﻋﺒﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻛﺜﯿﻴﺮ ھﮪﮬﻫﻮ :ﻗﺎﻟﺖ ﻛﺜﯿﻴﺮ ﺑﻨﺖ ﻟﯿﻴﻠﻰ أﺃﻣﮫﻪ ﻋﻦ اﺍﻟﺨﺰاﺍﻋﻲ اﺍﻟﺰﻋﺮاﺍء
 ﺑﻦ ﻣﺒﺸﺮ ﺑﻦ ﻋﺒﯿﻴﺪ ﺑﻦ ﺧﺎﻟﺪ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻷﺷﯿﻴﻢ ﺑﻨﺖ ﺟﻤﻌﺔ وﻭأﺃﻣﮫﻪ .ﻋﺎﻣﺮ ﺑﻦ ﻋﻤﺮوﻭ ﺑﻦ ﺣﺎرﺭﺛﺔ ﺑﻦ رﺭﺑﯿﻴﻌﺔ ﺑﻦ ﻋﻤﺮوﻭ ﺑﻦ ﻣﻠﯿﻴﺢ ﺑﻦ ﺳﻌﺪ
  .ﻋﺎﻣﺮ ﺑﻦ ﻋﻤﺮوﻭ ﺑﻦ ﺣﺎرﺭﺛﺔ ﺑﻦ رﺭﺑﯿﻴﻌﺔ ﺑﻦ ﻋﻤﺮوﻭ ﺑﻦ ﻛﻌﺐ ﺑﻦ ﺟﻌﺜﻤﺔ ﺑﻦ ﻋﺎﻣﺮ ﺑﻦ ﺳﯿﻴﺎﻟﺔ ﺑﻦ رﺭﯾﻳﺎحﺡ
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length, these stagings of his genealogy defy easy comparison because of the stops and 
starts throughout the first of the two, creating a rhythm we do not find in the second, 
which, unlike the first, focuses on his mother’s lineage in the second. These two akhbār 
do not diverge directly in the way we saw in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir.” Rather, the 
audience might struggle to determine if there is any contradiction at all between these two 
names while nonetheless remaining quite aware of their difference. The question cannot 
be one of whether these akhbār agree or disagree or of their objective truth value but in-
stead what we can do with them. They remain open and undetermined. Because the map, 
which is related to the rhizome, is “open and connectable in all of its dimensions,” it is 
“susceptible to constant modification” and can be “adapted to any kind of mounting, re-
worked by an individual, group, or social formation” (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 
12). That is, it is through interactive processes that knowledge is produced in the Aghānī. 
Iṣfahānī’s presentation of akhbār places the onus on the audience “to trace out trajecto-
ries” of unrealized potential directions (Smith 124). 
“SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL” 
 Kuthayyir’s poetry appears almost immediately in the Kitāb al-Shiʿr wa al-
Shuʿarāʾ chapter on him, while the first citation of his poetry in the Aghānī is postponed 
by the stagings of his lineage discussed above and then a discussion of his place as a poet 
and the value of his poetry. This postponement places audiences in suspense, building our 
curiosity to judge his skill for ourselves and join the conversation. Six pages into “Dhikr 
Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi,” the first provided line of Kuthayyir’s verse inspires and 
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directs judgments about both his poetry and character. Embedded in a discussion of his 
appearance, the verse emerges as the narrative climax: 
Ibn Naṣr al-Muhallabī and Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Jawharī informed me that 
they had heard ʿUmar ibn Shabba transmit the following report from Isḥāq bin Ib-
rāhīm from al-Madāʿnī from al-Waqqāṣī: I saw Kuthayyir walking around 
(yaṭūfu) the house, so whoever told you that he exceeds the span of three hands in 
height, call him a liar. He was such that when he entered upon ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn 
Marwān, he would tell him: Duck your head so the ceiling doesn’t hit it. 
Al-Ḥarmī bin Abī al-ʿAlāʾ informed me that he heard al-Zubayr ibn Bakkār 
transmit the following from al-Madāʿnī and from Ibn Ḥabīb from his father from 
his grandfather from his father’s grandfather ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, whose mother is 
Jumʿa bint Kuthayyir: Jarīr said to Kuthayyir: What a man you would be if not for 
your ugliness! Kuthayyir said: 
“If you are average among men, then for me, 
 If I died, the space I’d leave behind would be as great as that of a  
 tall man”139 (Iṣfahānī 9: 9-10) 
                                                
139 Original text: 
ﻲﻧﺮﺒﺧأﺃ ﺐﯿﻴﺒﺣ ﻦﺑ ﺮﺼﻧ ﻲﺒﻠﮭﻬﻤﻟاﺍ ﺪﻤﺣأﺃوﻭ ﻦﺑ ﺪﺒﻋ ﺰﯾﻳﺰﻌﻟاﺍ يﻱﺮھﮪﮬﻫﻮﺠﻟاﺍ ﻻﺎﻗ ﺎﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﺮﻤﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺔﺒﺷ لﻝﺎﻗ ﻲﻨﺛﺪﺣ قﻕﺎﺤﺳإﺇ ﻦﺑ 
ﻢﯿﻴھﮪﮬﻫاﺍﺮﺑإﺇ ﻦﻋ ﻲﻨﺋاﺍﺪﻤﻟاﺍ ﻦﻋ ﻲﺻﺎﻗﻮﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺖﯾﻳأﺃرﺭ اﺍﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ فﻑﻮﻄﯾﻳ ﻲﻓ ،٬ﺖﯿﻴﺒﻟاﺍ ﻦﻤﻓ ﻚﺛﺪﺣ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ ﺪﯾﻳﺰﯾﻳ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﺛﻼﺛ رﺭﺎﺒﺷأﺃ ؛ﮫﻪﺑﺬﻜﻓ 
نﻥﺎﻛوﻭ اﺍذﺫإﺇ ﻞﺧدﺩ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺪﺒﻋ ﺰﯾﻳﺰﻌﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ نﻥاﺍوﻭﺮﻣ لﻝﻮﻘﯾﻳ: ﺊطﻁﺄطﻁ ﻚﺳأﺃرﺭ ﻻ ﮫﻪﺒﯿﻴﺼﯾﻳ ﻒﻘﺴﻟاﺍ.  
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The notion of Kuthayyir’s ugliness and short stature materializes from these two anec-
dotes, each of which is introduced by a presentation of the social channels (both the chain 
of transmission (isnād) and the dialogue of the report (matn)) through which they trav-
elled and dramatize the social meaning and implications of his appearance.  
In the first anecdote, al-Waqqāṣī reports that having seen Kuthayyir walking 
around (yaṭūf) the house, anyone who claims that he is taller than three hands should be 
accused of being a liar (kadhdhibhu). The verb used to refer to Kuthayyir’s hanging about 
his house, i.e., yaṭūf, and the directive to call someone else a liar both bring to mind reli-
gious associations. First, as yaṭūf might also be rendered in English as “to circumambu-
late” and specifically to circumambulate the Kaʿba during pilgrimage (Lane 1892, Wehr 
671), its use in this anecdote offers a profane reenactment of this pious act. That is, al-
Waqqāṣī uses sacred imagery, i.e., circumambulating the Kaʿba to reference the mun-
dane, i.e., Kuthayyir wandering around his house. Likewise, al-Waqqāṣī’s jocular dictum 
trivializes the religiously-charged act of calling someone a liar (al-takdhīb), an act asso-
ciated with the direct denial of the divine revelation and which al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) 
would proclaim a century after Iṣfahānī curated his Aghānī was the “primary precondi-
                                                                                                                                            
ﻲﻧﺮﺒﺧأﺃ ﻲﻣﺮﺤﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ ﻲﺑأﺃ ءﻼﻌﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ ﺎﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﺮﯿﻴﺑﺰﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ رﺭﺎﻜﺑ لﻝﺎﻗ ﻲﻨﺛﺪﺣ قﻕﺎﺤﺳإﺇ ﻦﺑ ﻢﯿﻴھﮪﮬﻫاﺍﺮﺑإﺇ ﻦﻋ ،٬ﻲﻨﺋاﺍﺪﻤﻟاﺍ ﻦﻋوﻭ ﻦﺑاﺍ ﺐﯿﻴﺒﺣ 
ﻦﻋ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﺑأﺃ ﻦﻋ هﻩﺪﺟ ﻦﻋ ﺪﺟ ﯿﻴﺑأﺃﮫﻪ ﺪﺒﻋ ﺰﯾﻳﺰﻌﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﻣأﺃوﻭ ﺔﻌﻤﺟ ﺖﻨﺑ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ لﻝﺎﻗ: لﻝﺎﻗ ﺮﯾﻳﺮﺟ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻜﻟ: يﻱأﺃ ﻞﺟرﺭ ﺖﻧأﺃ ﻻﻮﻟ ﻚﺘﻣﺎﻣدﺩ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ 
ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ:  
 ْنﻥإﺇ  َكﻙأﺃ اﺍًﺪَْﺼﻗ ﻲﻓ  ِلﻝﺎﺟِﺮﻟاﺍ ﻲﻨﻧﺈﻓ  اﺍذﺫإﺇ  ﱠﻞَﺣ  ٌﺮَْﻣأﺃ ﻲﺘَﺣﺎﺳ  ُﻞﯾﻳﻮـَِﻄﻟ  
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tion” for accusing someone of being an infidel (al-takfīr) (Mitha 69). Al-Waqqāṣī com-
mands that anyone who says Kuthayyir is taller than three hand-spans (thalātha ashbār) 
be called a liar, and three hands, according the Maliki, Hanafi, and Hanbali schools of 
jurisprudence, would amount to 27cm, 35cm, and 46cm, respectively (Muhammad 52). 
Al-Waqqāṣī’s dictum, then, implies that Kuthayyir stood no taller than a foot and a half, 
thus purposely exaggerating Kuthayyir’s small stature to the point of absurdity. The reli-
gious diction of takdhīr contrasts with this attempt at humor in his dictum, which sug-
gests that whoever implies that this religiously-charged and self-conscious lie is a lie is 
themselves a liar, and calls al-Waqqāṣī’s credibility as a narrator is called into question. 
After this tongue-in-cheek mocking, we find a similar playfulness in what al-Waqqāṣī 
reports the Umayyad governor of Egypt and son of Caliph Marwān I, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn 
Marwān (d. 705), would say when Kuthayyir came to his door: “Duck your head so the 
ceiling doesn’t hit it” (Iṣfahānī 9: 9). Even political weights such as ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, this 
anecdote suggests, could not resist Kuthayyir’s mockability, which again in this instance 
centers around his short stature. Like the irony of al-Waqqāṣī’s dictum, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s 
sarcastic remark flouts any need for “sincerity.”  
The next khabar relate another instance in which Kuthayyir is mocked for his 
shortness. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, Kuthayyir’s grandson, reports an incident in which the satirical 
poet Jarīr (d. 728) makes a jab at Kuthayyir: “What a man you would be if not for your 
ugliness!” (Iṣfahānī 9: 10). Kuthayyir responds in verse, the first verse of his that we en-
counter in “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi,”: “If I am average among men, then 
some matter comes to me, I am tall.” (9: 10). As Kuthayyir’s response seems to presume, 
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the ugliness (al-damāma) to which Jarīr refers stems from his shortness, as it is an ugli-
ness that is “not pleasing to the eyes” in such a way that “relates to the stature” (Lane 
911). In the poetic response Iṣfahānī presents here, Kuthayyir offers a defense of his im-
portance as a man despite his height without lobbing an insult back at his fellow poet. 
This poetic defense resonates with Kuthayyir’s name, which is a diminutive of kathīr 
(many, a lot).  As Arabic diminutives can indicate a sense of endearment, insult, small-
ness, or intensity, we can read kuthayyir as both an endearing and insulting term, an allu-
sion to his short statue, and his intensity. As Kuthayyir suggests in this verse, he is a lot 
in a small package, an embodiment of a paradox we come to accept, and indeed, we learn 
throughout this chapter of the Aghānī that nothing is as it first appears to be.   
Up until this point, the akhbār have only taken up his lineage and status as a poet; 
no character flaws have surfaced—yet. Instead, this first discussion of Kuthayyir as a 
character focuses on his shortness and presents it as a physical flaw upon which the 
mockery he endured was centered. Furthermore, the mockery we encounter reveals the 
disingenuousness of some of his ridiculers and emphasizes the positive view of others 
toward him as a man and poet, despite the insults about his appearance. As I have men-
tioned to earlier, the majority of the akhbār that Iṣfahānī includes in “Dhikr Akhbār 
Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” will stage Kuthayyir as disingenuous and inconsiderate. With 
that in mind, it is striking that the first lines of poetry we encounter follow anecdotes of 
others behaving disingenuously and inconsiderately toward Kuthayyir. We encounter his 
poetry, then, as a defensive yet inoffensive response to the mocking and teasing he is sub-
ject to as a result of his physical appearance and thus are primed to be sensitive to 
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Kuthayyir’s presentation of his subjectivity in his poetry. As the victim of mockery based 
on physical flaws, the character of Kuthayyir elicits some audience sympathy. Further-
more, this mocking casts doubt upon the “sincerity” and considerateness of the narrators 
themselves and those who we will later encounter charging Kuthayyir with being a liar.  
 The polyvocality of Kuthayyir’s first verse as cited above emerges from the ac-
companying anecdotes and the isnād. Rather than serving as mere contextualization or 
background, the isnād and anecdote, together with the verse, form a compound narrative 
that can be viewed in terms of Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of heteroglossia, in which the 
power of the text originates in the coexistence of and conflict with different types of 
speech: the speech of Iṣfahānī, the speech of the narrators, and the speech of the charac-
ters. As Bakhtin contends, such heteroglossic texts imply a “contradictory environment of 
alien words” that is present to the speaker “in the consciousness of the listener, as his ap-
perceptive background, pregnant with responses and objections” (Dialogic Imagination 
281). The invective and sarcasm in these anecdotes, along with the cacophony of voices 
around them, provoke the audience’s responses and objections, adding its many voices to 
the text to participate in the production of knowledge in the text.  
 The extensive use of isnād and absence of Iṣfahānī’s direct narrative voice chal-
lenges the concept of authoritative knowledge and contrast with Ibn Qutayba’s limited 
use of isnād and immediate authoritative interference. Authorial aims in the Aghānī are, 
as Bakhtin argues for the case of the novel, “refracted” through “another's speech in an-
other's language” (Dialogic Imagination 324). Knowledge is produced not through an 
authoritative figure nor through communal consensus, but through communal practices 
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that place a premium on artful, performative renderings of people and events, mirroring 
the ways in which literary salons (mujālasāt) of the time “enabled people...to inherit, bor-
row, adjust, and share cultural knowledge” (Ali, Salons 13-14). The acknowledgement 
that knowledge, or “truth,” is socially constructed is commonplace today. What we sense 
from the Aghānī, as well as the mujālasāt, however, is not merely an awareness of the 
social construction of knowledge behind the scenes, but an enactment of it as an implicit 
reality. In other words, by consistently staging knowledge in its social context in “Dhikr 
Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi,” Iṣfahānī, we might sense, suggests to his audience that 
the significance of a particular piece of knowledge is bound to the social contexts and 
setting from which that knowledge emerges and is performed, reinforced, and morphed. 
JUDGES BECOMING THE JUDGED 
 In responding to Deleuze and Guattari's call to experiment with what the literary 
machine can do with other machines, we can plug the Aghānī into the tenth century hu-
manism machine to appreciate its ability to inspire sympathy for Kuthayyir by staging his 
faults within the social context and directing skepticism not towards Kuthayyir but to-
wards his critics. Kuthayyir’s poetry and transgressive behavior first raised eyebrows dur-
ing the Umayyad Era (661-750), a period of critical transition and transformation for Ar-
abic society. Urban migration and the consequent clash between the Bedouin and Islamic 
social orders that characterized the period raised social concerns and anxieties about 
adapting social mores and attitudes (Jayyusi 389). As Kuthayyir is for the audience a his-
torical, literary figure and not a contemporary with whom they must interact, the motiva-
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tion to join in the mocking of Kuthayyir is replaced by a desire to scorn his unenlightened 
contemporaries of Umayyad society.  
 Iṣfahānī composed his retelling of the legend two centuries after the Kuthayyir 
ʿAzza story first emerged, at a time when Arabo-Islamic society was witnessing another 
crucial period of transition and transformation. The Abbasids, who had removed the 
Umayyads from power in the mid-eighth century, had been ruling most of the Islamicate 
realm for two centuries, but the disintegration of this power began almost as soon as it 
was established (Hodgson, Venture 233). By the mid-ninth century, the Abbasids were 
losing control over their vast empire, and the tenth century witnessed the breakup of the 
caliphate, which gave way to a number of successor states (Hodgson, Venture 493). Sa-
mer Ali argues that the murder of the Caliph al-Mutawakkil in 861 marked a particularly 
traumatic moment for Abbasid society, one that generated “new ideals of decentralized 
governance, egalitarianism, and social mobility” and “a concern for the human subject, 
individualism, and foreign cultures” (Salons 5, 195). Such new ideals meant a new social 
code was in order and, thus, renewed anxieties about defining and determining acceptable 
behaviors. It is in this context that Iṣfahānī’s novel reimagination of the Kuthayyir ʿAzza 
legend emerged and addressed concerns about acceptable behavior while reflecting in its 
approach to these concerns the philosophical shift towards skepticism and the destabiliza-
tion of knowledge. 
As we have seen with “The Narration and Lore of Dhu l’Rumma” (“Dhikr Dhī ʾl-
Rumma wa Khabarihi”), the ambivalence of Kuthayyir’s contemporaries toward him, as 
presented in the Aghānī, resonates with the anxieties that emerged from the changes with-
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in the social order of both the 7/8th centuries and the 10th century. The primary objection 
to Kuthayyir that the akhbār report is his behavior, which tends to thwart social conven-
tions and expectations. For example, Iṣfahānī’s version of the Kuthayyir legend includes 
a story in which an unnamed man from the Banū Muzayna tribe criticizes Kuthayyir for 
not praying at the proper time: 
He said: I spent one evening with Kuthayyir as a guest at his place. We talked a 
bit and slept. When dawn came, he was writhing in pain. I got up and performed 
ablutions and prayed while Kuthayyir was sleeping under his blanket. When the 
first rays of the sun rose, he writhed in pain and said: “Maid, bring me some wa-
ter.” He said: I said, “Damn you for the rest of the day! Or at least for this hour!” I 
mounted my camel and left him behind.140 (Iṣfahānī 9: 27) 
Disturbed by Kuthayyir’s nonobservance of the dawn prayer, and perhaps also by his ap-
parent hangover, our anonymous Muzayni narrator leaves him writhing in pain and curs-
es him as he rides away in apparent in indignation. It is likely that Iṣfahānī’s audience 
may have recognized their own concerns with proper behavior in those of Kuthayyir’s 
contemporaries, but within the widened perspective, this story also invites a critical look 
                                                
140 Original text: 
لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺖﻔﺿ اﺍﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﺔﻠﯿﻴﻟ ﺖﺑوﻭ هﻩﺪﻨﻋ ﻢﺛ ﺎﻨﺛﺪﺤﺗ ﺎﻨﻤﻧوﻭ. ﺎﻤﻠﻓ ﻊﻠطﻁ ﺮﺠﻔﻟاﺍ ،٬رﺭﻮﻀﺗ ﻢﺛ ﺖﻤﻗ تﺕﺄﺿﻮﺘﻓ ﺻوﻭﺖﯿﻴﻠ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛوﻭ ﺪﻗاﺍرﺭ ﻲﻓ 
ﮫﻪﻓﺎﺤﻟ. ﺎﻤﻠﻓ ﻊﻠطﻁ نﻥﺮﻗ ﺲﻤﺸﻟاﺍ رﺭﻮﻀﺗ ﻢﺛ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺎﯾﻳ ﺔﯾﻳرﺭﺎﺟ يﻱﺮﺠﺳاﺍ ﻲﻟ ءﺎﻣ. لﻝﺎﻗ ﺖﻠﻗ: ﺎﺒﺗ ﻚﻟ ﺮﺋﺎﺳ مﻡﻮﯿﻴﻟاﺍ وﻭأﺃ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﺔﻋﺎﺴﻟاﺍ اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ 
ﺖﺒﻛرﺭوﻭ ﻲﺘﻠﺣاﺍرﺭ ﮫﻪﺘﻛﺮﺗوﻭ.  
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at Kuthayyir’s displeased and ungracious houseguest, who appears sanctimonious. In-
deed, it is not only Kuthayyir that the Aghānī examines; the judgments about him and 
those that issue them are also available for critique. Considering the vehemence of the 
scapegoating to which Kuthayyir is subjected, the audience is called upon to show mercy, 
understanding, and generosity. “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” does not offer a 
definitive assessment of Kuthayyir’s character. While it reports the claims of others re-
garding his character, the audience is left to make its own judgment based on a variety of 
akhbār that stage his interactions with others. The audience’s knowledge of Kuthayyir is 
socially produced on every level; knowledge is presented as narratives of Kuthayyir’s 
social interactions, which are themselves traded at social gatherings, and the Aghānī in-
vites its audience to make judgments based on these akhbār.  
 Furthermore, the presentation of knowledge of Kuthayyir in the Aghānī suggests 
an interest not only with who Kuthayyir was and what poetry he composed, but also 
about his behaviors and interactions. As we have seen, the first verse attributed to 
Kuthayyir in this chapter is a single line that foregrounds the way in which he responds to 
mockery. The preceding section, which builds suspense around Kuthayyir’s poetry, cele-
brates his superior ability in composing panegyrics. While the verse that follows does not 
constitute praise poetry per se, it demonstrates an ability to reframe criticism and turn it 
on its head. Moreover, as the criticism prompting the poetic response in this case is per-
sonally directed, this organization suggests that poetic ability is tied in with social experi-
ences and frames Kuthayyir as a victim rather than a villain. 
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 The performative texture of this chapter in the Aghānī and the relevance of 
Kuthayyir’s interactions with others are further evidenced by the numerous anecdotes 
unaccompanied by verse. In one such anecdote, Kuthayyir is portrayed as lacking the 
proper reverence toward patriarchal authority: 
Al-Ḥaramī informed us that al-Zubayr reported to him what his father told him: 
Kuthayyir was disobedient (ʿāqq) to his father. One of his father's fingers became 
injured. Kuthayyir said to him: Do you know why your finger was injured? He 
said: I don't know. He said: Because you raise it to God when making a false oath 
(fī yamīnin kādhibin).141 (Iṣfahānī 9: 26) 
Historian and genealogist al-Zubayr bin Bakkar (d. 870) reports this story, which he 
heard from his father, to al-Ḥaramī, and Iṣfahānī relates it to the audience. In this story, 
Kuthayyir accuses his father not merely of lying but of making false oaths. Kuthayyir’s 
accusation of improper conduct becomes the basis for the narrator, al-Zubayr’s father, to 
send an accusation his way. He accuses the accuser himself of improper conduct, explic-
itly charging Kuthayyir with paternal disobedience. Both accusations have religious di-
mensions; for example, making false oaths and parental disobedience make up two of the 
                                                
141 Original text: 
ﺎﻧﺮﺒﺧأﺃ ﻲﻣﺮﺤﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ ﺎﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﺮﯿﻴﺑﺰﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ ﻲﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﻲﺑأﺃ لﻝﺎﻗ: نﻥﺎﻛ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﺎﻗﺎﻋ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﺑﻷ ،٬ نﻥﺎﻛوﻭ هﻩﻮﺑأﺃ ﺪﻗ ﮫﻪﺘﺑﺎﺻأﺃ ﺔﺣﺮﻗ ﻲﻓ ﻊﺒﺻإﺇ ﻦﻣ 
ﻊﺑﺎﺻأﺃ هﻩﺪﯾﻳ. لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﮫﻪﻟ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ: يﻱرﺭﺪﺗأﺃ ﻢﻟ ﻚﺘﺑﺎﺻأﺃ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﺔﺣﺮﻘﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ ؟ﻚﻌﺒﺻإﺇ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﻻ يﻱرﺭدﺩأﺃ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺎﻤﻣ ﺎﮭﻬﻌﻓﺮﺗ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﷲ ﻲﻓ ﻦﯿﻴﻤﯾﻳ 
ﺔﺑذﺫﺎﻛ.  
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four heinous crimes (kabāʾir) that the Prophet Muhammad cites in a ḥadīth recorded in 
Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī: “Among the heinous crimes are idolatry, parental disobedience (ʿuqūq 
al-wālidayni), suicide, and false oaths” (al-Bukhārī 1653). By explicitly framing 
Kuthayyir’s accusation of a heinous crime as a heinous crime itself, the anecdote trans-
fers the judgment from Kuthayyir’s father onto Kuthayyir. In turn, by framing 
Kuthayyir’s story as a series of linked accusations and judgments, “Dhikr Akhbār 
Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” invites the audience to transform the judge into the judged. This 
transfer of judgment, however, transcends the common edict against judging others lest 
one be judged. That is, this unending game of accusations suggests the absurdity of the 
inherent paradox of this edict, which itself becomes the ground for judgments.  
Another episode, also in the form of a transmitted report without accompanying 
verse, suggests an indirect accusation against Kuthayyir’s tendency for disingenuousness 
and to violate implied proper behavior: 
Kuthayyir would visit one of his aunts, who was an older, virtuous woman. She 
would show him regard (tukrimuhu) and offer him a pillow to sit on. He said to 
her one day: No, by God, you do not know me and you do not show me (lā tuk-
rimunī haqq karāmatī) the proper regard! She said: Indeed, by God, I know you. 
He said: So, who am I? She said: You are the son of so-and-so and so-and-so, and 
she began praising his father and mother. He said: Now I know that you don't 
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know me. She said: So, who are you? He said: I am Jonah (yūnus ibn Matta).142 
(Iṣfahānī 9: 26) 
This episode stages an enactment of Kuthayyir’s unorthodox religious beliefs in order to 
call their “sincerity” into question. Here, the scholar Ibn Da’b (d. 787) reports that 
Kuthayyir would unfairly accuse his “older, virtuous” (barza) aunt of not showing him 
proper regard, as he is the reincarnation of Jonah. The narrator says his aunt shows him 
proper regard; Kuthayyir says she does not. Both the narrator and his aunt say he is her 
brother’s son; Kuthayyir says he is not. Not only does Kuthayyir reject what the narrator 
and his aunt present as reality, he does so in a way that transgresses accepted religious 
beliefs by claiming to be Jonah. Without directly stating it, this anecdote dramatizes both 
senses of the descriptor Ibn Qutayba uses for Kuthayyir in his Book of Poetry and Poets 
(Kitāb al-Shiʿr wa al-Shuʿarāʾ). This descriptor, rāfiḍ, denotes both one who rejects and 
a religious heretic. Rather than describing him as a rāfiḍ, however, this anecdote, as much 
of the other anecdotes in “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi,” presents this accusa-
tion to the audience as a performance. The audience does not simply receive this 
                                                
142 Original text: 
نﻥﺎﻛ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﻞﺧﺪﯾﻳ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻤﻋ ﮫﻪﻟ ةﺓزﺯﺮﺑ ﮫﻪﻣﺮﻜﺘﻓ حﺡﺮﻄﺗوﻭ ﮫﻪﻟ ةﺓدﺩﺎﺳوﻭ ﺲﻠﺠﯾﻳ ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﻠﻋ. لﻝﺎﻗ ﺎﮭﻬﻟ ﺎﻣﻮﯾﻳ: ﻻ ﷲوﻭ ﺎﻣ ﻲﻨﻨﯿﻴﻓﺮﻌﺗ ﻻوﻭ 
ﻲﻨﻨﯿﻴﻣﺮﻜﺗ ﻖﺣ ﻲﺘﻣاﺍﺮﻛ ﺖﻟﺎﻗ: ﻰﻠﺑ ﷲوﻭ ﻲﻧإﺇ ﻚﻓﺮﻋﻷ. لﻝﺎﻘﻓ: ﻦﻤﻓ ؟ﺎﻧأﺃ ﺖﻟﺎﻗ: ﻦﺑاﺍ نﻥﻼﻓ ﻦﺑاﺍوﻭ ،٬ﺔﻧﻼﻓ ﺖﻠﻌﺟوﻭ حﺡﺪﻤﺗ هﻩﺎﺑأﺃ 
ﮫﻪﻣأﺃوﻭ. لﻝﺎﻘﻓ: ﺪﻗ ﺖﻓﺮﻋ ﻚﻧأﺃ ﻻ ﻲﻨﻨﯿﻴﻓﺮﻌﺗ. ﺖﻟﺎﻗ: ﻦﻤﻓ ؟ﺖﻧأﺃ لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺎﻧأﺃ ﺲﻧﻮﯾﻳ ﻦﺑ ﻰﺘﻣ.  
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knowledge of Kuthayyir, then, but is invited to consider Kuthayyir as a more complex 
character.  
Furthermore, the two reports cited above, which appear in direct succession in 
“Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” read like setups to jokes with punchlines deliv-
ered by Kuthayyir: “Because you raise it to God when making a false oath,” and “I am 
Jonah (yūnus ibn matta).” While it appears the narrators of each of these anecdotes aim to 
expose Kuthayyir’s idiocy and lack of respect for family and social boundaries, the brevi-
ty, disapproval, and finality of these reports expose these mean-spiritedness of these aims 
and the focus is transferred from Kuthayyir onto those who mock and criticize him with-
out losing their comic dimension. 
THE SUBJECTIVITY OF “SINCERITY” 
 Perhaps the most prominent concern expressed about Kuthayyir in the Aghānī is 
in regard to his “sincerity” or lack thereof in his professed love for ʿAzza. Two akhbār 
narrate the first encounter between Kuthayyir and ʿAzza in very ways. The first is pre-
ceded by a sort of disclaimer presented through Iṣfahānī’s direct narrative voice, which 
also intervenes here to add an unmediated introduction that uses the passive voice, avoid-
ing authoritative claims about Kuthayyir himself. It begins as follows: 
An abundance of amatory verses for ʿAzza al-Ḍamriya has been attributed to 
Kuthayyir. He is known through her, so he is called Kuthayyir ʿAzza. She is 
ʿAzza bint Ḥumayl ibn Waqqāṣ. Al-Ḥaramī bin Abū al-ʿAlāʿ informed me that he 
heard al-Zubayr transmit the following report from Muḥammad bin al-Ḥasan: 
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Abū Baṣra al-ʿIfārī al-Muḥaddath, who is called Ḥumayl bin Waqqāṣ, is the father 
of ʿAzza, whom Kuthayyir mentions in erotic verses. The beginning of his pas-
sionate love for her was—despite that it is said: he was lying about that and was 
never in love, and that is mentioned after his story with her—according to what 
al-Ḥaramī told me, saying: Zubayr bin Bakkār said ʿAbdallah bin Ibrāhīm al-Saʿdī 
told me Ibrāhīm Ibn Yaʿqūb Ibn Jamīʿ al-Khazāʿī said:  
The beginning of Kuthayyir's passionate love for ʿAzza was when he passed by 
some women from Banū Ḍamra and he had with him some sheep…143 (Iṣfahānī 9: 
32-33) 
This layered khabar opens with a passive statement that precedes any isnād: “An abun-
dance of amatory verses for ʿAzza al-Ḍamriya has been attributed to Kuthayyir” (9: 32). 
Iṣfahānī presents Kuthayyir’s poetry for ʿAzza not as poetry he necessarily composed but 
as poetry attributed to him, casting some doubt at least upon the notion that he actually 
                                                
143 Original text: 
ﺐﺴﻧوﻭ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ةﺓﺮﺜﻜﻟ ﮫﻪﺒﯿﻴﺒﺸﺗ ةﺓﺰﻌﺑ ﺔﯾﻳﺮﻤﻀﻟاﺍ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﻟإﺇ فﻑﺮﻋوﻭ ﺎﮭﻬﺑ ﻞﯿﻴﻘﻓ ﺜﻛﺮﯿﻴ ةﺓﺰﻋ. ﻲھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ ةﺓﺰﻋ ﺖﻨﺑ ﻞﯿﻴﻤﺣ ﻦﺑ صﺹﺎﻗوﻭ. ﻲﻧﺮﺒﺧأﺃ 
ﻰﻣﺮﺤﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ ﻰﺑأﺃ ءﻼﻌﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ ﻲﻨﺛّﺪﺣ ﺮﯿﻴﺑﺰﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ ﻲﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ ﻦﺑ ﻦﺴﺤﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ:  
ﻮﺑأﺃ ةﺓﺮﺼﺑ يﻱرﺭﺎﻔﻐﻟاﺍ ثﺙﺪﺤﻤﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﻤﺳاﺍوﻭ ﻞﯿﻴﻤﺣ ﻦﺑ صﺹﺎﻗوﻭ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫ ﻮﺑأﺃ ةﺓﺰﻋ ﻲﺘﻟاﺍ نﻥﺎﻛ ﺐﺴﻨﯾﻳ ﺎﮭﻬﺑ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ. نﻥﺎﻛوﻭ ءاﺍﺪﺘﺑاﺍ ﮫﻪﻘﺸﻋ ﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺎﯾﻳإﺇ 
ﻰﻠﻋ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ ﺪﻗ ﻞﯿﻴﻗ: ﮫﻪﻧإﺇ نﻥﺎﻛ ﻲﻓ ﻚﻟذﺫ ﺎﺑذﺫﺎﻛ ﻢﻟوﻭ ﻦﻜﯾﻳ ،٬ﻖﺷﺎﻌﺑ ﻚﻟذﺫوﻭ ﺮﻛﺬﯾﻳ ﺪﻌﺑ هﻩﺮﺒﺧ ﺎﮭﻬﻌﻣ ﺎﻤﯿﻴﻓ ﻲﻧﺮﺒﺧأﺃ ﮫﻪﺑ ﻲﻣﺮﺤﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ ﺎﻨﺛﺪﺣ 
ﺮﯿﻴﺑﺰﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ رﺭﺎﻜﺑ لﻝﺎﻗ ﻲﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﺪﺒﻋ ﷲ ﻦﺑ ﻢﯿﻴھﮪﮬﻫاﺍﺮﺑإﺇ يﻱﺪﻌﺴﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ ﻲﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﻢﯿﻴھﮪﮬﻫاﺍﺮﺑإﺇ ﻦﺑ بﺏﻮﻘﻌﯾﻳ ﻦﺑ ﻊﯿﻴﻤﺟ ﻲﻋاﺍﺰﺨﻟاﺍ: ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ نﻥﺎﻛ لﻝوﻭأﺃ 
ﻖﺸﻋ ةﺓﺰﻋﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ نﻥأﺃ اﺍﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﺮﻣ ةﺓﻮﺴﻨﺑ ﻦﻣ ﻲﻨﺑ ةﺓﺮﻤﺿ ﮫﻪﻌﻣوﻭ ﺐﻠﺟ ﻢﻨﻏ…  
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composed these amatory verses. Then, after presenting some isnād, Iṣfahānī chimes in 
again after beginning to relate the report: “The beginning of his passionate love for her 
was—despite that it is said: he was lying about that and was never in love, and that is 
mentioned after his story with her—according to what al-Ḥaramī told me, saying…” (9: 
32-33). The doubt cast by the opening statement of this section of “Dhikr Akhbār 
Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” builds here to frame the story of Kuthayyir’s falling in love with 
ʿAzza as one that is to be looked upon with skepticism and scrutiny.  
This khabar continues to tell the story of the beginning of Kuthayyir’s falling in 
love with ʿAzza. We learn that these women from the Banū Ḍamra sent the young ʿAzza 
to ask Kuthayyir to sell them one of his sheep and to take the payment for it from them 
when he finished his rounds. He became smitten with ʿAzza, we are told, and gave her 
the sheep. When he returned, one of the women approached him with the money for the 
sheep, saying he would only take the money from the person to whom he gave the sheep, 
which occasions the line of verse:  
Everyone who has a debt has paid and fulfilled his duty to his creditor 
 But as ʿAzza has delayed payment, she has held her creditor captive.144 (9: 
33) 
                                                
144 Original text: 
لﻝﺎﻗ: ﻻ ﺬﺧآﺁ ﻲﻤھﮪﮬﻫاﺍرﺭدﺩ ﻻإﺇ ﻦﻤﻣ ﺖﻌﻓدﺩ ﺶﺒﻜﻟاﺍ ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﻟإﺇ. جﺝﺮﺧوﻭ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ لﻝﻮﻘﯾﻳ:  
ﻰََﻀﻗ  ﱡﻞُﻛ يﻱذﺫ  ٍﻦﯾﻳَدﺩ ﻰﱠﻓََﻮﻓ  ُﮫﻪَﻤﯾﻳﺮَﻏ  ُةﺓ ﱠﺰَﻋَوﻭ  ٌلﻝﻮﻄَﻤَﻣ ﻰﱠﻨَﻌُﻣ ﺎـﮭﻬُﻤﯾﻳﺮَﻏ  
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This first version of this tale of the beginning then ends with the line: “He said: such was 
his first meeting with her” (Iṣfahānī 9: 33).  
The second version of the story follows in the next khabar. The opening of the se-
cond version offers a more detail than the first but the plot is quite consistent. The two 
versions diverge with regard to who approached whom initially. In the first, it is the 
women, through ʿAzza, who approach Kuthayyir, and in the second, it is Kuthayyir who 
approach the women. While the first version ends with the aforementioned line of poetry, 
the second includes more verse and then continues the tale further: 
He continued on his way. Then he returned to them when he had sold off his flock 
and recited: 
I looked at her intensely when she was a young girl 
 Over time she matured and her breasts appeared 
They had put her in a shift while she was in her young girl’s chemisette 
 When girls her age were not yet wearing shifts 
Among the modest women, the young beauty's companion desired her  
 When the playful banter doesn’t expire as long as you keep it up  
A song mentioned after the completion of this khabar in included with this line 
and others because it is of the same type. So he also sang to them: 
Everyone who has a debt has paid and fulfilled his duty to his creditor 
 But as ʿAzza has delayed payment, she has held her creditor captive145  
                                                
145 Original text: 
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 ehs dna mih ot reh thguorb yeht oS .azzAʿ tub lla esufer uoY :mih ot dias yeht oS
 eh naht ylesnetni erom mih htiw evol ni llef azzAʿ taht retfA .tnatculer etiuq saw
 .reh devol
 dbAʿ nib zīzAʿ-la dbAʿ nib rakaB ūbA nbI dammaḥuM deksa I :dias ryabuZ-lA
 wenk eH .noitasrevnoc siht tuoba ladnaJ ūbA saw nwonk īʿāzahK-la nāmḥaR-la
 morf ladnaJ ūbA nbI zīzAʿ-la dbAʿ rehtafdnarg sih morf rehtaf sih morf ti tuoba
  )53-43 :9 īnāhafṣI( 641.rehtaf reh morf riyyahtuK tnib aʿmuJ rehtom sih
-ruF .liated dna esrev erom sedulcni noisrev siht ,noisrev tsrif eht htiw tnetsisnocni toN
 hcihw ,mih ot tbed s’azzAʿ tuoba esrev s’riyyahtuK htiw gnidne naht rehtar ,eromreht
 dna tseuqer sih htiw deilpmoc nemow eht taht sdda rabahk siht ,ssennettims sih stseggus
                                                                                                                                            
  :ﻓﯿﻴﮭﻬﺎ ﻓﺄﻧﺸﺪھﮪﮬﻫﻦ ﺟﻠﺒﮫﻪ ﺑﯿﻴﻊ ﻣﻦ ﻓﺮغﻍ ﺣﯿﻴﻦ إﺇﻟﯿﻴﮭﻬﻦ رﺭﺟﻊ ﺛﻢ ﻟﻮﺟﮭﻬﮫﻪ،٬ وﻭﻣﻀﻰ
  ﻧﮭﻬﻮدﺩھﮪﮬﻫﺎ وﻭﺑﺎنﻥ ﺷﺒﺖ أﺃنﻥ ﺣﯿﻴﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ  ﻋﺎﺗـﻖ وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻲ ﻧﻈﺮةﺓ إﺇﻟﯿﻴﮭﻬﺎ ﻧﻈﺮتﺕ
  رﺭﯾﻳﺪھﮪﮬﻫﺎ اﺍﻟﺪرﺭعﻉ ﯾﻳﻠﺒﺲ وﻭﻟﻤﺎ ﻣﺠﻮبﺏ ﻣﺆﺻﺪ ذﺫاﺍتﺕ وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻲ دﺩرﺭﻋﻮھﮪﮬﻫﺎ وﻭﻗﺪ
  ﺗﻌﯿﻴﺪھﮪﮬﻫﺎ ﻟﻮ أﺃﺣﺪوﻭﺛﺔ اﺍﻧﻘﻀﺖ ﻣﺎ إﺇذﺫاﺍ  ﺟﻠﯿﻴﺴﮭﻬﺎ وﻭدﺩ اﺍﻟﺒﯿﻴﺾ اﺍﻟﺨﻔﺮاﺍتﺕ ﻣﻦ
  :أﺃﯾﻳﻀﺎ وﻭأﺃﻧﺸﺪھﮪﮬﻫﻦ .ﺟﻨﺴﮫﻪ ﻣﻦ إﺇﻟﯿﻴﮫﻪ ﯾﻳﻀﺎفﻑ وﻭﻣﺎ اﺍﻟﺨﺒﺮ ھﮪﮬﻫﺬاﺍ ﺗﻤﺎمﻡ ﺑﻌﺪ ﯾﻳﺬﻛﺮ ﻏﻨﺎء ﻣﻌﮫﻪ أﺃﺧﺮ وﻭأﺃﺑﯿﻴﺎتﺕ اﺍﻟﺒﯿﻴﺖ ھﮪﮬﻫﺬاﺍ ﻓﻲ
  ﻏﺮﯾﻳﻤﮭﻬـﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﻰ ﻣﻤﻄﻮلﻝ وﻭﻋﺰةﺓ ﻏﺮﯾﻳﻤﮫﻪ ﻓﻮﻓﻰ دﺩﯾﻳﻦ ذﺫيﻱ ﻛﻞ ﻗﻀﻰ
 :txet lanigirO 641
  .إﺇﯾﻳﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺎ ﺣﺒﮫﻪ ﻣﻦ أﺃﺷﺪ ذﺫﻟﻚ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻋﺰةﺓ أﺃﺣﺒﺘﮫﻪ ﺛﻢ .ﻛﺎرﺭھﮪﮬﻫﺔ وﻭھﮪﮬﻫﻲ إﺇﻟﯿﻴﮫﻪ وﻭأﺃﺑﺮزﺯﻧﮭﻬﺎ ﻋﺰةﺓ إﺇﻻ أﺃﺑﯿﻴﺖ :ﻟﮫﻪ ﻓﻘﻠﻦ 
 اﺍﻟﺤﺪﯾﻳﺚ،٬ ھﮪﮬﻫﺬاﺍ ﻋﻦ ﺟﻨﺪلﻝ ﺑﺄﺑﻲ اﺍﻟﻤﻌﺮوﻭفﻑ اﺍﻟﺨﺰاﺍﻋﻲ اﺍﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ ﻋﺒﺪ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻟﻌﺰﯾﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺪ ﺑﻦ ﺑﻜﺮ أﺃﺑﻲ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻓﺴﺄﻟﺖ :اﺍﻟﺰﺑﯿﻴﺮ ﻗﺎلﻝ
  .أﺃﺑﯿﻴﮭﻬﺎ ﻋﻦ ﻛﺜﯿﻴﺮ ﺑﻨﺖ ﺟﻤﻌﺔ أﺃﻣﮫﻪ ﻋﻦ ﺪلﻝﺟﻨ أﺃﺑﻲ ﺑﻦ اﺍﻟﻌﺰﯾﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺪ ﺟﺪهﻩ ﻋﻦ أﺃﺑﯿﻴﮫﻪ ﻋﻦ وﻭﺣﺪﺛﻨﯿﻴﮫﻪ ﻓﻌﺮﻓﮫﻪ
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brought the reluctant ʿAzza to him, causing her to fall more deeply in love with him than 
he was with her. This new ending of their first meeting suggests a new meaning of this 
origin story and calls into question once again Kuthayyir’s love for ʿAzza. Iṣfahānī then 
concludes this khabar with another set of isnād that lend support to the story of Kuthayyir 
falling in love with ʿAzza.  
 Considering these two akhbār together, we find that they each strike a balance 
between affirming and denying Kuthayyir’s “sincerity” in his professed love for ʿAzza. 
The first story itself casts no doubt, but it is introduced by a chain of isnād that raises 
skepticism. Meanwhile, the second story relates that it was ʿAzza’s love for Kuthayyir 
was greater than his love for her, casting some doubt on Kuthayyir’s “sincerity.” Howev-
er, this story, which includes Kuthayyir’s amatory verse for ʿAzza, is reinforced by its 
consistency with the first story as well as by the final isnād that provides support for the 
story’s authority. The way the isnād and khabar interact with one another in “Dhikr 
Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” achieves a delicate tension between affirming and deny-
ing. It is not the stark contrast of performative friction in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir” 
that we find here, but rather a more subtle balancing act between doubt and certainty. 
What begins to emerge from the akhbār of this chapter of the Aghānī is a sense that skep-
ticism should not take the form of affirming or denying a proposed truth but rather it 
should take the form of a continuous process of questioning of both affirmations and de-
nials. Rather than encouraging a reactionary nihilism or seeking refuge in dogmatism in 
response to the fear of disingenuousness or trickery, Iṣfahānī’s treatment of the doubts 
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surrounding Kuthayyir’s “sincerity” embraces the possibility of deception as a force that 
constantly counterbalances the tyranny of authoritative knowledge.  
 These anecdotes are followed by a khabar accompanied a lengthy isnād that nar-
rates an encounter between an aging ʿAzza and the Umayyad caliph ʿAbd al-Malik (d. 
705) in which the caliph questions ʿAzza about the reason for Kuthayyir’s love for her, 
suggesting some incredulity based on her physical appearance at the time: 
ʿAzza dropped in on ʿAbd al-Malik bin Marwān, and she had grown old. He said 
to her: You are ʿAzza Kuthayyir. She said: I am ʿAzza bint Ḥumayl. He said: You 
are the one for whom Kuthayyir said: “ʿAzza has a fire that never dies out / Like a 
star when looking upon her from afar.” So what is it that he admired so much in 
you (mā alladhī aʿjabahu minki)? She said: Not at all, Prince of the Believers! By 
God, I was at that time better than fire on a cold night. According to what 
Muḥammad bin Ṣāliḥ al-Aslamī said: She said to him: What he admired in me is 
what the Muslims admired in you when they made you caliph. He said: He had 
black teeth that he would hide, so when he laughed, they appeared. She said to 
him: That’s what I wanted to show.147 (Iṣfahānī 9: 35-36) 
                                                
147 Original text: 
ﺖﻠﺧدﺩ ةﺓﺰﻋ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺪﺒﻋ ﻚﻠﻤﻟاﺍ ﻦﺑ نﻥاﺍوﻭﺮﻣ ﺪﻗوﻭ ،٬تﺕﺰﺠﻋ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﺎﮭﻬﻟ ﺖﻧأﺃ ةﺓﺰﻋ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﺖﻟﺎﻘﻓ: ﺎﺑأﺃ ةﺓﺰﻋ ﺖﻨﺑ ﻞﯿﻴﻤﺣ. لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺖﻧأﺃ ﻲﺘﻟاﺍ 
لﻝﻮﻘﯾﻳ ﻚﻟ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ:  
ةﺓﺰﻌﻟ رﺭﺎﻧ ﺎﻣ خﺥﻮـﺒﺗ ﺎـﮭﻬـﻧﺄـﻛ  اﺍذﺫإﺇ ﺎﻣ ﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺎﻨﻘﻣرﺭ ﻦﻣ ﺪﻌﺒﻟاﺍ ﺐﻛﻮﻛ  
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In this anecdote, each of ʿAzza’s responses to the caliph’s questions neither affirms nor 
denies Kuthayyir’s “sincerity.” Instead, in each, she ignores the implied insult and incre-
dulity of the caliph. When asked if she is ʿAzza Kuthayyir, or, the ʿAzza of Kuthayyir, an 
inversion of the usual possessive construction used to refer to ʿudhri poets, she simply 
responds by stating that she is ʿAzza, daughter of Ḥumayl. In her next response, she re-
jects the specific lines the caliph recites, declaring that this flattering line barely does her 
then fire-like presence justice. Her last response turns the question back onto the caliph 
and calls upon him to consider what made him apparently so appealing to Muslims such 
that would legitimate his appointed position.  
ʿAbd al-Malik’s curiosity about what it was that drew Kuthayyir to ʿAzza seems 
to stem from a desire to embarrass her by insulting her appearance, while also suggesting 
his incredulity that Kuthayyir could have been as deeply in love with her as his poetry 
would suggest. Rather than expressing concern for such doubts, ʿAzza plays off of the 
caliph’s insecurity about his own appearance and admirability. Her response suggests that 
the belief that one is loved, whether as a romantic beloved or as a beloved leader, requires 
vulnerability. By raising the question of what it was that the Muslims found so admirable 
in him, she makes the caliph laugh, revealing the black teeth he sought to hide.  
                                                                                                                                            
ﺎﻤﻓ يﻱﺬﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﺒﺠﻋأﺃ ﻚﻨﻣ? ﺖﻟﺎﻗ: ﻼﻛ ﺎﯾﻳ ﺮﯿﻴﻣأﺃ ﻦﯿﻴﻨﻣﺆﻤﻟاﺍ ﷲﻮﻓ ﺪﻘﻟ ﺖﻨﻛ ﻲﻓ هﻩﺪﮭﻬﻋ ﻦﺴﺣأﺃ ﻦﻣ رﺭﺎﻨﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻠﯿﻴﻠﻟاﺍ ةﺓﺮﻘﻟاﺍ. ﻲﻓوﻭ ﺚﯾﻳﺪﺣ 
ﺪﻤﺤﻣ ﻦﺑ ﺢﻟﺎﺻ ﻲﻤﻠﺳﻷاﺍ: ﺖﻟﺎﻘﻓ ﮫﻪﻟ: ﮫﻪﺒﺠﻋأﺃ ﻲﻨﻣ ﺎﻣ ﺐﺠﻋأﺃ ﻦﯿﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟاﺍ ﻚﻨﻣ ﻦﯿﻴﺣ كﻙوﻭﺮﯿﻴﺻ ﺔﻔﯿﻴﻠﺧ. لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺖﻧﺎﻛوﻭ ﮫﻪﻟ ﻦﺳ 
ءاﺍدﺩﻮﺳ ،٬ﺎﮭﻬﯿﻴﻔﺨﯾﻳ ﻚﺤﻀﻓ ﻰﺘﺣ تﺕﺪﺑ. ﺖﻟﺎﻘﻓ ﮫﻪﻟ: اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ يﻱﺬﻟاﺍ تﺕدﺩرﺭأﺃ نﻥأﺃ ﮫﻪﯾﻳﺪﺑأﺃ.  
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Rather than simply reinforcing or complicating doubts about Kuthayyir’s “sinceri-
ty” or the truth behind the Kuthayyir ʿAzza love story, this khabar calls upon the audi-
ence to reconsider the function of concerns about “sincerity” and disingenuousness. The 
character of Caliph ʿAbd al-Malik appears in this khabar, as in other akhbār in this chap-
ter, as we will see, to pose questions to a central characters of the story, engaging with the 
story as a representative of its audience. That is, his questions seek not simply to find out 
what happened but how the characters felt about what happened. Rather than revealing 
ʿAzza’s subjective experience through these questions, he realizes his own subjectivity. 
The questions he poses and the answers he receives in this khabar reveal more about his 
own insecurities and vulnerabilities, than they do ʿAzza’s. As the caliph’s role in this sto-
ry is much like that of an audience representative, the audience is likewise called upon to 
consider their own insecurities and vulnerabilities. In realizing our subjectivity and the 
caliph his, the notion of “sincerity” loses its clarity. That is, judging love and being loved, 
which emerge as subjective experiences here, as either sincere or insincere becomes un-
tenable. Once again, the lens of “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” draws away 
from the central character of Kuthayyir, toward the narrator, and finally lands upon the 
audience.  
Caliph ʿAbd al-Malik appears again in a later report of “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir 
wa Nasabihi.” In it, it is Kuthayyir who the caliph approaches with a question. This time 
he asks about “the most wondrous (aʿjab) khabar of his with ʿAzza” (Iṣfahānī 9: 37). 
Kuthayyir responds by narrating their encounter when traveling for Ḥajj (9: 37-39). Ac-
cording to Kuthayyir’s account, during the journey, ʿAzza went from tent to tent, having 
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been sent out to buy butter by her husband, to whom she was wed shortly after her first 
encounter with Kuthayyir (9: 38). Without realizing it, ʿAzza entered Kuthayyir’s tent 
where he had been sharpening an arrow. As if in a trance, he looked at her and continued 
to sharpen until he cut through to his bone and began bleeding (9: 38). ʿAzza used her 
robe to wipe the blood away and Kuthayyir sent her back with butter for her husband. 
When her husband saw the blood, he forced her to relate what had happened (9: 38). Af-
ter learning about the incident, he struck her and forced her to curse Kuthayyir to his 
face: 
She approached me and her husband was with her. She said to me, crying: you 
son of a whore. Then, they left. That is when I said:  
The pig made her curse me and I liked how she did it  
 But for her owner she humiliated herself. (Iṣfahānī 9: 38)148  
A section of song from this poem:  
My two friends, this is ʿAzza's abode, so bind the legs  
 Of your young she-camels and cry where she has settled down 
Before ʿAzza, I hadn't known what weeping was  
                                                
148 Original text: 
ﺖﻔﻗﻮﻓ ﻲﻠﻋ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ ﺎﮭﻬﻌﻣ ﺖﻟﺎﻘﻓ ﻲﻟ: ﺎﯾﻳ ﻦﺑ ﺔﯿﻴﻧاﺍﺰﻟاﺍ ﻲھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ ،٬ﻲﻜﺒﺗ ﻢﺛ ﺎﻓﺮﺼﻧاﺍ. ﻚﻟﺬﻓ ﻦﯿﻴﺣ لﻝﻮﻗأﺃ:  
ﺎُﮭﻬﻔﱢﻠَُﻜﯾﻳ  ُﺮﯾﻳﺰْﻨِﺨﻟاﺍ ﻲِﻤْﺘَﺷ ﺎﻣَوﻭِ ﺎﮭﻬﺑ * ﻲﻧاﺍَﻮھﮪﮬﻫ  ّﻦﻜﻟوﻭ ﻚﯿﻴﻠَﻤﻠﻟ  ِﺖﱠﻟََﺬﺘِْﺳاﺍ  
ﺔﺒﺴﻧ ﺎﻣ ﻲﻓ هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ةﺓﺪﯿﻴﺼﻘﻟاﺍ ﻦﻣ ءﺎﻨﻐﻟاﺍ  
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 Nor did I know pangs of the heart until she took control of me 
If only my camel had been tied up at ʿAzza's  
 With weak rope such that it could have separated from it and gone astray 
Her luggage found a home with the settled people  
 And she had a jealous tyrant other than me, so she went astray 
I said to her: ʿAzz, every misfortune,  
 If the soul finds a home in it one day, it becomes weak 
Treat us poorly or treat us well, for us,  
 she is neither blameworthy nor hated when she is hateful  
I am satiated and satisfied, not sick or intoxicated  
 about ʿAzza, because from our symptoms she took pleasure 
I desired her to the extent that when I saw her  
 I saw my desires as paths that had drawn near.  
As if I was calling out to a rock when she rejected me,  
 Like a slippery stone, upon which even the most agile would slip  
 Merciful you are and she who has come upon you is nothing but a cold woman; 
 Whoever can’t handle this way of hers, she abandons. 
Ruin befalls he who wants ruin for you  
 Those women who said ʿAzza went mad went mad themselves149  
                                                
149 Original text: 
 ﱠَﻲﻠﯿﻴﻠَﺧ اﺍَﺬھﮪﮬﻫ  ُﻢْﺳَرﺭ ةﺓِﺰﱠـَﻋ ﻼَـﻘـْﻋﺎـﻓ  ﺎﻤُﻜْﯿﻴَﺻﻮَﻠﻗ ﻢﺛ ﺎﯿﻴـَﻜْﺑاﺍ  ُﺚﯿﻴـَﺣ  ِﺖﱠﻠـَﺣ  
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       (Iṣfahānī 9: 38-39) 
The story, narrated by Kuthayyir, and the lines of his love-complaint poetry (nasīb) fore-
ground his subjectivity. After Kuthayyir unintentionally cuts through his bone and draws 
his own blood, he stains ʿAzza with it, who returns to unwillingly draw blood through 
insult. The word used for blood (damm) shares its root with the word used earlier to stage 
Kuthayyir’s ugliness (damāmah), and thus recalls the early insults that centered around 
his ugliness and presented him as a sympathetic victim.  
Then, staged as a response to ʿAzza’s forced insult, Kuthayyir’s poetry presents 
his subjective experience of loving ʿAzza. The audience encounters Kuthayyir’s subjec-
tivity without direct mediation for the first time in the text, and the question of “sincerity” 
is transferred from seeking to determine Kuthayyir’s “sincerity” to assessing his ability to 
                                                                                                                                            
ﺎﻣَوﻭ  ُﺖْﻨُﻛ يﻱِرﺭَْدﺩأﺃ  َﻞَْﺒﻗ  ِةﺓ ﱠﺰَﻋ ﺎﻣ ﺎِﻜـﺒﻟاﺍ   ﻻَوﻭ  ُتﺕﺎﻌﺟﻮﻣ  ِﺐَْﻠﻘﻟاﺍ ﻰ ـﱠﺘَﺣ  ِﺖﱠﻟََﻮﺗ  
 ُﺖَْﯿﻴَﻠﻓ ﻲﺻﻮَﻠﻗ  ْﺪَْﻨـﻋ  ِةﺓ ﱠَﺰـﻋ تﺕَﺪﱢُﯿﻴـﻗ    ِﻞْﺒَِﺤﺑ  ِﻒﯿﻴﻌَﺿ  َنﻥﺎﺑ ﺎﮭﻬْﻨِﻣ  ِﺖ ـﱠﻠـَﻀَـﻓ  
 ََﺢﺒَْﺻأﺃَوﻭ ﻲﻓ  ِمﻡَْﻮﻘﻟاﺍ  ِﻦﯿﻴﻤﯿﻴﻘُﻤﻟاﺍ  ُﻠْﺣَرﺭﺎـﮭﻬـ    َنﻥﺎﻛَوﻭ ﺎـَﮭﻬﻟ  ٍغﻍﺎـﺑ  َيﻱاﺍﻮـِﺳ  ِﺖ ـﱠﻠَـﺒَـﻓ  
 ُﺖُْﻠَﻘﻓ ﺎـﮭﻬَـﻟ  ّﺰـَﻋﺎﯾﻳ  ﱡﻞـُﻛ  ٍﺔﺒﯿﻴـُﺼـﻣ   اﺍذﺫإﺇ  َْﺖﻨﱢطﻁُوﻭ ﺎﻣَﻮﯾﻳ ﺎَﮭﻬﻟ  ُﺲـﻔ ـﱠﻨﻟاﺍ  ِﺖﱠـﻟَذﺫ  
ﻲﺌﯿﻴَﺳأﺃ ﺎﻨﺑ وﻭأﺃ ،٬ﻲـﻨـِﺴَﺣأﺃ ﻻ  ٌﺔﻣﻮـﻠـَﻣ  ﺎـﻨﯾﻳََﺪﻟ ﻻَوﻭ ﺔﱠﯿﻴِـﻠـْﻘـَﻣٌ  نﻥإﺇ  ِﺖـﻠـﻘـﺗ  
ًﺎﺌﯿﻴَﻨھﮪﮬﻫ ًﺎﺌﯾﻳَﺮـﻣ ﺮﯿﻴـﻏ  ٍءاﺍدﺩ  َ◌ٍﺮـِﻣﺎـﺨـُﻣ   ِةﺓ ﱠﺰَِﻌﻟ ﻦِﻣ ﺎﻨِﺿاﺍﺮَﻋأﺃ ﺎﻣ  ِﺖ ـﱠﻠـَﺤَـﺘْﺳاﺍ  
ﺎـﮭﻬُـﺘْﯿﻴﱠﻨََﻤﺗ ﻰ ـﱠﺘـَﺣ اﺍذﺫإﺇ ﺎـﻣ ﺎـﮭﻬُـﺘَْﯾﻳأﺃَرﺭ     ُﺖَْﯾﻳأﺃَرﺭ ﺎﯾﻳﺎﻨَﻤﻟاﺍ ًﺎـﻋ ﱠﺮُﺷ ﺪَـﻗ  ِﺖ ـﱠﻠـََظﻅأﺃ  
ﻲﻧﺄﻛ يﻱدﺩﺎُﻧأﺃ  ًةﺓَﺮْﺨَﺻ ﻦﯿﻴﺣ  ْﺖـَﺿَﺮـَْﻋأﺃ  ﻦِﻣ  ِﻢ ﱡﺼﻟاﺍ ﻮﻟ ﻲﺸﻤﺗ ﺎﮭﻬﺑ  ُﻢْﺼُﻌﻟاﺍ  ِﺖّـﻟَزﺯ  
ﺎًﺣﻮﻔَﺻ ﺎَﻤﻓ  َكﻙﺎـﻘـﻠـﺗ ﻻإﺇ ﻠﯿﻴـﺨَـﺑ ًﺔ   ﻦََﻤﻓ  ﱠﻞَﻣ ﺎﮭﻬْﻨِﻣ ﻚﻟذﺫ  َﻞـْﺻَﻮﻟاﺍ  ِﺖّـﻠـَﻣ  
 َبﺏﺎَﺻأﺃ ىﻯَدﺩَﺮﻟاﺍ ﻦﻣ  َنﻥﺎﻛ ىﻯﻮﮭﻬﯾﻳ  ِﻚﻟ ىﻯَدﺩ ﱠﺮﻟاﺍ   ﱠﻦُﺟَوﻭ ﻲﺗاﺍﻮﻠﻟاﺍ  َﻦـُْﻠﻗ  ُةﺓ ﱠﺰـَﻋ  ِﺖ ـﱠﻨـُﺟ  
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express his subjective experience. Kuthayyir’s love for ʿAzza does not express itself in 
praise or flattering images; rather, he expresses his love as pain. This pain leads him to 
tears and his heart to pang; it also seems to drive his criticism of her choice in settling 
down with a jealous tyrant, as well as her cold and slippery nature. He also declares that 
he derives a kind of strength from this pain, such that he is able to show her mercy de-
spite her hatefulness and feels healthy and satiated, unintoxicated by his love. Through 
this range of emotion, he expresses his love for ʿAzza. The power of his expression of 
love derives not from any overtness but instead from its implicitness in his play with 
conventions of ʿudhrī poetry, such as grief and criticism. In the face of accusations of 
“insincerity” in love, this verse functions not to defend Kuthayyir’s love but to express 
his humanity.  
 Iṣfahānī follows this expression of Kuthayyir’s humanity, after two intermediary 
akhbār, with a set of akhbār from those who claim Kuthayyir was lying about his love 
for ʿAzza. His direct narrative voice makes a rare appearance to introduce the narrators of 
these akhbār to come as: “Those who mentioned that Kuthayyir was lying about his 
love”150 (Iṣfahānī 9: 41). The two reports that follow relate: “Abū Khalīfa said Ibn Sallām 
told us: Kuthayyir was pretending and was not in love; Jamīl was truthful in his passion 
and love”151 and “Aḥmad bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Jawharī and Ḥabīb bin Naṣr al-Mahlabī 
                                                
150 Original text: 
ﻦﻣ ﺮﻛذﺫ نﻥأﺃ اﺍﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ نﻥﺎﻛ بﺏﺬﻜﯾﻳ ﻲﻓ ﮫﻪﻘﺸﻋ  
151 Original text: 
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told us that Umar bin Shabba said to us that Isḥāq bin Ibrāhīm claimed (zaʿama) that he 
heard Abū Ubayda saying: Jamīl was sincere in his love, and Kuthayyir was lying”152 
(Iṣfahānī 9: 41). These voices relate suspicion about Kuthayyir’s professed feelings for 
ʿAzza and compare Kuthayyir’s “insincerity” with Jamīl’s “sincerity.” Iṣfahānī’s presen-
tation of these akhbār as part of a group that mention “that Kuthayyir was lying about his 
love,” however, invites suspicion not about Kuthayyir’s love but instead about the claims 
of these narrators.  
 Rather than first presenting an illustrative anecdote that dramatizes Kuthayyir’s 
“insincerity,” such as the one that eventually follows, Iṣfahānī begins with declarations of 
that alleged “insincerity.” After Kuthayyir’s compelling verse, which never actually pro-
fesses love for ʿAzza but instead expresses love, these blunt, accusatory declarations 
prove rather impotent in negating Kuthayyir’s persuasive expression of love. Further-
more, the isnād introducing each of these declarations cast doubt upon their credibility. 
The isnād of the first khabar includes two contemporaries of Iṣfahānī who simply declare 
Kuthayyir a liar. Without a chain of transmission leading to a narrator who might have 
met or known Kuthayyir, these judgments of Iṣfahānī’s contemporaries Abū Khalīfa (d. 
                                                                                                                                            
ﺎﻧﺮﺒﺧأﺃ ﻮﺑأﺃ ﺔﻔﯿﻴﻠﺧ لﻝﺎﻗ ﺎﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﻦﺑاﺍ مﻡﻼﺳ لﻝﺎﻗ: نﻥﺎﻛ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﺎﯿﻴﻋﺪﻣ ﻢﻟوﻭ ﻦﻜﯾﻳ ،٬ﺎﻘﺷﺎﻋ نﻥﺎﻛوﻭ ﻞﯿﻴﻤﺟ قﻕدﺩﺎﺻ ﺔﺑﺎﺒﺼﻟاﺍ ﻖﺸﻌﻟاﺍوﻭ.  
152 Original text: 
ﺎﻧﺮﺒﺧأﺃ ﺪﻤﺣأﺃ ﻦﺑ ﺪﺒﻋ ﺰﯾﻳﺰﻌﻟاﺍ يﻱﺮھﮪﮬﻫﻮﺠﻟاﺍ ﺐﯿﻴﺒﺣوﻭ ﻦﺑ ﺮﺼﻧ ﻲﺒﻠﮭﻬﻤﻟاﺍ ﻻﺎﻗ ﺎﻨﺛﺪﺣ ﺮﻤﻋ ﻦﺑ ﺔﺒﺷ لﻝﺎﻗ ﻢﻋزﺯ قﻕﺎﺤﺳإﺇ ﻦﺑ ﻢﯿﻴھﮪﮬﻫاﺍﺮﺑإﺇ 
ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ ﻊﻤﺳ ﺎﺑأﺃ ةﺓﺪﯿﻴﺒﻋ لﻝﻮﻘﯾﻳ نﻥﺎﻛ ﻞﯿﻴﻤﺟ قﻕﺪﺼﯾﻳ ﻲﻓ ،٬ﮫﻪﺒﺣ ﻦﻠﻛوﻭ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ بﺏﺬﻜﯾﻳ.  
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917) Ibn Sallām (d. 846) are rather unpersuasive. The second isnād also complicates the 
judgment it introduces, specifically by employing the verb “he claimed” (zaʿama). This 
verb, unlike the verbs we usually find in the isnād of the Aghānī and other akhbār books, 
such as “he said” (qāla) or “he reported” (akhabara), implies some sense of doubt in 
what is being reporting. Lane’s Lexicon, for example, relates that zaʿama is “mostly used 
in relation to thing respecting which there is doubt,…and which is not certainly 
known…or it is mostly used in relation to that which is false, or that respecting which 
there is doubt, or suspicion” (1232). It is not Kuthayyir, then, who emerges as insincere, 
but rather the narrators of the claims that he was.  
 The illustrative anecdote that we do eventually encounter directly following these 
two declarations comes with the direct intervention of Iṣfahānī’s narrative voice. Instead 
of presenting an isnād as introduction, Iṣfahānī explains that “what follows is what we 
found in the reports but have not heard from anyone”153 (Iṣfahānī 9: 41). This curious 
preface seems to suggest that Iṣfahānī found “what follows” in written, unnamed reports, 
despite the fact that he quite often cites the written sources upon which he relies, and that 
he found no direct oral sources that converge with what he found in these written reports. 
Nonetheless, Iṣfahānī includes this rather lengthy anecdote in his narration of the 
Kuthayyir ʿAzza legend, leaving the audience uncertain about how to approach it but, 
with the curiousness of the preface, eager to listen further.  
                                                
153 Original text: 
ﺎﻤﻣوﻭ هﻩﺎﻧﺪﺟوﻭ ﻓﻲ هﻩرﺭﺎﺒﺧأﺃ ﻢﻟوﻭ ﮫﻪﻌﻤﺴﻧ ﻦﻣ ﺪﺣأﺃ  
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 According to the story, Kuthayyir noticed ʿAzza one day while she was walking 
with a swagger and wearing a niqab. Not recognizing her, he followed her and said: “My 
lady, stop so I can talk to you. I've never seen any woman like you before”154 (Iṣfahānī 9: 
41). When ʿAzza asked him whether ʿAzza had left him wanting someone else, he re-
sponded, “I swear, if ʿAzza were my mother, she would grant you as a gift to me”155 
(Iṣfahānī  9: 41-42). ʿAzza scolded him and revealed her face, leaving Kuthayyir speech-
less and pale. After she left, Kuthayyir recited: 
If only before I said what I said the poison  
 Of crushed cantharides had been mixed with my water 
And I died without her knowing I betrayed her 
 How many who request winnings are not winners? 
I acknowledge my fault that I have wronged her 
 And that I will not reveal the rest of her secrets156 (Iṣfahānī 9: 42) 
                                                
154 Original text: 
ﺎﯾﻳ ﻲﺗﺪﯿﻴﺳ ﻲﻔﻗ ﻰﺘﺣ ﻚﻤﻠﻛأﺃ ﻲﻧﺎﻓ ﻢﻟ رﺭأﺃ ﻚﻠﺜﻣ ﻂﻗ  
155 Original text: 
ﻲﺑﺄﺑ ﺖﻧأﺃ ﷲوﻭ ﻮﻟ نﻥأﺃ ةﺓﺰﻋ ﺔﻣأﺃ ﻲﻟ ﺎﮭﻬﺘﺒھﮪﮬﻫﻮﻟ ﻚﻟ.  
156 Original text: 
ﻻأﺃ ﻲﻨﺘَﯿﻴﻟ  َﻞَْﺒﻗ يﻱﺬﻟاﺍ  ُﺖُﻠﻗ  َﺐﯿﻴﺷ ﻲﻟ ﻦِﻣ ﻢﱠﺴﻟاﺍِ  ٌتﺕﺎﺣْﺪَﺟ  ِءﺎﻤﺑ  ِحﺡِرﺭاﺍَرﺭﱠﺬﻟاﺍ  
 ﱡﺖَُﻤﻓ َﻢﻟوﻭ ﻢﻠﻌﺗ  ﱠﻲـﻠـﻋ  ًﺔﻧﺎﯿﻴـﺧ ﻢَﻛَوﻭ  ٍﺐﻟﺎطﻁ  ِﺢﺑﺮﻠﻟ ﺲﯿﻴﻟ  ِﺢِـﺑاﺍِﺮﺑ  
 ُءﻮﺑأﺃ ﻲﺒﻧﺬﺑ ﻲﻨﻧإﺇ ﺪﻗ ﺎـﮭﻬُـﺘـﻤﻠظﻅ  ﻲﻨﻧإﺇوﻭ ﻲﻗﺎﺒﺑ ﺎھﮪﮬﻫ ﱢﺮِﺳ  ُﺮﯿﻴﻏ  ِﺢِﺋﺎـﺑ  
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This isnād-less khabar narrates a story in which Kuthayyir mistakes ʿAzza for a stranger 
and approaches her flirtatiously, demonstrating to her that he has not recognized her in 
her niqab. When ʿAzza scolds him and reveals herself, Kuthayyir turns pale and speech-
less until he recites verse in which he admits and expresses great regret about his betrayal 
of ʿAzza. There is no chain of authority supporting this story, whose “authority” lies in its 
entertainment value. It has subjective “truth value” inasmuch as it is worth repeating. Its 
mere utterance awakens doubts about Kuthayyir’s “sincerity” and provides an anecdotal 
basis for the claims of his disingenuousness, while also suggesting, however, that it is the 
only basis for those claims we encountered. Meanwhile, Iṣfahānī allows Kuthayyir’s po-
etic expression of guilt and regret to conclude the story, which once again reveals his 
humanity. Iṣfahānī’s arrangement of the akhbār demands a reception of the subjective 
truths they suggest, wherein the audience becomes sensitive to the subjectivity offered by 
each voice in the layers of voices he presents for each utterance, as well as their own. In 
calling the audience’s attention to and disrupting the mechanisms which might seem to 
enable it to distinguish supposedly true and false statements, the Aghānī deterritorializes 
the Kuthayyir legend and invites it to participate in a process of knowledge production 
that is more egalitarian and contextually contingent.  
RESURRECTING THE SCAPEGOAT 
 After presenting thirty-six pages of overwhelmingly censorious akhbār that frame 
Kuthayyir as supposedly “disingenuous” and socially “inappropriate,” Iṣfahānī offers 
akhbār relating to Kuthayyir’s death, funeral, and legacy. These akhbār, which I present 
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here without isnād, suddenly reframe Kuthayyir not only as beloved and admired, but 
also as something of a venerated prophet:  
(1) Some of Kuthayyir’s people cried when death befell him. Kuthayyir said to 
them: Don’t cry, as if after forty nights, you will hear my soles on the street com-
ing back to you.157 (Iṣfahānī 9: 47) 
(2) Kuthayyir and ʿIkrima of Ibn ʿAbbās on the same day, so the Quraysh tribe 
gathered at Kuthayyir’s funeral and there was no one to carry ʿIkrima’s body.158 
(9: 47) 
(3) ʿIkrima of Ibn ʿAbbās and Kuthayyir bin ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Khuzāʿī, ʿAzza’s 
companion, died on the same day in the year 105. I saw them both prayed upon 
together on the same day in the afternoon in the funerary place. The people said: 
Today the most knowledgeable of people and the most expressive of people 
died.159 (9: 47) 
                                                
157 Original text: 
ﻰﻜﺑ ﺾﻌﺑ ﻞھﮪﮬﻫأﺃ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻠﻋ ﻦﯿﻴﺣ لﻝﺰﻧ ﮫﻪﺑ تﺕﻮﻤﻟاﺍ. لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﮫﻪﻟ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ: ﻻ ،٬ﻚﺒﺗ ﻚﻧﺄﻜﻓ ﻲﺑ ﺪﻌﺑ ﻦﯿﻴﻌﺑرﺭأﺃ ﺔﻠﯿﻴﻟ ﻊﻤﺴﺗ ﺔﻔﺸﺧ ﻰﻠﻌﻧ ﻦﻣ 
ﻚﻠﺗ ﺔﺒﻌﺸﻟاﺍ اﺍرﺭﺎﻌﺟ ﻢﻜﯿﻴﻟإﺇ.  
158 Original text: 
تﺕﺎﻣ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﺔﻣﺮﻜﻋوﻭ ﻰﻟﻮﻣ ﻦﺑاﺍ سﺱﺎﺒﻋ ﻲﻓ مﻡﻮﯾﻳ ،٬ﺪﺣاﺍوﻭ ﺖﻌﻤﺘﺟﺎﻓ ﺶﯾﻳﺮﻗ ﻲﻓ ةﺓزﺯﺎﻨﺟ ،٬ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛ ﻢﻟوﻭ ﺪﺟﻮﯾﻳ ﺔﻣﺮﻜﻌﻟ ﻦﻣ ﮫﻪﻠﻤﺤﯾﻳ.  
159 Original text: 
 
  209 
(4) ʿIkrima and Kuthayyir ʿAzza died on the same day. When their funeral pro-
cessions began, I didn’t hear of any woman or man in the city who stayed behind. 
He said: It was said: Today the most expressive of people and most knowledgea-
ble of people died. He said: The woman were overcome with sorrowful tears and 
mentioned ʿAzza in their dirges for him. Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad bin ʿAlī160 said: 
They sent me off to Kuthayyir’s funeral to promote it. He said: We started push-
ing the women away from it [the funeral] and Muḥammad bin ʿAlī started to hit 
them with his sleeve: Bow down, Companions of Yūsuf! One of the women 
stepped up to him and said: Son of God’s Messenger, you are right! We are the 
Companions of Yūsuf, and we were better to him than you were. He said: When 
he left, she was brought to him like a spark of fire. Muḥammad bin ʿAlī said to 
her: Are you the one saying that you are better to Yūsuf than us? She said: Yes! 
Will you guarantee me protection from your anger, Son of God’s Messenger? He 
said: You are safe from my anger, go ahead! She said: We, Son of God’s Messen-
ger, invited him to the pleasures of eating, drinking, enjoyment, and delight. You 
                                                                                                                                            
تﺕﺎﻣ ﺔﻣﺮﻜﻋ ﻰﻟﻮﻣ ﻦﺑاﺍ سﺱﺎﺒﻋ ﺮﯿﻴﺜﻛوﻭ ﻦﺑ ﺪﺒﻋ ﻦﻤﺣﺮﻟاﺍ ﻲﻋاﺍﺰﺨﻟاﺍ ﺐﺣﺎﺻ ةﺓﺰﻋ ﻲﻓ مﻡﻮﯾﻳ ﺪﺣاﺍوﻭ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻨﺳ ﺲﻤﺧ ،٬ﺔﺋﺎﻣوﻭ 
ﺎﻤﮭﻬﺘﯾﻳأﺃﺮﻓ ﺎﻌﯿﻴﻤﺟ ﻲﻠﺻ ﯿﻴﻠﻋﺎﻤﮭﻬ ﻲﻓ مﻡﻮﯾﻳ ﺪﺣاﺍوﻭ ﺪﻌﺑ ﺮﮭﻬﻈﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ ﻊﺿﻮﻣ ،٬ﺰﺋﺎﻨﺠﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﻘﻓ سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ: تﺕﺎﻣ مﻡﻮﯿﻴﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﻘﻓأﺃ سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ ﺮﻌﺷأﺃوﻭ 
سﺱﺎﻨﻟاﺍ.  
160 Muḥammad bin ʿAlī Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn bin al-Ḥusayn al-Ṭālibī al-Hāshimī al-Qurayshī 
(d. 732) is the fifth Imam of Twelver Shi’ism.  
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 ﻋﻦ رﺭﺟﻞ وﻭﻻ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺪﯾﻳﻨﺔ اﺍﻣﺮأﺃةﺓ ﺗﺨﻠﻔﺖ ﻋﻠﻤﺖ ﻓﻤﺎ ﺟﻨﺎزﺯﺗﺎھﮪﮬﻫﻤﺎ،٬ ﻓﺄﺧﺮﺟﺖ وﻭاﺍﺣﺪ،٬ ﯾﻳﻮمﻡ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺰةﺓ وﻭﻛﺜﯿﻴﺮ ﻋﻜﺮﻣﺔ ﻣﺎتﺕ
 ﻋﺰةﺓ وﻭﯾﻳﺬﻛﺮنﻥ ﯾﻳﺒﻜﯿﻴﻨﮫﻪ ﻛﺜﯿﻴﺮ ﺟﻨﺎزﺯةﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺍﻟﻨﺴﺎء وﻭﻏﻠﺐ :ﻗﺎلﻝ .اﺍﻟﻨﺎسﺱ وﻭأﺃﻋﻠﻢ اﺍﻟﻨﺎسﺱ أﺃﺷﻌﺮ اﺍﻟﯿﻴﻮمﻡ ﻣﺎتﺕ وﻭﻗﯿﻴﻞ :ﻗﺎلﻝ .ﺟﻨﺎزﺯﺗﯿﻴﮭﻬﻤﺎ
 اﺍﻟﻨﺴﺎء ﻋﻨﮭﻬﺎ ﻧﺪﻓﻊ ﻓﺠﻌﻠﻨﺎ :ﻗﺎلﻝ .ﻷرﺭﻓﮭﻬﺎ ﻛﺜﯿﻴﺮ ﺟﻨﺎزﺯةﺓ ﻋﻦ ﻟﻲ اﺍﻓﺮﺟﻮاﺍ :ﻋﻠﻲ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺟﻌﻔﺮ أﺃﺑﻮ ﻓﻘﺎلﻝ :ﻗﺎلﻝ .ﻟﮫﻪ ﻧﺪﺑﺘﮭﻬﻦ ﻓﻲ
 رﺭﺳﻮلﻝ ﺑﻦ ﯾﻳﺎ :ﻓﻘﺎﻟﺖ ﻣﻨﮭﻬﻦ اﺍﻣﺮأﺃةﺓ ﻟﮫﻪ ﻓﺎﻧﺘﺪﺑﺖ .ﯾﻳﻮﺳﻒ ﺻﻮاﺍﺣﺒﺎتﺕ ﯾﻳﺎ ﺗﻨﺤﯿﻴﻦ :وﻭﯾﻳﻘﻮلﻝ ﺑﻜﻤﮫﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﯾﻳﻀﺮﺑﮭﻬﻦ وﻭﺟﻌﻞ
 ﺣﺘﻰ ﺑﮭﻬﺎ اﺍﺣﺘﻔﻆ :ﻣﻮاﺍﻟﯿﻴﮫﻪ ﻟﺒﻌﺾ ﺟﻌﻔﺮ أﺃﺑﻮ :ﻓﻘﺎلﻝ :ﻗﺎلﻝ .ﻟﮫﻪ ﻣﻨﻜﻢ ﺧﯿﻴﺮ ﻟﮫﻪ ﻛﻨﺎ وﻭﻗﺪ ﯾﻳﻮﺳﻒ ﻟﺼﻮاﺍﺣﺒﺎتﺕ إﺇﻧﺎ ﺻﺪﻗﺖ،٬ ﻟﻘﺪ ﷲ
 اﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﻠﺔ أﺃﻧﺖ :ﻋﻠﻲ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻟﮭﻬﺎ ﻓﻘﺎلﻝ .اﺍﻟﻨﺎرﺭ ﺷﺮاﺍرﺭةﺓ ﻛﺄﻧﮭﻬﺎ اﺍﻟﻤﺮأﺃةﺓ ﺑﺘﻠﻚ أﺃﺗﻲ اﺍﻧﺼﺮفﻑ ﻓﻠﻤﺎ :ﻗﺎلﻝ .اﺍﻧﺼﺮﻓﻨﺎ إﺇذﺫاﺍ ﺑﮭﻬﺎ ﻲﺗﺠﯿﻴﺌﻨ
 ﯾﻳﺎ ﻧﺤﻦ :ﻗﺎﻟﺖ .ﻓﺄﺑﯿﻴﻨﻲ ﻏﻀﺒﻲ ﻣﻦ آﺁﻣﻨﺔ أﺃﻧﺖ :ﻗﺎلﻝ ?ﷲ رﺭﺳﻮلﻝ ﺑﻦ ﯾﻳﺎ ﻏﻀﺒﻚ ﺗﺆﻣﻨﻨﻲ ﻧﻌﻢ :ﻗﺎﻟﺖ ?ﻣﻨﺎ ﺧﯿﻴﺮ ﻟﯿﻴﻮﺳﻒ إﺇﻧﻜﻦ
 اﺍﻟﺠﺐ ﻓﻲ أﺃﻟﻘﯿﻴﺘﻤﻮهﻩ اﺍﻟﺮﺟﺎلﻝ ﻣﻌﺸﺮ ﯾﻳﺎ وﻭأﺃﻧﺘﻢ وﻭاﺍﻟﺘﻨﻌﻢ،٬ وﻭاﺍﻟﺘﻤﺘﻊ وﻭاﺍﻟﻤﺸﺮبﺏ اﺍﻟﻤﻄﻌﻢ ﻣﻦ اﺍﻟﻠﺬاﺍتﺕ إﺇﻟﻰ دﺩﻋﻮﻧﺎهﻩ ﷲ رﺭﺳﻮلﻝ ﺑﻦ
 ﺗﻐﺎﻟﺐ وﻭﻟﻦ دﺩرﺭكﻙ ! :ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻓﻘﺎلﻝ ? أﺃرﺭأﺃفﻑ وﻭﺑﮫﻪ أﺃﺣﻨﻰ ﻋﻠﯿﻴﮫﻪ ﻛﺎنﻥ ﻓﺄﯾﻳﻨﺎ .اﺍﻟﺴﺠﻦ ﻓﻲ وﻭﺣﺒﺴﺘﻤﻮهﻩ اﺍﻷﺛﻤﺎنﻥ ﺑﺄﺑﺨﺲ وﻭﺑﻌﺘﻤﻮهﻩ
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We find no trace of the negative sentiments toward Kuthayyir with which Iṣfahānī has 
bombarded us in these final pages of “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi.” In the first 
of these akhbār, the prospect of his death is met with sorrow. We find people crying be-
side Kuthayyir’s deathbed, and Kuthayyir speaks to his mourners as a prophet promising 
his resurrection from the dead: “after forty nights, you will hear my soles on the street 
coming back to you” (Iṣfahānī 9: 47). His promise of returning after death recalls the 
promise of Jesus’ resurrection and eventual final return as well as the prophesied return 
of Mahdī, an intertextual link that also recalls “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir.” Similarly, 
Kuthayyir’s reference to forty nights recalls the length of time Mūsā spent on Mount Si-
nai when he received the ten commandments as well as the time Jesus spent fasting in the 
desert, here recalling the story of Qays bin Dharīḥ’s period of resistance in “Dhikr Qays 
bin Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi.” Although we had encountered Kuthayyir claim-
ing to be the reincarnation of Jonah in the earlier akhbār, the narrators here do not stage 
these allusions to prophets as a character’s claim to prophesy. Rather, they infuse the nar-
rative with this heightened language. He is still the same self-aggrandizing Kuthayyir on 
his deathbed, but the audience is no longer alone in granting Kuthayyir understanding in 
his grandiose sense of self.  
                                                                                                                                            
ةﺓاﺍﺮﻣإﺇ ﻻإﺇ ﺖﺒﻠﻏ. ﻢﺛ لﻝﺎﻗ ﺎﮭﻬﻟ: ﻚﻟأﺃ ﻞﻌﺑ? ﺖﻟﺎﻗ: ﻲﻟ ﻦﻣ لﻝﺎﺟﺮﻟاﺍ ﻦﻣ ﺎﻧأﺃ ﮫﻪﻠﻌﺑ. لﻝﺎﻗ: لﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﻮﺑأﺃ ﺮﻔﻌﺟ: ،٬ﺖﻗﺪﺻ ﻚﻠﺜﻣ ﻦﻣ ﻚﻠﻤﺗ 
ﺎﮭﻬﻠﻌﺑ ﻻوﻭ ﺎﮭﻬﻜﻠﻤﯾﻳ. لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺎﻤﻠﻓ ﺖﻓﺮﺼﻧاﺍ لﻝﺎﻗ ﻞﺟرﺭ ﻦﻣ مﻡﻮﻘﻟاﺍ: هﻩﺬھﮪﮬﻫ ﺐﻨﯾﻳزﺯ ﺖﻨﺑ ﺐﻘﯿﻴﻌﻣ.  
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 The second, third, and fourth of these akhbār relate the coincidence of 
Kuthayyir’s death with that of the well-respected faqīh (Islamic scholar) ʿIkrima of Ibn 
ʿAbbās, a coincidence which links them and suggests their equal status in their respective 
fields. The first relates that Kuthayyir’s funeral was so well-attended that no one was left 
to carry ʿIkrima’s body in his funeral procession, while the other two relate that both fu-
nerals were well-attended, as their deaths represented the deaths of “the most expressive” 
and “the most knowledgeable” of people. The fourth proceeds to dramatize the great ado-
ration that the women of the city in particular expressed for Kuthayyir. This adoration is 
performed through a discussion of the women’s devotion to the prophet Yūsuf, who 
serves as an allusion to Kuthayyir. Yūsuf’s legendary good looks made him irresistible to 
women, and we find Kuthayyir similarly irresistible to women here, despite his famously 
bad looks.  
 Iṣfahānī concludes “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” with a khabar praising 
the ability of Kuthayyir’s poetry to move one to an ecstatic loss of self control (ṭarab)̧. In 
it, the architect and famed singer ʿUmar al-Wādī recounts hearing someone singing 
Kuthayyir’s poetry, poetry he had “never heard the likes of before,” causing him to nearly 
fall off his camel in ecstasy (ṭarab).163 Having begun with unequivocal criticism of 
                                                
163 I almost fell off my camel in ecstasy (ṭarab). I said: By God I would give one of my 
limbs to have access to this voice. I set off in its direction, which turned out to be coming 
from a sheep herder. I asked him to repeat the verses for me. He said: Yes! If I had with 
me something to have you recite from, I would not repeat it and instead make it your reci-
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Kuthayyir’s appearance and character, the chapter ends with unequivocal praise of his 
poetic skill and legacy. In death, Kuthayyir receives the admiration, respect, and sympa-
thy that people denied him in life—he is revered by women as Yūsuf and respected by 
people, even the likes of ʿUmar al-Wādī, for his poetic ability, and his death is mourned 
by the people of the city at least as much as ʿIkrima.  
CONCLUSION 
 The story of Kuthayyir ʿAzza in the Aghānī is not the story of a man who pre-
tended to love a woman named ʿAzza but the story of a man who claimed to love a wom-
an named ʿAzza and whose love for her was doubted. The question of his “sincerity” is 
left open, as is the judgment of his manners and behaviors. “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa 
Nasabihi” calls upon its audience, like the “rhizomatic” text as conceptualized by 
                                                                                                                                            
tation. When I sing it while hungry, I am satiated, while thirsty, I am quenched, while 
lonely, I find company, while lazy, I am energized. He said: So he repeated them to me 
until I took possession of them, and I took nothing else but those verses with me when I 
entered the city. (Iṣfahānī 9: 50) 
Original text: 
تﺕﺪﻜﻓ ﻂﻘﺳأﺃ ﻦﻋ ﻲﺘﻠﺣاﺍرﺭ ،٬ﺎﺑﺮطﻁ ﺖﻠﻗوﻭ: ﷲوﻭ ﻦﺴﻤﺘﻟﻷ لﻝﻮﺻﻮﻟاﺍ ﻰﻟإﺇ اﺍﺬھﮪﮬﻫ تﺕﻮﺼﻟاﺍ ﻮﻟوﻭ بﺏﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺬﺑ ﻮﻀﻋ ﻦﻣ ،٬ﻲﺋﺎﻀﻋأﺃ 
ﺖﻤﻤﯿﻴﺘﻓ ﮫﻪﺘﻤﺳ اﺍذﺫﺈﻓ عﻉاﺍرﺭ ﻲﻓ ،٬ﻢﻨﻏ ﮫﻪﺘﻟﺄﺴﻓ ﮫﻪﺗدﺩﺎﻋإﺇ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻠﻋ. لﻝﺎﻗ: ﻢﻌﻧ ﻮﻟوﻭ ﻲﻧﺮﻀﺣ ىﻯﺮﻗ ﮫﻪﻜﯾﻳﺮﻗأﺃ ﺎﻣ ،٬ﮫﻪﺗﺪﻋأﺃ ﻲﻨﻜﻟوﻭ ﮫﻪﻠﻌﺟأﺃ 
،٬كﻙاﺍﺮﻗ ﺎﻤﺑﺮﻓ ﺖﻤﻧﺮﺗ ﮫﻪﺑ ﺎﻧأﺃوﻭ نﻥﺎﺛﺮﻏ ،٬ﻊﺒﺷﺄﻓ نﻥﺎﺸﻄﻋوﻭ ،٬ىﻯوﻭرﺭﺄﻓ ﺶﺣﻮﺘﺴﻣوﻭ ،٬ﺲﻧﺂﻓ نﻥﻼﺴﻛوﻭ ﺄﻓﻂﺸﻧ. لﻝﺎﻗ: ﺎﻤھﮪﮬﻫدﺩﺎﻋﺄﻓ ﮫﻪﯿﻴﻠﻋ 
ﻰﺘﺣ ،٬ﺎﻤﮭﻬﺗﺬﺧأﺃ ﺎﻤﻓ نﻥﺎﻛ يﻱدﺩاﺍزﺯ ﻰﺘﺣ ﺖﺠﻟوﻭ ﺔﻨﯾﻳﺪﻤﻟاﺍ ﺎﻤھﮪﮬﻫﺮﯿﻴﻏ.   
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Deleuze and Guattari, to approach this openness not only by engaging in the process of 
knowledge production it allows by also by maintaining its openness in doing so.  
 The “Dhikr Akhbār Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi” foregrounds the subjective experi-
ences and responses of its characters, narrators, and audiences, roles whose boundaries 
are themselves blurred. Iṣfahānī confronts us as an audience with the extensive invective 
and sarcasm narrators and characters direct at Kuthayyir throughout the chapter, which he 
often follows with a poetic response from Kuthayyir’s mouth. This foregrounding of sub-
jective responses provokes us to add our own voices in responding to the text and partici-
pate in the production of knowledge, while also becoming aware of our vulnerabilities, 
setting us up to sympathize with the much-mocked Kuthayyir. Indeed, Iṣfahānī stages 
truth as contextually and socially contingent. We find no authoritative figure nor commu-
nal consensus from which an objective truth can be imagined. Iṣfahānī’s curating of the 
akhbār emphasizes communal practices that place a premium on artful, performative ren-
derings of people and events. Furthermore, Iṣfahānī’s treatment of the doubts surrounding 
Kuthayyir’s “sincerity” offers deception as a force that counterbalances the tyranny of 
authoritative knowledge. 
 As tenth-century Arabo-Islamic society experienced the decentralization of au-
thority and the increased influence of the middle strata of society (Ali, “Abbasid Public 
Sphere”), akhbār texts continued to reevaluate the process of knowledge production and 
accepted behavior norms. With the spread of adab culture, the courts no longer had a 
monopoly on these social practices and more individuals had access to participate in them 
(Ali, Abbasid Public Sphere 475-476), bringing along with them their own notions of 
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norms and mores. The Kuthayyir ʿAzza story in the Aghānī promotes relative truths pro-
duced through social practices by suggesting that truth has been relative and socially pro-
duced since the advent of Islam. With new political leaders and alliances, as well as new 
colleagues to contend with at social gatherings, knowing whom one could trust became 
particularly crucial for political, social, and financial success in the tenth century. The 
Kuthayyir ʿAzza story in the Aghānī reflects the anxieties and fears around the possibility 
of deception and distortion of the truth in the new social and political configurations of 
the time. 
 Questions about how to deal with ugly, lying “trolls” like Kuthayyir have raised 
similar anxieties and fears expressed in current debates in America about social practices 
on the internet, from comment threads to viral stories, as well as political practices, such 
as political campaigns. While Iṣfahānī’s retelling of the Kuthayyir ʿAzza story reflects a 
community with similar concerns, it offers an alternative perspective toward them. Rather 
than advocating the elimination of such social practices to avoid distorting the truth and 
threatening the authority of hosts, Iṣfahānī’s text points to “ugly trolls” like Kuthayyir as 
constant reminders of the relativity of truth, not the cause of its relativity. The curation of 
akhbār in the Aghānī exploits Kuthayyir’s many apparent faults to earn sympathy for the 
flawed, talented poet. In the face of criticism and accusations of “insincerity” and decep-
tion, his poetry is allowed to speak for itself and speak for him, suggesting a role for 
judgments based on evaluations of artfulness and skill in poetically rendering a subjective 
defense of truths.  
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Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I have presented approaches to the Aghānī that attempt to open 
up the text beyond the bounds of either/or binaries that have tended to dominate its recep-
tion in modern scholarship. In attending to Iṣfahānī’s curation of akhbār, isnād, and poet-
ry, I have offered receptions of the Aghānī’s chapters devoted to four ʿudhrī love poets 
that engage with the text’s performance of these stories as open, malleable, and unsettled.  
 Throughout the dissertation, I engage with Bakhtin’s theory of “dialogism” to sug-
gest that Iṣfahānī’s orchestration of voices in these chapters urge the audience to partici-
pate in his performance of the stories of these tragic love poets. The layered multivoiced-
ness of Iṣfahānī’s Kitāb al-Aghānī invites a reception in which the audience finds itself 
implicated in the stakes of these stories. The many voices of these four chapters of the 
Aghānī raise a variety of questions salient to human experience, and I have pointed to 
those that I articulate as questions about “madness,” “authenticity,” and “sincerity.” Like 
Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome, Iṣfahānī’s Aghānī, as with many akhbār texts, has mul-
tiple entryways and exits and foregrounds processes, relations, and happenings. As such, 
the Aghānī opens up relationships of reciprocity with its audience. The text provokes its 
audience to confront its own human experience and transfer the affects the confrontation 
produces back onto the text. The story of Majnūn Laylā in the Aghānī invites us into and 
opens up madness, leaves us muddled, and provokes us to a kind of mad wonder. In the 
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Aghānī’s Qays Lubnā story, Iṣfahānī betrays and exposes our expectations of finality, co-
hesion, and a rationality free from madness. Meanwhile, Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s rootedness as a 
Bedouin and thus the very notion of “authenticity” frays and unravels in Iṣfahānī’s narra-
tion of the story of the poet “with the frayed rope.” Then, the story of Kuthayyir ʿAzza in 
the Aghānī invites us to reconsider “sincerity” and to confront our human vulnerabilities 
by inspiring our sympathy for an ugly, lying extremist.  
 In entering into a conversation with and among these four Aghānī chapters, I have 
attended to the nuances of Iṣfahānī’s staging of a range of possible articulations of human 
experiences that free the text from the binds of either/or binaries. I have sought to engage 
with the way in which Iṣfahānī raises these question about “madness,” “authenticity,” and 
“sincerity” through his curation of akhbār by considering the performative impact of the 
Aghānī’s openness, malleability, and unsettledness. In Chapter 1, “Iṣfahānī’s Invitation to 
Madness in the Story of Majnūn Laylā,” I suggest that by confronting us with unresolv-
ing narrative divergence, Iṣfahānī’s lengthy introduction to the Majnūn Laylā romance in 
“Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu” stages Majnūn as an enigma and invites us 
to madness. In particular, this confrontation with the unfamiliar provokes a kind of mad 
wonder (ʿajab) in the audience, which reenacts Majnūn’s pursuit of his unattainable be-
loved Laylā in its parallel pursuit of the unattainable madman/Majnūn. As I suggest in 
Chapter 2 “A Touch of Something: The Story of Majnūn Laylā.” if we respond to this 
invitation to madness in “Akhbār Majnūn Banī ʿĀmir wa Nasabuhu,” we find that mad-
ness itself opens up. In becoming mad, we join a boundless world of madmen and mad-
ness. When being infected with madness—which Iṣfahānī stages as an unstable marker of 
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counter-normativity (lawtha)—becomes the norm, we must reconsider cultural norma-
tivities. In Chapter 3, “Problematizing Rationality in Iṣfahānī's Qays Lubnā Narrative,” I 
suggest that the Aghānī’s presentation of the Qays Lubnā story in “Dhikr Qays bin 
Dharīḥ wa Nasabihi wa Akhbārihi” dramatizes the breakdown of normative expectations. 
By arranging akhbār into a collective narrative, Iṣfahānī stages the coherence and cau-
sality presumed in “rationality” as inevitably unsustainable.   
 In Chapter 4, “Reframing the ‘Authenticity’ of Dhū ‘l-Rumma in the Aghānī,” I 
suggest that the “authenticity” at stake in “Dhikr Dhī ‘l-Rumma wa Khabarihi” is that of 
the poet’s rootedness (aṣāla), particularly his rootedness as a Bedouin, which takes on 
existential importance for Arabic poetry (al-shiʿr) and the burgeoning Arabo-Islamic cul-
ture in both the 8th and 10th centuries. Iṣfahānī presents akhbār that frustrate attempts at 
getting at an evaluation of the “authenticity” of Dhū ‘l-Rumma’s Bedouinness. In doing 
so, he stages rootedness as a Bedouin as inevitably unrooted or of many roots. This un-
rootedness and multi-rootedness of Bedouin “authenticity” lift the “seal” from his poetry 
and thus Arabic poetry in general. In Chapter 5, “Sincerity in the Story of Kuthayyir 
ʿAzza,” I also consider the implications of what is at stake in Iṣfahānī’s curation of 
akhbār for Umayyad and Abbasid societies. In particular, I suggest that in “Dhikr Akhbār 
Kuthayyir wa Nasabihi,” Iṣfahānī stages the poet’s “sincerity” as the prevailing concern 
of the many, layered voices of narrators and characters of the lore and calls the notion of 
“sincerity” into question.   
 Because I have so focused my gaze in this dissertation upon Iṣfahānī’s Aghānī, my 
admiration for the text and Iṣfahānī’s role as curator of it is undoubtedly quite evident. 
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What is likely much less evident is my view that the Aghānī is not a particularly excep-
tional akhbār text in terms of its openness to receptions that engage with its performance 
of knowledge as open, malleable, and unsettled. I would like to emphasize here, then, that 
akhbār texts as a genus and as products of a culture of performance, i.e., adab culture, 
tend to stage knowledge as such. In attending to akhbārīs’ curation of akhbār, isnād, and 
poetry in other so-called reference works, we are likely to encounter novel approaches to 
literature and its relationship with the world that embrace seemingly diverse fields of 
knowledge and human experience as overlapping and evolving.  
 More precisely, my hope is that in this dissertation I have pointed to a conversa-
tion with the Aghānī that invites us to reconsider our expectations of and approach to not 
only akhbār texts and premodern Arabic literature but also perhaps our expectations of 
and approach to literature in general and our own interactions with and experiences of the 
world. 
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